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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ACHIEVING ZERO ACCIDENTS – A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR 
CONTINUOUS SAFETY IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY  
by 
Rizwan Ul-Haque Farooqui 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Syed M. Ahmed, Major Professor 
In the U.S., construction accidents remain a significant economic and social problem. 
Despite recent improvement, the Construction industry, generally, has lagged behind 
other industries in implementing safety as a total management process for achieving zero 
accidents and developing a high-performance safety culture. One aspect of this total 
approach to safety that has frustrated the construction industry the most has been 
“measurement”, which involves identifying and quantifying the factors that critically 
influence safe work behaviors. The basic problem attributed is the difficulty in assessing 
what to measure and how to measure it – particularly the intangible aspects of safety. 
Without measurement, the notion of continuous improvement is hard to follow. 
This research was undertaken to develop a strategic framework for the measurement 
and continuous improvement of total safety in order to achieve and sustain the goal of 
zero accidents, while improving the quality, productivity and the competitiveness of the 
construction industry as it moves forward. The research based itself on an integral model 
of total safety that allowed decomposition of safety into interior and exterior 
characteristics using a multiattribute analysis technique. Statistical relationships between 
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total safety dimensions and safety performance (measured by safe work behavior) were 
revealed through a series of latent variables (factors) that describe the total safety 
environment of a construction organization. A structural equation model (SEM) was 
estimated for the latent variables to quantify relationships among them and between these 
total safety determinants and safety performance of a construction organization. The 
developed SEM constituted a strategic framework for identifying, measuring, and 
continuously improving safety as a total concern for achieving and sustaining the goal of 
zero accidents. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General 
In the U.S., construction accidents remain a significant economic and social problem, 
with over 400,000 injuries and 1,200 deaths annually (BLS 2010). Compared to the high 
risk sectors, construction involves frequent but relatively small scale accidents, with 
many and diverse hazard sources. Construction work involves a large number of work 
processes that need to adapt to the project-specific requirements and context. As a result, 
construction work processes are loosely-defined, unlike the well-defined procedures of 
the high-risk systems (such as aviation, nuclear and chemical plants). Furthermore, the 
complex, dynamic, and often unpredictable construction tasks and environments, 
combined with high production pressures and workload create high likelihood of errors.  
With the continuous pressures for speed, productivity and competitiveness, the 
challenge for construction researchers and practitioners is to develop work systems that 
are simultaneously highly productive and highly reliable and can function safely and 
effectively in the dynamic, complex and competitive conditions of construction projects. 
(Mitropoulos et al., 2009). This requires a more fundamental understanding of the 
workplace elements and processes that generate accidents, and new approaches to safety 
management. In order to achieve a high-performance safety culture, it is critical that 
construction organizations must not approach construction safety and health as just 
another step in avoiding unwanted accidents or federal fines, but as a strategic tool, that if 
implemented effectively, has the potential to maximize competitiveness and profit. This 
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strategic approach to construction safety requires an assessment of safety from a total 
perspective, i.e. an assessment of all aspects determining the total safety of an 
organization. This treatment allows a fundamental understanding of the key factor sets 
that govern safe behaviors of workers, and aids in determining the underlying key factors 
that control these behaviors. 
This integral or total approach to safety can be instrumental in providing excellence 
in construction safety through continuous improvement by the total involvement and 
dedication of each individual who is in any way a part of business. It is a structured 
approach to improvement. If correctly applied, it assists a construction company in 
continuously improving its total safety performance and achieving the goal of zero 
accidents in their organizations. 
1.2 Background and Motivation 
Great strides towards a safe workplace environment have been made in the 
construction industry over the last few decades. Majority of construction companies have 
comprehensive safety plans, but the quality of the plan does not necessarily correlate to a 
company’s safety performance. Written safety plans have the potential to be very 
effective, but companies must go beyond the safety plan and create a true “safety culture” 
(Hinze, 1997). 
Most current safety practices in the construction sector are based on the normative 
approach (compliance with prescribed safety rules) (Mitropoulos et al., 2009). They focus 
on measures to control hazards, and means to control workers’ behaviors so that they 
comply with prescribed safe practices. This approach emphasizes (1) management 
commitment and policies to prevent unsafe conditions and (2) workers’ training and 
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motivation to prevent unsafe behaviors. Safety programs – such as contractor’s selection, 
training, inspections, motivation, enforcement, etc., as well as efforts towards safety 
culture, and behavior-based safety aim at increasing the workers’ compliance with 
prescribed ‘safe behaviors.’ This approach has resulted in significant improvements, but 
is still nowhere close to reaching the zero-accident goal.  
While the traditional application of normative approach aims at creating safe work 
behaviors, it ignores how the characteristics of the individual, production system and 
team processes influence the work behaviors and affect the possibility of errors and 
accidents (Mitropoulos et al., 2009). First, it does not account for the production and 
economic pressures for efficiency, and the workers’ natural tendency for least effort. 
Second, the normative approach does not account for the factors that shape the work 
situations such as, individual commitment of a worker or teamwork practices of a crew. 
These factors generate the situations the workers face, and the crew’s ability to cope with 
these situations. Rasmussen et al. (1994) explains how the workers’ behaviors tend to 
migrate closer to the “boundary of loss of control” due to two primary pressures: the 
production pressures for increased efficiency, and the tendency for least effort, which is a 
response to increased workload. Safety programs attempt to counter the above pressures 
and prescribe safe behaviors away from the boundary. However, the pressures that push 
workers toward the boundary require that safety efforts are continuous. From a practical 
perspective, a key concern is that at the work level, there is a continuous tension between 
safety and production or costs; in the short term, such conflicts are usually resolved in 
favor of production, because production efforts have relatively certain outcomes and 
receive rapid and rewarding feedback (Reason 1990). A study of safety on international 
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projects (Mahalingam and Levitt 2007) also illustrated that economic pressures were 
stronger determinants of work behavior than the safety regulations.  
As a result of these pressures, efforts to improve safety through technical 
advancements (new methods and improved safety features) tend to be ineffective because 
the behavior “migrates” close to the new boundary of loss of control (Mitropoulos et al., 
2009). Thus, human adaptation compensates for safety improvements. This phenomenon 
of “risk homeostasis” has been observed in transportation, navigation, and traffic research 
and explains why technological safety improvements have not generated the expected 
improvements in safety (Wilde 1985; Fuller 2005). Furthermore, in interdependent 
systems, the boundary of safe behavior for one actor depends on the possible violation of 
defenses by other actors (Rasmussen 1997). Thus, the stage for an accident may be 
prepared as a result of several actors’ behaviors that erode the “error margin.” 
The current safety strategies in construction, which are largely oriented towards 
technical advancements, have proven to be inadequate for the increasingly competitive 
and dynamic conditions of the workplace (Mitropoulos et al., 2009). The challenge for 
researchers and practitioners is to develop total safety systems that are simultaneously 
highly productive and highly reliable and can function effectively in the dynamic, 
complex, and competitive conditions that construction projects face. This requires a 
treatment of safety from a total perspective taking into consideration the impact on safety 
of organizational work culture, production pressures, team processes, individual 
characteristics and the like. This treatment will allow a fundamental understanding of the 
key factor sets that govern safe behaviors of workers, and will aid in determining the 
underlying key factors that control these behaviors. This would allow a strategic move 
 5
towards a high-performance and continuously improving safety culture, with the result of 
achieving and sustaining the goal of zero accidents. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The Construction industry, generally, has lagged behind other industries in 
implementing safety management as a total process for achieving zero accidents and 
developing a high-performance safety culture. The main reason for this has been the 
perception that safety as a total management process is hard to implement in the 
construction industry. One aspect of this total approach to safety that has frustrated the 
construction industry the most has been “total safety measurement”, which involves 
identifying and measuring the factors that critically influence safe behaviors. The basic 
problem attributed is the difficulty in assessing what to measure and how to measure it – 
particularly the intangible aspects of safety. Without measurement, the notion of 
continuous improvement is hard to follow. 
Traditionally, safety on construction sites is measured by level of implementation of 
safety rules and procedures, and hazard control mechanisms. This systems approach to 
safety measurement fails to address the “person”, “culture", and “behavior” components 
associated with total safety. Recent advancements in construction safety, such as the 
move towards “safety culture” and “behavior-based safety” have proven to generate 
better results; however, these approaches also fail to acknowledge safety as an “integral” 
or “total” process encompassing multiple dimensions, i.e. person, culture, behavior and 
process, which cumulatively determine the true safety performance of a construction 
company. Furthermore, safety performance on construction sites is usually measured 
using “lagging” indicators (such as accidents) and not by using “leading” indicators (such 
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as safe work behaviors). The effect of adopting these traditional approaches to safety has 
been three-fold:  
1. Construction companies invest all/ major safety related efforts on reducing the 
number of accidents/ injuries by adopting related control mechanisms and 
incentive/ disincentive mechanisms based on accidents/ injuries, rather than 
investing in safety efforts for inculcating total safety in the workforce and 
adopting measures for “total” safety process analysis and improvement in order to 
achieve sustainable safety;  
a. Construction companies (and administrative bodies observing their safe 
behaviors, such as OSHA) measure their safety performance based on 
number of accidents/ injuries over a certain period of time (number of lost 
work hours) and not in terms of the company processes being safe or 
unsafe. Hence the leading indicator to safe performance is taken as 
“reduced number of accidents” rather than “safe behaviors”. It is 
important to note here that, although the earlier can be a result of good 
safety performance, it can very well be a representative of accidents not 
reported or accidents not happening because the near-misses have 
fortunately not been converted to accidents. 
2. Construction workers tend to hide their unsafe acts (injuries) to the extent possible 
because until they do not reveal their unsafe acts/ injuries to top management, 
they are likely to be considered as safe workers and will not be punished for 
unsafe behaviors. This worker attitude shifts their focus from behaving safely to 
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hiding unsafe acts, which, although may reduce the number of accidents reported, 
will not help in inducing total safety culture in the workers. 
3. Construction workers find themselves working in an environment where, although 
they usually have an incentive to act safely, do not have any obligation, 
commitment or motivation to see to it that their co-workers are also behaving 
safely. 
Considering above, it can be inferred that it is a dire need that safety be addressed 
from the perspective of “total measurement and improvement” rather than from the 
perspective of “controlling the outcome (accidents)”. This need translates to the objective 
of developing a measurement model – with tools and methodologies for the identification 
and measurement of factors determining total safety for continuous safety improvement.   
Another aspect of this total approach to safety that has frustrated the construction 
industry is that there exists no common and overarching methodology to implement 
safety as a total management process. Consequently, contractors do not fully recognize, 
and realize, the value of strategic safety management as a total process. A direct 
consequence of this has been that safety is usually considered the responsibility of “safety 
personnel” (such as safety department, safety director, safety manager, etc.) in an 
organization and is seldom considered the responsibility of “everyone” in the company. 
Workers usually do not find themselves responsible for their unsafe acts unless 1) they 
get converted to incidents, and 2) they are observed as incidents by the safety personnel.   
With the above problem statement established, it is obvious to state that it is highly 
significant to demonstrate how a strategic framework for safety improvement in the 
construction industry based on an integral or total approach to safety can be developed. 
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This framework is oriented towards enforcing a total safety culture in construction 
organizations. The core objective of the framework is to provide a mechanism to measure 
total safety using leading indicators and improve total safety by improving the underlying 
factors influencing safe behaviors. This would allow a strategic move towards a high-
performance and continuously improving safety culture, with the result of achieving and 
sustaining the goal of zero accidents. 
1.4 Research Hypothesis 
It is the premise of this research that individual intentions as well as group culture 
(corporate safety culture) have as much, or more, to do with the safety performance than 
the safety program. This research develops itself on an integral approach to safety 
containing four dimensions (person, culture, behavior and process) that collectively 
define the interior and exterior pursuits necessary to determine the true safety 
performance of a construction organization. It is hypothesized that all four pursuits offer 
complementary, rather than contradictory, perspectives. That is, it is possible for all to be 
correct and necessary for a complete account of safety existence. Also, each by itself 
offers only a partial view of reality. Hence an integral or total view of construction safety 
can only be achieved if integration is made of these four areas of knowledge through an 
acknowledgement of them as the four fundamental dimensions of safety. The research 
then endeavors into correlating these total safety dimensions to the safety performance of 
a company. It is further hypothesized that all four pursuits by their very nature cultivate 
successful safety performance. While these hypotheses seem intuitive, little research has 
been conducted to specifically identify and measure critical characteristics as related to 
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all the four dimensions that, in integration, influence safety.  This research attempts to 
quantify the relationship between total safety dimensions and safety performance.  
1.5 Research Goal 
This research endeavored to develop a strategic framework to continuously improve 
safety in order to create a high-performance safety culture on construction worksites, 
with the strategic aim of achieving zero accidents. This framework took an integral or 
total approach to safety by including the key factors in all four dimensions (person, 
culture, behavior, and process) that collectively determine the true and total safety 
performance of a construction organization. Since the framework was based on 
fundamental issues and endeavored to measure the total safety environment, it is 
envisaged that the systems developed using the proposed framework would 
simultaneously be highly productive and highly reliable, in addition to being functioning 
safely and effectively in the dynamic, complex and competitive conditions of 
construction projects.  
This framework is envisaged to be instrumental for inculcating total safety 
environment in construction organizations. The core objective of the framework would be 
to provide a mechanism to measure total safety using leading indicators and improve it by 
improving the factors influencing safe behaviors. This would allow a strategic move 
towards a high-performance and continuously improving safety culture, with the result of 
achieving and sustaining the goal of zero accidents. This approach is contrasting from the 
traditional approach of treating safety from an “outcome” (accidents) perspective. The 
framework is simple in nature, facilitating its wide implementation. 
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1.6 Research Objectives 
As mentioned earlier, the primary goal of the study was to develop a strategic 
framework based on approaching safety as a total process in the construction industry for 
the measurement and continuous improvement of safety in order to achieve and sustain 
the goal of zero accidents, while improving the quality, productivity and the 
competitiveness of the construction industry as it moves forward. 
Consistent to the above goal, the objectives of the research study were: 
1. To assess the current state of safety in the construction industry and establish the 
need for addressing safety as a total process in construction contracting 
organizations; 
2. To identify the factors determining the total safety environment of a construction 
contracting organization, which are most suitable and appropriate for 
measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role in strategic safety 
improvement; and 
3. To develop a strategic framework for defining, measuring, and improving total 
safety in the construction industry in order to achieve and sustain the goal of zero 
accidents. 
1.7 Scope of Study 
Although equally applicable to other construction sectors, the study limited itself to 
commercial building construction sector only. This was owing to the limited timeframe in 
which the study needed to get completed. 
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1.8 Significance of the Research Study 
The major significance of this research seeking to develop a strategic safety 
improvement framework can be related as follows: 
1. It is important to manage the multifaceted safety risks associated with 
construction projects not only to secure work and make profit, but to also act 
responsibly and provide a safe work environment to the employees.  
2. The developed framework can be adopted by U.S. contractors to continuously 
improve their safety performance and hence achieve the goal of zero accidents. 
3. The current financial crisis has put the role of safety risk management in the 
construction business into focus. For U.S. firms engaging themselves in the 
construction business, one of the most effective means of mitigating financial 
risks is through a strategic safety management model. 
1.9 Research Methodology 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the research process was carried in a two-
phase approach. The steps followed in each of the phases are described in the following 
sub-sections. 
The main goal of the study, as stated earlier, was to demonstrate how a total safety 
framework can be developed for the measurement and continuous improvement of safety 
in order to achieve and sustain the goal of zero accidents. 
1.9.1. Research Phase I  
This phase of research was conducted to achieve objective 1 of the study. It consisted of 
the following tasks. 
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1.9.1.1. Literature Review  
In the initial process of research, a thorough literature study was conducted in order to 
form a firm basis to develop detailed questionnaire surveys. Published literature on 
current safety scenario in the construction industry and construction industry safety 
performance was thoroughly studied. Information gathered was used, in particular, to 
develop questionnaire surveys targeting construction contractors in the U.S. to assess the 
following aspects of safety in the construction industry: 
1. Current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor management in construction 
industry,  
2. Current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and foremen in 
construction industry,  
3. Criticism on OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) with 
respect to its lack of success in acting as a catalyst to incorporate total safety in a 
construction organizations, and  
4. State of adoption and implementation of safety as a total management process in a 
contracting firm’s management system. 
1.9.1.2. Data Collection  
In this phase, detailed questionnaires were developed and sent to construction 
contractors consistent to achieving objective 1 of the study. This phase provided a 
comprehensive database and valuable data on the current state of safety in the 
construction industry. 
The results obtained from surveys conducted in this phase of research were analyzed 
to establish a rationale of the need of addressing safety as a total process in the 
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construction industry. Once the rationale was established, the next phase of research was 
undertaken.   
1.9.2. Research Phase II 
The second objective of this research study was to identify the factors which could be 
instrumental in continuously improving the safety performance of construction projects. 
These factors were considered under several domains, viz., person, culture, behavior, and 
process. The factors in each domain were obtained from literature review and expert 
input. The premise was that when these factors are improved then we can attain 
continuous safety improvement in the construction industry. 
Once the multi-dimensional factors impacting safety performance were established, a 
zero-accident safety improvement framework was established based on an integral 
approach to safety. This constituted the third objective of the study. The framework 
development required collecting relevant data from the industry and applying modeling 
techniques to develop a measurement and improvement model for total safety in the 
construction industry. 
The framework provides a strategic safety performance evaluation and improvement 
mechanism for a construction firm and the construction industry. This strategic 
improvement framework facilitates total safety concepts and techniques to be 
incorporated into the existing management systems in a contracting organization. Also, it 
allows a contracting organization to focus its efforts on those factors that would 
strategically improve safety performance of the organization as well as will provide 
opportunity for continuous safety improvement and hence achieving and sustaining the 
goal of zero accidents. 
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1.10. Results 
This research has developed a strategic framework for the construction industry for 
the measurement and continuous improvement of total safety in order to achieve and 
sustain the goal of zero accidents, while improving the quality, productivity and the 
competitiveness of the construction industry as it moves forward, without adding 
complexity and administrative burden. The developed framework could be used as a tool 
by the industry to measure and continuously improve safety. It not only provides the 
construction participants a clear picture of the safety performance of the company, but 
also identifies areas to be improved. Although the framework was developed based on 
data collected from the commercial building construction sector in the U.S., the 
framework is fundamental in nature and is highly adaptable by other sectors of the 
industry as well by other nations.  
1.11 Relevance of Research to Strategic Goals of NIOSH and OSHA  
The research has direct relevance with Strategic Goal 8 of the National Construction 
Agenda (NORA 2008) of NIOSH (National Institute of Occupational Safety And Health). 
The goal states: 
“Increase understanding of factors that comprise both positive and negative 
construction safety and health cultures; and, expand the availability and use of effective 
interventions at the policy, organizational, and individual level to maintain safe work 
practices 100% of the time in the construction industry.” 
The above strategic goal consists of the following two intermediate goals: 
“Intermediate Goal 1: Create a working definition and framework for construction 
industry safety and health culture and improve understanding of the factors that 
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contribute to a positive or negative safety and health culture in the construction 
industry.” 
“Intermediate Goal 2: Develop and expand the use of validated measurement 
methods for evaluating safety culture and safety climate in the construction industry” 
Also, National Construction Agenda suggests that there is overlap between strategic 
goal 8 and Safety and Health Management in Construction. Aspects of safety and health 
management (such as top management commitment, teamwork, production systems) 
affect safety culture in an organization.  
Moreover, the research is also in line with the strategic plan put forward by OSHA 
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration) (OSHA 2008): 
“All OSHA programs are designed to reduce fatalities, injuries, and illnesses, but the 
approaches differ depending on the circumstances and nature of the underlying cause of 
the problem. Direct interventions achieve the outcomes by engaging in one-to-one 
relationships with employers and employees. Direct intervention will always be 
necessary to ensure workplace safety and health. At the same time, lasting solutions will 
come about because employers, workers, and many others embrace a workplace safety 
and health culture. From OSHA's perspective, its resources devoted to realizing this goal 
have the potential to multiply its effectiveness - by instilling safety and health values 
among the broad population and enlisting them in pursuing the same goals. Achieving 
this goal will require concerted effort, enhancement of OSHA's compliance assistance 
skills, innovation, and continued dedication to safety and health ideals.” 
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1.12 Organization of Dissertation 
The dissertation is logically organized into seven (7) chapters and appendices: 
Chapter one is the introduction and is composed of background, problem statement, 
research hypothesis, goal, objectives and scope of study.  
Chapter two comprises of literature review on current safety scenario in the U.S. 
construction industry, safety research paradigms, current safety strategies and limitations, 
and zero accident approach to safety.  
Chapter three describes in detail the methodology followed in this research.  
Chapter four discusses phase I of the data analysis process, which was undertaken to 
determine the need for addressing safety as a total management process in construction 
contracting organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents.  
Chapter five discusses phase II of the data analysis process, which was undertaken to 
identify the factors (latent variables/ constructs) determining the total safety environment 
of a construction contracting organization, which are most suitable and appropriate for 
measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role in achieving and sustaining 
the goal of zero accidents. 
Chapter six delves into the development of the strategic safety improvement model 
based on the identified factors and their associated indicators. This model is estimated 
using structural equation modeling (SEM) technique to identify latent constructs that 
describe total safety and to quantify relationships among them and between these total 
safety determinants and safety performance of a construction organization. 
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Chapter seven summarizes the conclusions of this study and recommendations for 
further research based on the research findings and insight developed during the course of 
this study.  
The appendices include the questionnaires used in the study.     
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Safety record in construction is one of the poorest (Hinze, 2005; Hallowell and 
Gambatese, 2009; Mitropoulos et al., 2009, Molenaar et al., 2009; Mohamed, 2002). 
Construction has the highest rate of accidents among all industries (Hinze, 1997; 
Sawacha et al., 1999; Ahmed et al., 2000). Traditional research in safety has largely 
focused on the prescriptive approach to safety (safety programs, compliance, rules, 
management procedures, etc.). Available safety management models invariably revolve 
around compliance, and more recent models have been developed around safety culture, 
safety climate, and behavior improvement. However, there have been few studies in the 
area of total safety and much of this research is of qualitative nature. The discussion in 
this chapter leads the reader to conclude how the existing research lacks a strategic total 
approach to safety.  
2.2 Current Safety Scenario 
The construction industry in the United States accounts for about 10 percent of the 
gross domestic product, having an annual dollar volume of about $450 billion. The 
industry employs five percent of the nation’s work force—yet that five percent 
experiences a disproportionate 20 percent of all traumatic occupational fatalities and 12 
percent of the total number of disabling injuries (BLS, 2010). 
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Accident data prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2010) show that the 
construction industry has performed much worse than the average of all industries. 
Although the safety performance of the construction industry has improved dramatically 
in the 1990s and 2000s, injury rates in the construction industry are still 50% higher than 
that of all industries, lagging all industries by about 10 years. With an average 
employment of approximately 7% of the industrial workforce, the construction industry 
has regularly accounted for over 1,100 construction worker deaths per year or nearly 20% 
of all industrial worker fatalities (www.bls.gov). These accidents have also resulted in 
great economic losses. The research conducted by Everett and Frank (1996) concluded 
that the total costs of construction accidents accounted for 7.9–15.0% of the total costs of 
new, nonresidential projects. A more recent research study by Coble and Hinze (2000) 
showed that the average workers’ compensation insurance costs could be conservatively 
estimated as constituting 3.5% of the total project costs. In order to reduce and eventually 
eliminate construction accidents, researchers have explored techniques implemented by 
different construction parties to realize the “zero-injury objective.” 
Research shows that development and implementation of effective safety programs 
reduce accidents. Unfortunately, when it comes to spending time and money on safety, 
many do not feel safety is vital to the success of their projects. This attitude stems from a 
failure to recognize that effectively implementing project safety techniques will, while 
reducing job injuries, also reduce the workers’ compensation premium by 50 to 90 
percent and the indirect costs of injury by a like amount (CII, 1993). 
In the last couple of decades, the industry has taken major steps in identifying and 
eliminating the causes of accidents on construction sites.  On many construction sites, 
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safety has become one of the most important emphasis areas.  Construction firms are 
realizing that the initial investment, and the continuous efforts to maintain a good safety 
record, do pay off by not only reducing injuries on the job site, but by also contributing to 
an “on time” and “within budget” project delivery. 
The larger construction companies have generally been the most aggressive firms in 
pursuing the goal of zero accidents. Many of these firms are the pacesetters and therefore, 
the safety record and the way safety is structured in these firms are of great importance to 
the construction community.  It is the large construction firms in the United States that 
have made important strides toward improving construction safety.  The strides in safety 
are so significant that injury frequency rates that were once the goals of firms have now 
become unacceptable levels of safety performance for many firms. 
Despite recent improvements and a number of success stories, the safety performance 
of the construction industry, in general, remains poor (Hinze, 2008; Hallowell and 
Gambatese, 2009; Mitropoulos et al., 2009; Molenaar et al., 2009; Mohamed, 2002) and 
is far from achieving the goal of incident and injury free environment (a.k.a. zero 
accidents). It is important to investigate as to why the safety performance of the 
construction industry is not up to par. This investigation requires a fundamental 
understanding of the various safety research paradigms as explained in the next section. 
2.3 Safety Research Paradigms  
Rasmussen (1997) identifies three paradigms in the evolution of research on accidents 
and occupational safety. The first paradigm focuses on normative, prescriptive theories 
concerning the way people ought to act. Efforts to prevent occupational accidents focus 
on task design and safe rules of conduct—they attempt to control behavior through 
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normative instruction of the ‘one best way,’ selection and development of ‘competent’ 
personnel, and motivation and punishment. The current safety practices in the 
construction sector are grounded on this safety paradigm (Mitropoulos et al., 2009).  
The second paradigm focuses on descriptive models of work behavior in terms of 
deviations from the normative, ‘best way’ of working—that is errors and biases. This 
paradigm guides efforts to control behavior by removing causes of errors. It includes 
studies of errors (Rigby 1970, Rasmussen et al.1981), management errors and resident 
pathogens (Reason 1990). 
The third paradigm takes a cognitive approach to safety. The cognitive approach 
focuses on the interaction of the individual and the work system. It is concerned with the 
characteristics of the work system (the features of the task, tools and environment) that 
influence the individual decisions and actions and the possibility of errors (Rasmussen et 
al. 1994). From a cognitive perspective, an error is not a ‘human failure’ but a symptom 
of a problem in the work system (Dekker 2005). This paradigm provides descriptive 
models of work behavior in terms of the behavior-shaping features of the work 
environment. Such models include the risk homeostasis theory (Wilde 1985), 
Rasmussen’s (1997) model of migration to accidents, and the Task-Capability Interface 
Model (Fuller 2005). The cognitive approach to safety attempts to prevent accidents by 
increasing the workers’ ability to successfully adapt to the work environment. It aims at 
making visible the constraints and work affordances of the workplace (Flach et al. 1998). 
Most current safety practices in the construction industry are based on the normative 
approach, which has its own strategic limitations as discussed in the next section. 
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2.4 Current Safety Strategies and Limitations 
The current safety practices in the construction industry are mostly based on 
compliance with prescribed safety rules. They focus on measures to control hazards, and 
means to control workers’ behaviors so that they comply with prescribed safe practices. 
“A systems approach to safety” label term is widely used in literature (Flin et al. 2000) to 
refer to this normative approach to safety. It encompasses all aspects of the organization’s 
safety management system including safety policies, procedures, committees, etc. This 
system provides a systematic process for planning, implementing, monitoring, and 
reviewing safety performance. Elements of the construction safety system include safety 
policy and objectives, safety standards and targets, planning and organization of work, 
implementation and normal operational practice, monitoring, feedback and audits, 
corrective action, review, and continual improvement. The systems approach to safety 
has been the core of research in construction safety. 
This systems approach emphasizes (1) management commitment and policies to 
prevent unsafe conditions and (2) workers’ training and motivation to prevent unsafe 
behaviors. Safety programs—such as contractor’s selection, training, inspections, 
motivation, enforcement, etc., as well as efforts towards safety culture, and behavior-
based safety aim at increasing the workers’ compliance with prescribed ‘safe behaviors.’ 
This approach has resulted in significant improvements, but is still far from reaching the 
zero-accident goal. 
While the traditional application of normative approach aims at creating safe work 
behaviors, it ignores how the characteristics of the individual, team and production 
system processes influence the work behaviors and affect the possibility of errors and 
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accidents. First, it does not account for the production and economic pressures for 
efficiency. Second, the normative approach does not account for the factors that shape the 
work environment such as individual commitments, cultural norms, attitudes and 
perceptions of an individual and group, etc. These factors generate the environment the 
workers work in, and the crew’s ability to continuously and consistently perform safely.  
With regard to production and economic pressure, from a practical perspective, there 
is a continuous tension between safety and production or costs at the work level; in the 
short term, such conflicts are usually resolved in favor of production, because production 
efforts have relatively certain outcomes and receive rapid and rewarding feedback 
(Reason 1990). A recent study of safety on international projects (Mahalingam and Levitt 
2007) also illustrated that economic pressures were stronger determinants of work 
behavior than the safety regulations. As a result of these pressures, efforts to improve 
safety through technical advancements (new methods and improved safety features) tend 
to be ineffective (Mitropoulos et al., 2009) because human adaptation compensates for 
safety improvements. This phenomenon of “risk homeostasis” has been observed in 
transportation, navigation, and traffic research and explains why technological safety 
improvements have not generated the expected improvements in safety (Wilde 1985; 
Fuller 2005). Furthermore, in interdependent systems, the boundary of safe behavior for 
one actor depends on the possible violation of defenses by other actors (Rasmussen 
1997). Thus, the stage for an accident may be prepared as a result of several actors’ 
behaviors that erode the “error margin.”  
With regard to factors that shape the work environment such as individual 
commitments, cultural norms, attitudes and perceptions of an individual and group, these 
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factors interact with the systems and produce work behaviors that may prove to be 
unhealthy or unsafe. Efforts to improve safety through systems and technical 
advancements (without an integral treatment of these factors) tend to be ineffective 
because the behavior change is only temporary and is not usually sustainable.  
Hence the current safety strategies in construction, which are largely oriented towards 
systems advancements and behavior control, prove to be inadequate to achieve and, more 
importantly, sustain the goal of zero accidents because of these fundamental flaws in the 
approach.  
The key challenge for researchers and practitioners is to develop total safety systems 
that are simultaneously highly productive and highly reliable and can function effectively 
in the dynamic, complex, and competitive conditions that construction projects face. This 
requires a treatment of safety from an integral perspective taking into consideration all 
dimensions of safety and their inter-dependence. This treatment will allow a fundamental 
understanding of the individual, organizational and production system characteristics that 
govern both the safe behaviors of workers and the effectiveness of safety systems, and 
will aid in determining the underlying factors that control the true total safety 
performance of a company. 
Recent research in safety (mostly in the last two decades or so) has targeted safety 
culture, safety climate and behavior based safety as significant contributors/ measures of 
safety performance of a construction organization. This direction of safety research has 
generated fruitful results and is discussed in the next section. 
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2.5 Safety Culture, Climate and Behavior Based Safety Research 
A generic definition of corporate culture is helpful in the understanding of safety 
culture. Hampden-Turner (1990) define corporate culture as “a pattern of basic 
assumptions in vented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope 
with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well 
enough to be valid and to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, 
and feel in relation to these problems.” Numerous other definitions of corporate culture 
exist in the academic literature. Examples of a few selected definitions are tabulated in 
Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Selected Corporate Culture Definitions 
 
Reference 
 
Definition of corporate culture 
 
Hai, 1986 Corporate culture is a collection of uniform and enduring beliefs, 
customs, traditions, and practices that are shared and continued 
by the employees of a corporation. 
Maloney and 
Federle, 1990 
Corporate culture is a collection of shared beliefs that define the 
fundamental characteristics of an organization and create an 
attitude that distinguishes one organization from all others. 
Graves, 1986 Culture is the unique configuration of norms and attitudes that 
characterize the manner in which employees combine to 
accomplish tasks. 
Kotter and Heskett, 
1992 
Corporate culture refers to the values held by employees of an 
organization that tend to persist even when membership changes. 
 
Corporate culture is instrumental in an organization’s success. It provides the 
workplace environment for the employees of an organization. When people work in an 
environment that they perceive as rewarding, they are more likely to perform at a high 
level. Furthermore, a company’s success is the result of the organization performing 
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certain tasks very well (Maloney and Federle, 1990). Corporate culture is what 
determines these work environments, as well as the tasks in which an organization excels. 
Safety culture can be considered as a particular aspect or subset of corporate culture. 
Strictly speaking, the organization (or one of its subunits) has one underlying culture, and 
that culture has characteristics that may be more or less supportive of safety, quality, 
productivity or any other performance target. Thus, a more useful formulation than 
talking about the safety culture is to ask whether an organization's culture is supportive of 
safety. Yet definitions of the term “safety culture” exist in literature and the tem is often 
coined when describing the subset of organizational culture that affects workers’ attitudes 
and behaviors in relation to an organization’s ongoing safety performance. 
The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI 1993) 
provides the definition that “the safety culture of an organization is the product of group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the 
commitment to and the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety 
management.” Numerous definitions of safety culture exist in the academic literature. 
Examples of a few selected definitions are tabulated in Table 2.2. Most of the definitions 
are relatively similar in their belief perspectives, with each focused, to varying degrees, 
on the way people think and/or behave in relation to safety. Though definitions vary, 
there is a consensus of safety culture being a proactive stance towards safety. This now 
has been almost universally accepted if not always practiced (Lee and Harrison, 2000; 
Choudhry et al., 2007). 
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Table 2.2: Selected Safety Culture Definitions 
 
Reference 
 
Definition of safety culture 
 
Hale (2000) Safety culture refers to “the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions 
shared by natural groups as defining norms and values, which 
determine how they act and react in relation to risks and risk 
control systems.” 
Guldenmund (2000) Safety culture is defined as those aspects of the organizational 
culture that will impact on attitudes and behavior related to 
increasing or decreasing risk. 
Cooper (2000) Culture is “the product of multiple goal-directed interactions 
between people (psychological), jobs (behavioral) and the 
organization (situational); while safety culture is ‘that 
observable degree of effort by which all organizational 
members direct their attention and actions toward improving 
safety on a daily basis.” 
Mohamed (2003) Safety culture is a subfacet of organizational culturethat 
affects workers’ attitudes and behavior in relation to an 
organization’s ongoing safety performance. 
 
Zohar (1980) introduced “safety climate” as “a summary of molar perceptions that 
employees share about their work environment.” Researchers considered it as a 
subcomponent of the safety culture (Cooper, 2000; Neal et al., 2000; Choudhry and Fang 
2005) and a reflection of actual safety culture (Lee and Harrison, 2000; Flin et al., 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000). Mohamed (2003) suggested that safety culture is concerned with the 
determinants of the ability to manage safety (top-down organizational approach); 
whereas, safety climate is concerned with the workers’ perceptions of the role safety 
plays in the workplace (bottom-up perceptional approach). Thus, culture is something 
that is more deeply embedded and long term, taking longer to change and influencing 
organizational performance across many areas of functioning. Climate, on the other hand, 
changes faster and more immediately reflects the attention of leadership. As specific 
events occur that influence the organization, the climate for safety (or for any other 
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factor) changes. The most striking example is the impact on safety climate immediately 
following a serious injury or fatality. Most of the time, such an event triggers a 
strengthening of the safety climate. However, this change often does not last over the 
long term. 
Behavior-based safety (BBS) refers to the systematic application of psychological 
research on human behavior. It is an analytic or data-driven approach, where critical 
behaviors get identified and targeted for change. In BBS, primary attention is directed at 
specific safety-related behaviors that are, typically, performed by workers (Krause et al. 
1984). Workers’ performance gets systematically observed to know base-period scores. 
Using these scores, goal-setting meetings are arranged, with the participation of workers, 
to set realistic and attainable targets of performance. Workers are encouraged to practice 
safe behaviors. Providing feedback is essential to reinforce desired safety behaviors, thus 
fostering continuous improvement. It is noteworthy that more than 80% of all workplace 
accidents and incidents are attributed to unsafe behaviors (HSE, 2005). 
In recent years, there has been a movement away from safety measures purely based 
on retrospective data or “lagging indicators,” such as accident rates, toward so-called 
“leading indicators,” such as measurements of safety climate (Flin et al. 2000; Mohamed, 
2002). The shift of focus has been driven by the awareness that organizational, 
managerial, and human factors rather than purely technical failures are prime causes of 
accidents (Weick et al. 1999; Langford et al., 2000; Mohamed, 2002) developed a model 
to examine and assess relationships between safety climate determinants and the safety 
climate in construction site environments, and the correlation between the safety climate 
and workers’ safe behavior. Molenaar et al. (2009) developed a model to measure critical 
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cultural characteristics that influence safety and to quantify the relationship between 
culture and safety performance. Grote and Kunzler (2000) presented a sociotechnical 
model of safety culture that links the safety management system and safety culture to the 
general organizational design.  Geller (1994) put forward a model distinguishing three 
dynamic and interactive factors, namely, person, behavior, and environment. Three years 
later, a total safety culture model, which included this safety triad and recognized the 
dynamic and interactive relationship between them, was proposed (Geller 1997). Cooper 
(2000) argued that organizational culture is the product of multiple goal-directed 
interactions between people, jobs, and the organization, and presented a model 
recognizing the presence of an interactive or reciprocal relationship between 
psychological, situational, and behavioral factors. Choudhry et al. (2007) integrated three 
related concepts, namely, safety climate, behavior-based safety, and safety system, into a 
safety culture model allowing different dimensions of construction safety culture to be   
measured individually or in combination. 
A previous safety research of note that provided the stimulus to this research was that 
by Molenaar et al. (2009), which developed a structural equation model of corporate 
culture as it affects safety performance. This research was based on the hypothesis that 
construction safety performance (measured by EMR – Experience Modication Rating) is 
predictable on the basis of corporate safety culture. The research proposed that 
construction organizations can have inherent characteristics that predispose them to be 
susceptible to accidents. The characteristics that influence corporate safety culture were 
classified into three main categories: (1) people; (2) process; and (3) value. The primary 
results of the study can be summarized by stating that corporate safety culture is 
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significantly related to safety performance. From an integral strategic perspective of 
safety, the limitations of this research study were: 1) the study only looked at the 
“culture” domain of the fundamental domains defining total safety; 2) the study used a 
lagging indicator (EMR) to measure safety performance; and 3) the data collected to 
develop the model was limited. The research in hand attempts to overcome these 
limitations and builds upon a large data set, considers an integral view of all fundamental 
total safety dimensions (person, culture, behavior and process), and uses a leading 
indicator (safe work behavior) to measure safety performance. 
Another research study of note that also provided stimulus for this research was that 
conducted by Mohamed (2002), which examined the relationship between the safety 
climate and safe work behavior in construction site environments. This study also utilized 
the technique of structural equation modeling to come up with a relationship model 
between safety climate determinants and safety performance (as measured by safe work 
behaviors). From an integral strategic perspective of safety, the limitations of this 
research study were: 1) the study looked at the “culture” (in fact climate) and the 
“behavior” domains of the fundamental total safety dimensions; 2) the study ignored 
interaction effects between the factors determining the safety climate; and 3) the study 
was only based on data collected from construction workers and did not take into account 
the perspectives of top management and supervisors. The research in hand attempts to 
overcome these limitations and builds upon an integral view of all fundamental total 
safety dimensions (person, culture, behavior and process), considers the interaction 
effects between the factors determining total safety, and basis itself on a large data set 
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with data collected from top management, supervisors, foremen, and construction 
workers. 
While all these models are intuitive and have addressed safety from a cultural, climate 
or behavior-based perspective, they still lack a total approach to safety i.e. an approach 
that would take into consideration the entire personal, group, behavioral, process and 
production system factors as an integrated model determining the true total safety 
performance of a construction organization. Furthermore, objective measurement and 
improvement of total safety (as identified by all dimensions defining and determining 
total safety) remains a concern yet to be addressed by prior research. This very gap in the 
body of knowledge concerning construction safety is the motivator that proved to be the 
driving factor for the research in hand. 
2.6 Effectiveness of OSHA as a Strategic Safety Improvement Organization 
In the United States, all construction safety is legislated by the Occupational Safety & 
Health Administration (OSHA), a federal agency that is part of the U.S. Department of 
Labor, which was created by the Congress under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
in 1970. Credible statistics reveal that OSHA has had a beneficial influence on the US 
construction industry in terms of reducing workplace accidents and occupational injuries. 
Undoubtedly, OSHA has played a pivotal role in the development of a safer work 
environment over the years. Nevertheless, the agency still has received substantial 
criticism from construction organizations for a number of reasons. Even though the 
number of workplace accidents and casualties has dropped down drastically in the 
construction industry ever since OSHA regulations have been implemented, construction 
firms have viewed OSHA's regulations and standards in a negative light as well. This is 
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despite the numerous attempts by the agency to promote training, consultation, and 
outreach services.  
One of the more common arguments against OSHA is that its heavy fines and 
ambiguous standards restrict an organization’s ability to develop as well as compete. An 
analysis of OSHA citations that were contested by employers before the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), for the years 1991–1993 (reported in 
the Occupational safety and health reporter published by the Bureau of National Affairs, 
and comprised of 255 citations) shows that in the majority of the OSHA citation cases, 
the arguments centered around the vagueness in the interpretation of OSHA standards. 
Several standards, for example, simply read that the employer must provide safety 
equipment. While the employer interpreted this to mean ‘‘make available,’’ OSHA 
interpreted it to mean ‘‘require use of.’’ A further analysis of these citations reflects that a 
significant increase in the dollar amounts penalized is seen from 1991–1992 to 1993. This 
was due to the new minimum sevenfold increase in penalties implemented by OSHA to 
make the impact of its citations a clear priority to contractors. Larger penalties 
presumably draw more attention from construction companies, and they may be more 
willing to allocate adequate money for safety programs to avoid these lofty penalties. 
However, it also entails the industry view that OSHA is more concerned with generating 
revenues (via penalties) than strategically improving safety in the industry. 
Assessing the issues why OSHA has not been completely successful in achieving and 
sustaining the goal of zero accidents in the construction industry is important in terms of 
determining the need of a strategic safety improvement framework for the industry 
targeted towards incident and injury free work environment. Existing literature fails to 
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identify these issues and hence the current study would delve into highlighting the key 
concerns with respect to OSHA’s lack of performance. 
2.7 Zero Accident Approach to Safety 
In the past decade the terms “zero accidents”, “zero injuries” and “incident and injury 
free” have been used a great deal by construction firms espousing their commitment to 
safety. Studies have shown that many construction firms, especially those in the industrial 
sector, have enjoyed significant improvements in their safety performances. These 
performance statistics have been considerably better than those of the overall 
construction industry and provide clear testimony of the effectiveness of efforts to 
improve safety. 
With the advent of increasing numbers of owners and contractors who are achieving 
zero lost workday injuries on construction projects, a new concept is emerging – zero 
injury. This new-found reality for some has become a sought-after possibility for others. 
Zero injury defines a unique attitude on projects achieving the category of “safety 
excellence.” This attitude appears as a zealous commitment by top management to the 
concept that zero injury is the only acceptable goal. Any other goal implies that injuries 
are expected and acceptable. The zero injury concept simply means that essentially all 
serious injury to workers can be successfully prevented. 
The zero injury philosophy is based on the belief that eliminating all worker injuries 
on projects for significant periods of time is possible. The first essential criterion required 
is the acceptance of the zero injury concept by those in charge and the effective 
communication of this to the workers. Further, it is essential that owners and contractors 
devote resources for the development and implementation of the safety techniques that 
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provide the highest impact on achieving zero injury projects. The construction industry 
needs to recognize that elimination of injuries is vital to the efficient execution of 
construction projects, and that productivity and safety are so intertwined in the 
workplace, that spending time and energy on safety not only improves safety 
performance but also improves schedule and reduces costs. 
In 1993, the CII released its report on zero accidents, called Zero Injury Techniques 
(CII, 1993). From this study, evolved the five high-impact zero accident techniques, 
summarized as follows, in decreasing order of relative importance: 
1. Preproject/ pretask planning for safety 
2. Safety orientation and training 
3. Written safety incentive programs 
4. Alcohol and substance abuse programs 
5. Accident/incident investigations 
In 1998, the National Center for Construction Education and Research and the M. E. 
Rinker Sr. School of Building Construction at the University of Florida conducted a 
survey to examine changes made since the zero accidents research was publicized. The 
purpose of the study was to further assess the status of the safety performance of large 
construction companies and to identify the-then best practices in the construction industry 
that made a difference in safety performance and that move the industry toward the goal 
of zero accidents. 
The results generated by the study reconfirmed the importance of several traditional 
safety methods and techniques employed by the construction industry and it also 
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identified some effective new techniques. These findings are summarized in the 
following ten key areas that contribute to improved safety performance: 
1. Demonstrated management commitment 
2. Staffing for safety 
3. Planning: pre-project and pre-task 
4. Safety education: orientation and specialized training 
5. Worker involvement 
6. Evaluation and recognition/reward 
7. Subcontract management 
8. Accident/incident investigations 
9. Drug and alcohol testing 
10. Contract Type 
While the idea of zero accidents is intuitive, not much research has been done 
specifically in terms of developing a strategic safety improvement model for the 
construction industry that would allow continuous measurement and improvement of 
factors determining the safety performance of a construction organization, and hence 
would be instrumental in reaching and sustaining the goal of zero accidents. Hence the 
current study would delve into developing such a model directed towards the goal of zero 
accidents. 
2.8 Total Safety Management 
Total Safety Management (TSM) bears its roots from Total Quality Management 
(TQM), which is ingrained on Deming’s Fourteen Points. Although not much research 
has been done on TSM in construction industry, for the last couple of decades, TSM 
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philosophy has found its way in construction safety research (Geller, 1994; Geller, 1997; 
Hinze, 2005). TSM focuses on safety as an integral process, not the management of 
safety, on continuous improvement of process in order to improve every facet of an 
organization. The implementation of TSM is fundamentally a process of culture change.  
Although ‘Total Safety Management’ has been a magic word, methods and techniques to 
implement Total Safety in an Industry are still to be developed. Moreover, no accurate 
information regarding the adoption and implementation of TSM in the construction 
industry is available. Hence the current study would delve into establishing the current 
state of adoption of TSM in the construction industry and the readiness of the 
construction organizations to embrace TSM philosophy.  
Much of the research done on TSM in construction industry has been of qualitative 
nature. One aspect of TSM that has frustrated the construction industry the most has been 
“measurement” of total safety, which involves identifying and quantifying the factors that 
critically influence safe work behaviors. The basic problem attributed is the difficulty in 
assessing what to measure and how to measure it – particularly the intangible aspects of 
safety. Without measurement, the notion of continuous improvement is hard to follow. 
Hence the need of the research in hand was pre-established i.e. to develop a strategic 
framework for the measurement and continuous improvement of total safety in order to 
achieve and sustain the goal of zero accidents, while improving the quality, productivity 
and the competitiveness of the construction industry as it moves forward. 
The key challenge for researchers and practitioners is to develop total safety systems 
that are simultaneously highly productive and highly reliable and can function effectively 
in the dynamic, complex, and competitive conditions that construction projects face. This 
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requires a treatment of safety from an integrated perspective taking into consideration all 
fundamental dimensions of safety and their inter-dependence. This treatment will allow a 
fundamental understanding of the individual and organizational characteristics that 
govern both the safe behaviors of workers and the effectiveness of safety systems, and 
will aid in determining the underlying factors that control the true safety performance of a 
company. 
2.9 An Integral Entity Model 
Ken Wilber (Wikipedia, 2011) defines four dimensions for every entity. Each entity 
or unit of reality that is both a whole and a part of a larger whole, has an interior and an 
exterior. It also exists as an individual and (assuming more than one of these entities 
exists) as a collective. Observing the entity from the outside constitutes an exterior 
(objective) perspective on that entity. Observing it from the inside is the interior 
(subjective) perspective, and so forth. If these four perspectives are mapped into 
quadrants, these constitute four quadrants, or dimensions as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
The above concept leads to defining four dimensions of every entity:  1) Behavioral 
i.e. exterior individual (or, in Figure 2.1, the upper-right); 2) Intentional i.e. interior 
individual (upper-left); 3) Cultural i.e. interior collective (lower-left); and 4) Process i.e. 
exterior collective (lower-right).  
All four pursuits – behavioral, intentional, cultural and process – offer 
complementary, rather than contradictory, perspectives. It is possible for all to be correct 
and necessary for a complete account of human existence. Also, each by itself offers only 
a partial view of reality. Further, according to Wilber, these four perspectives are equally 
valid at all levels of existence. 
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Figure 2.1: Integral Entity Model (adapted from the work of Ken Wilber) 
Note that the right sides of the quadrants are concerned with empirical observation—
what does it do? The left sides of the quadrants focus on interpretation—what does it 
mean? 
This integral entity model forms the basis of the current research and will be 
discussed more in the following chapters. 
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
Literature review shows that a vast amount of research has been conducted on 
construction safety in the past few decades. Recent advancements have been made in 
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viewing safety as a cultural issue. OSHA has played its part and has done extremely well 
in terms of reducing workplace accidents. However, safety research to date in the 
construction industry lacks a total treatment of safety as a strategic concern in business 
value. These limits are creating barriers to improved construction safety. There are a 
number of signs of this phenomenon, such as the invisible "vision," where the corporate 
safety policy has little to do with the day-to-day functional issues of safety. Safety 
performance reporting is typically limited to meeting regulatory-driven information 
requirements. Rarely is it recognized as a potentially effective means of communicating 
positive safety results. And, regardless of the quality of the company's safety 
performance, the basic relationship with the relevant regulatory agencies is still largely 
adversarial in nature. Companies must realize that they can benefit from voluntary 
initiatives and potential "partnering" arrangements where mutual interests with regulators 
may exist. Viewed in this light, even the current leaders in construction safety 
management will need to make important changes in their existing management systems. 
They must cultivate a vision for the future that elevates safety concerns and effectively 
integrates them into the overall management mix. For this very reason, a need for a 
strategic approach to safety improvement is called for, which forms the premise of this 
research. 
It is the premise of this research that individual intentions, commitments, group 
culture, and work behaviors have as much, or more, to do with the safety performance 
than the safety management system. This research develops itself on an integral approach 
to safety (as explained in section 5.3) that collectively define the interior and exterior 
pursuits necessary to determine the true total safety environment of a construction 
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organization. It is hypothesized that an integral view of construction safety can only be 
achieved if integration is made of these areas of knowledge through an acknowledgement 
of them as the fundamental dimensions of safety. It is further hypothesized that all safety 
pursuits by their very nature cultivate successful safety performance. While these 
hypotheses seem intuitive, literature review has highlighted that little research has been 
conducted to specifically identify and measure critical characteristics as related to all the 
dimensions that, in integration, define as well as influence total safety. This forms the 
core aim of this research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review discussed in Chapter 2 provides a background of the various 
facets of the current body of knowledge in relation to construction safety and highlights 
the lack of a comprehensive integral model of continuous strategic total safety 
improvement in the construction industry. Based on the information gathered from the 
literature review a specific research methodology was developed and is described in this 
chapter. 
More elaborately, this chapter outlines the specific research methodology employed 
in the development of the strategic model for continuous safety improvement in the 
construction industry, including the data collection procedures, survey instruments 
development, and data analysis techniques. Various statistical test procedures including 
structural equation modeling technique were used in the research investigation.  
The data for this research was collected through the use of five (5) surveys targeting 
construction contractors in the U.S. in order to achieve the following three (3) objectives: 
1. To assess the current state of safety in the construction industry and establish the 
need for addressing safety as a total process in construction contracting 
organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents; 
2. To identify the factors (latent variables/ constructs) determining the total safety 
performance of a construction contracting organization, which are most suitable 
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and appropriate for measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role 
in achieving the goal of zero accidents; and 
3. To develop a measurement model to measure the effect of the key determinants of 
safety performance (the critical factors) on a construction organization’s safety 
performance. 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the research process was carried in a two-
phase approach. The steps followed in each of the phases are described in the following 
sub-sections. 
3.2. Research Phase I  
3.2.1. Literature Review  
In the initial process of research, a thorough literature study was conducted in order to 
develop the research rationale as well as form a firm basis to develop survey instruments 
to be used in the study. Published literature on current safety scenario and strategies in 
the U.S. construction industry was thoroughly studied, with particular emphasis on 
current safety statistics, prevalent safety management practices of construction 
contractors (policies, procedures, programs, systems, etc.), safety performance 
measurement and improvement, safety culture & climate measurement and improvement, 
use of behavior-based safety techniques in construction, role, success and criticism on 
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), zero accident strategies in 
construction, and the move towards Total Safety Management (TSM) in construction 
industry. Furthermore, studies were done to identify what other developed countries (like 
U.K., Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc.) have been doing and achieving in terms of 
construction worker safety.  
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3.2.2. Data Collection Phase I  
3.2.2.1. Scope and Relevance to Study Objectives 
This phase of data collection was undertaken to achieve objective 1 of the study, i.e. 
to determine the need for addressing safety as a total management process in construction 
contracting organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents. This objective 
(objective 1 of the study) had four key sub-objectives as defined below: 
1. To evaluate the current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor management 
in construction industry,  
2. To evaluate the current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and 
foremen in construction industry,  
3. To analyze the state of success (and failure) of OSHA (Occupational Safety and 
Health Organization) as a regulatory agency to incorporate safety as a total 
process in construction organizations; and  
4. To investigate the state of adoption and implementation of safety as a total 
management process in a construction contracting firm’s management system, 
and to identify the benefits and obstacles.  
3.2.2.2. Data Collection Method 
Knoke and Bohrnstedt (1994) define data collection as an activity of developing 
primary data records for a given sample or population of observations. Babbie (1992) 
discussed different modes of data collection including experimental, survey, unobtrusive 
and evaluation. Because survey research involves collecting data through asking people 
questions, it was deemed the most appropriate method of data collection for this phase of 
the study. 
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3.2.2.3. Survey Research 
The survey research employed in this phase of the study has a fundamental 
characteristic as described by Fowler (1993): Collecting information by asking questions 
to industry personnel with industry & project experience in safety. 
The survey research was done via structured questionnaires and interviews from 
industry experts. A synopsis of the methodology adopted for safety spot analysis is given 
as follows: 
1. Identifying the key areas of safety concern (research aspects) to be investigated. 
2. Developing and conducting surveys for each area of concern. For each research 
aspect, the survey development and administration methodology consisted of the 
following steps: 
1.1 Conducting relevant literature review i.e. collecting base knowledge essential 
for survey development. 
1.2 Developing questionnaire surveys targeted to construction contracting 
organizations/ workers to elicit information on the research aspect being 
diagnosed.  
1.3 Conducting pilot surveys via face-to-face meetings with selected professionals 
including short-listed experts representing contractors and various staff levels 
of contracting organizations, with the objective to fine tune the survey 
instruments on the basis of expert feedback.  
1.4 Administering full-fledged questionnaire surveys through postal mail, 
electronic mail, fax, personal interviews and meetings. 
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1.5 Validating returned questionnaires (in terms of respondent profile and 
consistency of feedback). 
2. Developing a centralized database system to store the collected data from 
structured surveys for the purpose of analysis, and structuring the data in the 
database. 
3. Analyzing the data to compile the findings. 
4. Devising conclusions from the findings and developing recommendations 
consistent with the major objective of this phase of data collection i.e. to 
determine the need for addressing safety as a total management process in 
construction contracting organizations. 
The research methodology for each area of concern can be represented as a flowchart 
as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Research methodology – Research Phase I 
The methodology is described in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
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3.2.2.3.1. Identifying Key Areas of Safety Concern  
Consistent to the four sub-objectives of objective 1 of the study, the following four 
(4) key areas of concern related to construction safety were identified via preliminary 
literature review for further investigation: 
1. Current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor management in construction 
industry,  
2. Current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and foremen in 
construction industry,  
3. OSHA – success, barriers and limitations;  
4. Safety as a total management process in construction industry – adoption, 
implementation, readiness, benefits and obstacles. 
3.2.2.3.2. Survey Development, Administration and Validation 
3.2.2.3.2.1. Survey Instruments Development 
Extensive literature review provided the base information on each of the four (4) key 
areas of safety concern (as identified in section 3.2.2.3.1), which was used to develop the 
following four (4) surveys for this research as part of Data Collection Phase I .  
1. Evaluation of the current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor 
management in construction industry;  
2. Evaluation of the current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and 
foremen in construction industry; 
3. Analysis of the state of success (and failure) of OSHA (Occupational Safety and 
Health Organization) as a regulatory agency to incorporate safety as a total 
process in construction organizations; and  
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4. Investigation of the state of adoption and implementation of safety as a total 
management process in a construction contracting firm’s management system, 
and to identify the benefits and obstacles.  
3.2.2.3.2.2. Pilot Surveys 
Subsequent to the development of each survey instrument, pilot surveys were 
conducted via face-to-face meetings with select professionals including short-listed 
experts from construction contracting organizations representing their top management 
and middle/ project management, all having expertise in or exposure to safety issues. The 
intent of these pilot surveys was to pretest the questionnaires on select professionals so as 
to obtain such versions of the surveys (after appropriate modification in each as and if 
needed) that would achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity. 
With input from these local contractor representatives, the questionnaires were 
appropriately modified to best capture the information specific to research needs. The 
first section of the first questionnaire collected company demographic information, which 
was analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The survey included 
questions regarding the company’s location, nature of work, number of employees, 
annual turnover, etc. The entire set of questionnaires is given in Appendix I. 
3.2.2.3.2.3. Survey Administration 
3.2.2.3.2.3.1. Survey Method 
Data gathering is complex. So, the decision on which survey method depends on the 
particular research topic, characteristics of the sample, and availability of staff and 
resource (Fowler 1993). Assessing the methodologies for data collection against the 
objective of this phase of the research led to the determination that questionnaires send by 
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electronic mail and postal mail with as-necessary follow-up telephone calls were the most 
suitable for this phase of research work.  Because of the nature of structured interviews, it 
was determined that these would best be achieved by in-person interviews, However, 
because of geographic constraints many were done by telephone. For the questionnaire 
component of data gathering, telephone or facsimile correspondence were used only 
when the response to the questionnaire was behind scheduled due dates, or when the 
respondents contacted the researcher with questions or requests for further information. 
An exhaustive list of industry contractors was prepared as a first step of survey 
administration. Various published and unpublished sources were used to develop a list of 
commercial construction contractors in the U.S. construction industry. This identification 
was done, in particular, from the following sources: 
1. Engineering News Record (ENR) publications, including the list of Top 500 U.S. 
Contractors; 
2. The general contractors list published by the Associated General Contractors 
(AGC) of America; and  
3. A customized list of general contractors and subcontractors prepared from the 
yellow pages, trade magazines and other published and unpublished sources. 
3.2.2.3.2.3.2. Data Sample 
The theoretical population of this phase of research was the top management, senior 
project managers, and safety managers/officers of all general contracting firms as well as 
subcontracting firms in the United States. No limits on the size of construction firms or 
annual turnover of the construction firm were established. There were not a minimum 
number of years of experience an individual should have to qualify to be a participant. 
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This population description is in line with the major objective of this phase of research 
i.e. to assess the current state of safety in the construction industry and determine the 
need for addressing safety as a total management process in construction contracting 
organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents. 
The final data sample was selected by a combination of sampling methods. The 
researcher first used purposive sampling. In purposive sampling “the participants are 
hand-picked from the accessible population” (Gliner & Morgan, 2000). The participants 
were selected because of their experience as senior corporate and project managers for 
commercial construction firms. Firstly, the liaison of Florida International University 
(FIU) with the local construction industry was utilized for selecting appropriate 
construction companies.  Secondly, since many of the government organization (counties 
and cities) employees are students at FIU Construction Management (CM), Civil and 
Environmental Engineering (CEE) and other engineering departments, these employees 
were approached first hand for their voluntary contribution in the research. Thirdly, the 
CM department at FIU also has an advisory committee made up of a number of large 
commercial construction contractors in the South Florida region. These advisory 
committee members were also approached first hand with the request to voluntarily 
contribute to the research. 
Convenience sampling was also used to solicit participants for this phase of the 
research. In convenience sampling, “the participants are selected on the basis of 
convenience rather than chosen in a serious attempt to select participants who are 
representative of the theoretical population” (Gliner & Morgan, 2000). Senior managers 
working for companies in Florida to which the researcher had access were given the 
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opportunity to volunteer for participation. In some cases the companies were known to 
the researcher and in other cases the companies were randomly selected from the three 
sources identified above. 
Snowball sampling was also used. “Snowball sampling is a modification of 
convenience or accidental sampling …. People are asked for additional references” 
(Gliner & Morgan, 2000). 
The major chunk of data was collected using random sampling. According to good 
survey practice (Tull and Hawkins, 1990), a letter was sent to the Chief Executive/ 
Managing Director of companies randomly selected from the three sources of 
identification indicated above. This letter was sent to introduce the research and request 
voluntary input. Referred to in the letter was a request for names of the key personnel 
associated with safety management processes and safety decision making in the 
companies, who would subsequently be canvassed for opinions.  
The surveys were carried out over the period extending from September 2008 to 
February 2009.  The questionnaires were posted to named individuals in September 2008, 
with a suggested date for return at the end of November 2008. Questionnaires returns 
were received over the next five months, in some cases after a phone call reminder. 
3.2.2.3.2.3.3. Delimitations  
The focus was delimited to general contractors and specialty contractors with major 
experience in commercial building construction. In future studies, research may be 
expanded to other types of construction such as residential, heavy-civil, or industrial.  
3.2.2.3.2.4. Survey Validation 
Research validation was done in three steps.  
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Firstly, it was confirmed that the survey was filled by personnel with appropriate 
profile and experience.  Construction industry experience of respondents ranged from 9 
to over 28 years, and all participants had at least 11 years of experience in construction 
safety. On the basis of their position and work experience, it was inferred that the 
respondents had adequate knowledge of safety related activities in their organizations as 
well as in the industry and their responses were a reasonable representation of required 
data. 
Secondly, to avoid the problem of bias, it was decided not to use data provided by an 
organization with less than 5 responses on a particular survey. Based on this decision, the 
following was determined: 
1. Data from six (6) companies was discarded for survey instrument 1, since a total 
of 19 responses were received from these companies for survey instrument 1; 
2. Data from five (5) companies was discarded for survey instrument 2, since a total 
of 14 responses were received from these companies for survey instrument 2; 
3. Data from three (3) companies was discarded for survey instrument 3, since a 
total of 7 responses were received from these companies for survey instrument 3; 
and  
4. Data from four (3) companies was discarded for survey instrument 4 since a total 
of 11 responses were received from these companies for survey instrument 1. 
Moreover, 18 questionnaires were determined to be outliers and were also decided to 
be discarded. Hence a total of 69 questionnaires were discarded from the analysis. 
Thirdly, the conclusions drawn on the basis of the responses were further verified 
through interviews with experts to ascertain that they were unbiased. Twelve (12) face-
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to-face unstructured interviews were conducted in the vicinity of Miami, Florida from a 
selected cross-section of local construction industry experts to discuss the results and 
validate the findings. The targeted audience included top management and middle 
management representatives of leading contractors and subcontractors working in the 
commercial building construction sector in the South Florida region. 
The survey instruments generated quite substantial and valuable data on the current 
state of safety performance in the U.S. construction industry, specifically, the safety non-
performance causes.  The results obtained were particularly useful in developing the 
rationale of the need of an integral model of construction safety with the objective of 
continuously improving safety to reach the goal of zero accidents.  
3.2.2.3.2.5. Developing the Database and Data Analysis Mechanism 
Appropriate data storage mechanisms were developed and the data stored for the 
purpose of analysis. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to 
categorically compile and sort the data collected in the form of filled questionnaires, 
minutes of meetings, interviews, etc.  
Tables and Forms collecting data on SPSS were interfaced with Microsoft Excel for 
the purpose of data analysis.  Data analysis was done using SPSS and major findings 
compiled.  
3.3. Research Phase II 
Phase II of the research was consistent in achieving objectives 2 and 3 of the study. The 
scope and relevance of this phase of research with the study objectives is explained 
below. 
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The second objective of this research study was to identify the factors which could be 
instrumental in continuously improving the safety performance of construction 
organizations. This was achieved as follows. 
Based on the findings of the phase I of research, the research premise was established 
that an integral or total approach to safety was essential to determine the factors 
instrumental for total safety improvement in the industry. Further literature review 
enabled to outline four dimensions of construction safety with respect to a construction 
worker as an entity:  1) behavior i.e. exterior individual; 2) person i.e. interior individual; 
3) culture i.e. interior collective; and 4) process i.e. exterior collective. These dimensions 
collectively define the interior and exterior pursuits necessary to determine the true safety 
performance of a construction organization. It was envisaged that an integral view of 
construction safety can be achieved if integration is made of these four areas of 
knowledge through an acknowledgement of them as the four fundamental dimensions of 
safety.  
Defining the interior as well as exterior pursuits to safety was a complex task. This 
research began by decomposing safety dimensions into measurable attributes using a 
multiattribute analysis technique. Through expert interviews and an exhaustive literature 
review, a multiattribute hierarchy of safety pursuits was defined. The highest level of the 
hierarchy decomposed safety into four principal dimensions, viz., intent, culture, 
behavior and process. These four categories were then subdivided and decomposed into 
measurable safety characteristics that formed the basis of a questionnaire to measure 
safety.  
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This study adopted safe work behaviors (observable actions) as the safety 
performance indicator.  This selection was based on the justification that that leading 
indicators are better measures of safety performance than lagging indicators. Traditional 
measures of safety performance rely primarily on some form of accident or injury data. 
The main problems are that such data are insufficiently sensitive, of dubious accuracy, 
retrospective, and they ignore risk exposure. Although accident statistics are widely used 
throughout the construction industry, it is almost impossible to use accidents as a safety 
indicator for a single construction site. This is because of random variation, where many 
sites will have no accidents, and it is not possible to determine whether these sites with 
zero accidents are safer than sites with four or five accidents. 
The questionnaire contained two sections: Part I constituted statements to measure 
safety characteristics, while Part II consisted of items to measure safe work behavior as 
the safety performance indicator.   To the extent possible, the different statements used in 
developing the questionnaires were drawn upon scales that had been previously used by 
researchers. To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft 
questionnaires were constructed and pretested on a few graduate students and a few 
construction safety managers. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire. 
The questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 140 statements (138 statements 
listed in Part I and 2 statements listed in Part II) about safety issues at the organizational, 
group, and individual levels. A number of negatively worded statements were presented 
in the scale, as recommended in the measurement literature. 
A survey methodology was selected to collect data regarding the dimensions of safety 
because it offered the best opportunity to capture a cross section of the beliefs, values, 
 55
systems and behaviors in multiple companies in a timely and efficient manner. As the 
survey sample, the research targeted top management, senior project managers, safety 
managers/officers, supervisors, foremen, and construction workers of general contracting 
firms as well as subcontracting firms. This is in line with the major objective of the 
research – seeking a correlation between total safety determinants and safe work behavior 
in construction organizations. Appropriate modifications were made in the questionnaire 
in order to address the various levels of respondents (from field personnel to middle 
management to upper management).  
The data analysis technique used was structural equation modeling (SEM). Before the 
SEM analysis began, a rough estimate of the latent variables (factors) was derived from a 
confirmatory factor analysis. A principal factor analysis (PFA) using the varimax rotation 
method with Kaiser normalization was utilized. Based on the factor analysis results, the 
23 subcategories defined for the domains of factor sets were reduced into 6 factors (latent 
variables/ constructs/ underlying dimensions). The research premise was that when these 
factors are improved then we can attain continuous safety improvement in the 
construction industry. 
Once the multi-dimensional factors impacting safety performance were established, a 
base structural equation model (SEM) was developed following the broad hypothesis that 
safe work behaviors (and, thus, their reciprocal, unsafe behaviors) are consequences of 
the existing safety dimensions in a construction organization, which is determined by the 
inter-dependent factors identified earlier. Hypothesis was developed for each of the 
factors/ constructs to define paths in the structural model. Numerous iterations were 
performed to arrive at a final SEM specification. Hence a zero-Accident safety 
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improvement framework was established based on an integral approach to safety, which 
constituted the third objective of the study. Note that objective 3 of the dissertation had 
two sub-objectives: 
1. To develop a measurement model describing the relationship between the 
indicators and the factors.  
2. To develop a structural model describing the relationships amongst the 
factors, and the relationships between the factors and safety performance (as 
measured by safe work behavior).  
The program used for SEM analysis was AMOS (version 19.0). Both the 
measurement model and the structural model were developed using SEM analysis on 
AMOS.  The initial SEM was constructed using various combinations of the factor 
analysis results and then model improvements were performed using a combination of 
modification indices and solid theoretical support until a final satisfactory model was 
identified. In essence, asymptotic t-statistics and R-square goodness of fit (GOF) 
measures were employed to assess the regression equations in the model. 
Both the measurement and structural components of the SEM provided insight into 
the influence of total safety determinants on safety performance. The discussion is given 
in chapter 6 of the dissertation. 
It is envisaged that the framework developed would provide a strategic safety 
performance measurement and improvement mechanism for a construction firm. This 
strategic improvement framework would allow a contracting organization to focus its 
efforts on those factors that would strategically improve safety performance of the 
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organization as well as would provide opportunity for continuous safety improvement 
and hence achieve the goal of zero accidents. 
The methodology flow chart for the entire research effort is shown in Figure 3.2. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter outlined the background information collected, development of the 
Safety improvement framework, and the design and administration of the data collection 
instruments used in this research. The structured interviews used to determine 
background information, and the subsequent framework development process took 
approximately 16 months. The data collection was accomplished in two phases. The 
overall process of data collection took almost a year to complete. Statistical techniques 
such as factor analysis and structural equation modeling were undertaken to analyze the 
data and verify the research hypotheses. The following chapter discusses background 
information on the two major analysis techniques used during the study, i.e. confirmatory 
factor analysis and structural equation modeling.  
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Figure 3.2: Research methodology – Overall Research 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS PHASE I  
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3, the methodology implemented to conduct this research endeavor was 
discussed. This chapter discusses phase I of the data analysis process, which was 
undertaken to achieve objective 1 of the study, i.e. to establish the need of addressing 
safety as a total management process in construction contracting organizations in order to 
achieve the goal of zero accidents. 
To establish the need of addressing safety as a total management process, the 
following two specific research questions were deemed significant to address, which 
determined the key tasks at hand: 
1. Are the safety strategies currently employed by industry participants helping in 
strategically improving safety in construction organizations?  
• Task 1: Assess contractor management attitudes and approaches 
• Task 2: Assess supervisor-level attitudes and approaches 
• Task 3: Assess OSHA’s lack of performance 
2. Are the current safety improvement strategies instrumental in nurturing total 
safety in construction organizations? 
• Task 4a: Investigate the state of adoption and implementation of total safety 
in a contracting firm’s management system. 
• Task 4b: Investigate the readiness of construction organizations to embrace 
total safety. 
• Task 4c: Investigate the barriers towards implementing total safety. 
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To achieve the aforementioned tasks, survey research was done via structured 
questionnaires and interviews from industry experts. Extensive literature review provided 
the base information on each of the four (4) tasks constituting the key areas of safety 
concern (as identified in section 3.3.2.3.1), which was used to develop the following 
surveys for this phase of research: 
1. Assessment of current safety attitudes and approaches of contractor management 
in the construction industry;  
2. Assessment of current safety attitudes and approaches of supervisors and foremen 
in the construction industry;  
3. Analysis of the criticism on OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health 
Organization) with respect to its lack of success in acting as a catalyst to 
incorporate total safety in construction organizations; and 
4. Investigation of the state of adoption and implementation of safety as a total 
management process in construction contracting firms’ management systems, and 
to identify the obstacles. 
This chapter outlines the data collection and analysis process of each of the four 
surveys conducted in this phase of research. This begins with a brief description of the 
survey instruments and a discussion of the data collection process. This is followed by 
assessing the survey response rates and respondents’ profile. Subsequent to this, a 
detailed description of each survey along with a discussion of the key results is presented. 
This is done with particular emphasis to their utility towards establishing the rationale of 
the research i.e. determining the need for addressing safety as a total management process 
in construction contracting organizations in order to achieve the goal of zero accidents.  
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4.2 Brief Description of Survey Instruments and Utility toward Overall Research 
Objective 
4.2.1. Survey Instrument 1: Assessment of Current Safety Attitudes and Approaches 
of Contractor Management in the Construction Industry 
Contractor management plays an important role in organizing and implementing 
safety policies on construction sites (Mohamed, 2002). The interaction and 
communication of management with workers in terms of their commitment, support and 
motivation can have a positive (or negative) influence on workers’ perceptions, attitudes, 
competence, and behaviors towards safety. 
The objective of this survey was to assess the current safety attitudes and approaches 
of the top management of U.S. construction contracting firms in terms of providing 
commitment and support for implementation of key safety management policies, 
procedures and practices. Conclusions drawn from this research were to strengthen or 
weaken the argument that contractor management in construction organizations in the 
U.S. is generally focused towards safety compliance rather than safety participation. 
From the perspective of the overall aim of this dissertation, the underlying intent of 
this specific study was to collect and analyze data on contractor management attitudes 
and practices, which would serve as a basis to establish the rationale of this research: 
need for a strategic zero-accident safety management framework in the construction 
industry to achieve continuous and sustainable safety improvement.  
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4.2.2. Survey Instrument 2: Assessment of Current Safety Attitudes and Approaches 
of Supervisors and Foremen in the Construction Industry 
The construction supervisor/ foreman is typically the key person of contact for 
workers in the field on a construction project. This person is responsible for the direct 
daily supervision of activities with the key task is to see that all work elements are fitted 
together in the right sequence and at the right time. The supervisor plays an important 
role in organizing and managing productivity, quality, and safety outcomes. 
The objective of this survey was to assess the current safety attitudes and approaches 
of supervisors and foremen in U.S. construction contracting firms in terms of providing 
commitment, support and training/ coaching for promoting safety among workers and in 
the work environment. Conclusions drawn from this research were to strengthen or 
weaken the argument that the supervisors (and foremen) in construction organizations in 
the U.S. are generally focused towards safety compliance rather than safety participation.  
From the perspective of the overall aim of this dissertation, the underlying intent of 
this specific study was to collect and analyze data on the attitudes and practices of 
construction supervisors and foremen, which would serve as a basis to establish the 
rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety management 
framework in the construction industry to achieve continuous and sustainable safety 
improvement. 
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4.2.3. Survey Instrument 3: Analysis of the Criticism on OSHA with Respect to its 
Lack of Success in Acting as a Catalyst to Incorporate Total Safety in 
Construction Organizations 
Empirical evidence exists that, over the years, organizations have viewed OSHA and 
their numerous regulations, standards, and strict penalties in a negative light. One of the 
more common arguments against the agency is the fact that their heavy fines and 
guidelines deliver an overbearing and unwanted presence that greatly restricts an 
organization’s ability to develop as well as compete. This places a heavy burden on 
organizations by forcing increased operational fees and the costs associated to retrofit 
outdated equipment rather than investing on improving the processes for achieving long-
term safety objectives. A similar argument is that the agency is not actively participating 
in the necessary research to view and incorporate safety as an industrial development 
process, and hence their regulations do not support implementing safety as a total 
management process. 
This research collected industry opinions in order to more elaborately assess the 
criticism on OSHA with respect to its failure to act as a catalyst to incorporate total safety 
in a construction organization. In particular, the research attempted to delve into the 
reasons as to why OSHA has not been as successful as it should have been.  
From the perspective of the overall aim of this dissertation, the underlying intent of 
this specific study on OSHA was to collect and analyze data on OSHA criticism, which 
was to serve as a basis to establish the rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-
accident safety management framework in the construction industry to achieve 
continuous and sustainable safety improvement.  
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4.2.4. Survey Instrument 4: Investigation of the State of Adoption and 
Implementation of Safety as a Total Management Process in Construction 
Contracting Firms’ Management Systems, and to Identify the Obstacles 
Today’s construction projects are growing in complexity and in order to succeed on 
the global level, construction organizations must not approach construction safety and 
health as just another step in avoiding unwanted accidents or federal fines, but as a 
strategic tool, that if implemented effectively, will have the potential to maximize 
competitiveness and profit. This strategic approach to safety can be accomplished via a 
total management approach to safety.   
Literature review highlighted that no accurate information regarding the extent of 
usage of safety as a total management process in the construction industry was available. 
Hence this survey was conducted wherein the contractors and subcontractors were asked 
to identify the extent of adoption and implementation of safety as a total management 
process in their businesses. The results of the survey included measurements on the 
extent of knowledge of the industry personnel about safety as a total management 
process, and the use of techniques of implementing safety as a total management process 
in the industry. The survey further reflected industry opinions as to the benefits and 
obstacles of the application of total safety techniques to the construction industry in terms 
of achieving the goal of zero accidents.  
Conclusions drawn from this study were to strengthen or weaken the argument that 
the safety improvement strategies currently adopted by construction organizations in the 
U.S. are generally focused towards safety compliance rather than total safety 
management.  
 65
From the perspective of the overall aim of this dissertation, the underlying intent of 
this specific study was to collect and analyze data on safety improvement practices, and 
Total Safety Management adoption and readiness, which would serve as a basis to 
establish the rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety 
improvement framework in the construction industry to achieve continuous and 
sustainable safety improvement.  
4.3 Survey Administration 
The surveys were carried out over the period extending from September 2008 to 
February 2009.  The questionnaires were posted to named individuals in September 2008, 
with a suggested date for return at the end of November 2008. Questionnaire returns were 
received over the next five months, in some cases after a phone call reminder. 
The four surveys were administered via a consistent set of data sample of 
construction contractors and sub-contractors. More specifically, the final data sample 
included general contractors, structural steel contractors, poured concrete contractors, 
precast concrete contractors, masonry contractors, electrical contractors, mechanical and 
HVAC contractors, etc. representing 102 different companies (37 general contractors and 
65 specialty contractors) working in the building construction sector (commercial and 
institutional). These 102 companies selected shared many common traits. They were 
mostly medium to large size firms on the basis of their employee counts and annual 
turnovers; they all performed all or some of their own work (such as carpentry, concrete 
placement, masonry work, etc.); they all primarily concentrate on large commercial 
buildings; and all were willing to actively take part in data collection.  
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The focus was delimited to general contractors and specialty contractors with major 
experience in commercial building construction. In future studies, research may be 
expanded to other types of construction such as residential, heavy-civil, or industrial.  
4.3.1. Survey Response 
Over 2120 copies of the four questionnaires (approximately 530 each) were 
distributed to the identified companies through electronic and postal mail. To avoid the 
problem of bias, it was decided to collect data from no less than 5 employees working for 
the same organization. A total of 817 questionnaires were returned. However, 69 
questionnaires were either determined to be outliers or were discarded owing to 
possibility of bias. A total of 738 questionnaires were input into an SPSS database to be 
used for analysis. Overall survey response rates for each of the four surveys (in terms of 
individual participation) are depicted in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of 
responses in terms of organizational participation.  
Table 4.1: Overall response rates 
 Total 
questionnaires 
distributed 
Questionnaires 
returned  
Total 
number of 
potential 
responses 
Total 
valid 
responses 
received 
Percentage 
of valid 
responses 
Survey 1 530 212 212 192 36.22% 
Survey 2 530 197 197 174 32.83% 
Survey 3 530 223 223 201 37.92% 
Survey 4 530 185 185 171 32.26% 
Total 2120 817 817 738 34.81% 
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Table 4.2: Breakdown of responses with respect to type of organization 
Type of Organization Approached Responded Response 
% 
General Contractor 128 37 28.91% 
Subcontractor 183 65 35.52% 
Total 311 102 32.80% 
 
The survey response rates depicted in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (34.81% for individual 
participation and 32.80% for organizational participation) are very good for a 
construction industry questionnaire survey and should not be considered as biased 
(Akintoye and Macleod). In similar type of surveys, Panthi et al. (2007) received a 
response rate of 19.4%, Ahmed and Azhar (2004) received 30.4% and Wang et al. (2004) 
received a very low response rate of 7.75%. Baker (1998) reported that statistically 
reliable conclusions can be obtained from a sample size of 20 or more. Moreover, the 
conclusions drawn on the basis of the responses were further verified through interviews 
with experts, and hence can be considered as unbiased. 
4.3.2. Respondent Organizations’ Profile 
Figure 4.1 depicts information about distribution of respondent organizations in terms 
of their nature of work.  
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Figure 4.1: Nature of work of Respondent Organizations 
Figure 4.2 depicts information about the size of respondent organizations. The 
organization size is decided on the basis of number of employees as follows: 0-
50small; 51-250medium; and >250large. The results indicate that the majority of 
respondents are medium and large size companies. The annual turnover of these 
companies varies from $5 million to over $50 million. 
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Figure 4.2: Size of Respondent Organizations 
 
Table 4.3 depicts information about the geographic profile (states of operation) of 
respondent organizations. Most of the organizations had multi-state operations with 
major or minor businesses in more than 4 states. The average number of organizations 
surveyed per state was 10.9 with a high of 35 (for Florida) and a low of 5 (for 
Washington D.C.). 
Table 4.3: Geographic Profile (states of operation) of Respondent Organizations 
State 
No. of 
Participating 
Firms 
State 
No. of 
Participating 
Firms 
State 
No. of 
Participating 
Firms 
State 
No. of 
Participating 
Firms 
AL 11 IA 9 NV 8 SD 12 
AZ 8 KS 11 NH 7 TN 11 
AR 9 KY 12 NJ 11 TX 18 
CA 18 LA 14 NM 12 UT 12 
CO 6 ME 13 NY 22 VT 7 
CT 7 MD 12 NC 16 VA 9 
DE 8 MA 8 ND 13 WA 11 
DC 5 MI 10 OH 7 WV 8 
FL 35 MN 7 OK 8 WI 11 
GA 18 MS 6 OR 5 WY 9 
ID 12 MO 9 PA 6   
IL 14 MT 11 RI 7   
IN 11 NE 12 SC 10   
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Table 4.4 shows the collective distribution of respondent organizations In terms of the 
four regional divisions defined by the United States Census Bureau. It is evident from 
Table 4.4 that all the four regions share a reasonably balanced distribution of 
participation (the average share of participation of firms per state per region is 2.04% 
with a high of 2.30% (for region 3) and a low of 1.82% (for region 1). 
Table 4.4: Geographic Profile (regions) of Respondent Organizations 
Region 
Share of 
Participating 
Firms  
(No.) 
Share of 
Participating 
Firms  
(%) 
Region 1 (Northeast) – 9 states 88 16.42% 
Region 2 (Midwest) – 12 states 126 23.51% 
Region 3 (South) – 17 states 210 39.18% 
Region 4 (West) – 11 states 112 20.90% 
 
4.3.3. Demographic Information 
Middle management (mainly project managers and safety directors) and upper 
management (mainly vice presidents and senior managers) completed surveys 1, 3 and 4, 
while supervisors and foremen completed survey 2. Demographic information for the 
survey respondents is presented in Tables 4.5(a) and 4.5(b). 
Table 4.5a: Participants’ construction experience (Surveys 1, 3 & 4) 
 Average 
Years 
Most 
Experience 
Least 
Experience
Years in Construction 29.42 38 12 
Years as Executives/ Managers 17.68 27 5 
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Table 4.5b: Participants’ construction experience (Survey 2) 
 Average 
Years 
Most 
Experience 
Least 
Experience 
Years in Construction 23.17 29 9 
Years as Supervisors/ 
Foremen 
12.54 23 5 
 
Table 4.5(a) shows that the average construction experience of the participants for 
surveys 1, 3 and 4 was 29.42 years with a high of 38 years and a low of 12 years, while 
the average executive construction experience was 17.68 years with a high of 27 years 
and a low of 5 years. The average construction experience that these participants had 
before moving into the executive role was approximately 12 years. 
Table 4.5(b) shows that the average construction experience of the participants for 
survey 2 was 23.17 years with a high of 29 years and a low of 9 years, while the average 
supervisor-level or foremen-level construction experience was 12.54 years with a high of 
23 years and a low of 5 years. The average construction experience that these participants 
had before moving into the supervisory/ foremen role was approximately 10 years. 
Table 4.6 presents the educational qualification of the participants. This wide range of 
formal education among the participants did not produce a wide range of differences in 
the data.  
Table 4.6 shows that more than 80% of the participants had postsecondary degrees. A 
further diagnosis of the major concentrations for the postsecondary degrees held by these 
participants indicated that, including Civil Engineering and Architecture, 58.5% of the 
participants with a postsecondary degree had that degree in a construction related 
concentration (such as construction management, construction engineering and the like), 
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24% of the participants had that degree in business concentration (such as business 
administration and the like), while the remaining had diverse academic backgrounds 
ranging from majors in English, Psychology, Education, etc. 
Table 4.6: Participants’ education 
 
Number of 
Participants 
Post-
Master’s 
Degree 
Master’s 
Degree 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Associate’s 
Degree 
Some 
College 
(No 
Degree) 
High 
School 
Degree 
Survey 
1 192 
12 54 89 21 10 6 
Survey 
2 174 
0 12 25 86 35 16 
Survey 
3 201 
17 48 103 18 9 6 
Survey 
4 171 
11 37 97 14 7 5 
Total 738 40 151 314 139 61 33 
(%)  (5.42%) (20.46%) (42.55%) (18.83%) (8.27%) (4.47%) 
 
On the basis of their position, education, and work experience, it can be inferred that 
the respondents have adequate knowledge of the safety related activities in their 
organizations as well as in the industry.  
Overall, the data set (Table 4.6) accounts for a reasonable representation of the 
companies participating in this study, and produces statistically significant results as 
described later in this study.  
In accordance with established survey procedures and in recognition of the sensitive 
nature of the data collected, strict confidentiality was maintained during this survey 
research and no identities have been divulged. 
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4.4 Data Analysis  
4.4.1. Survey 1: Assessment of current safety attitudes and approaches of 
contractor top management in the construction industry 
4.4.1.1.Survey Description 
Corporate management plays an important role in organizing and implementing 
safety policies on construction sites (Mohamed, 2002). The interaction and 
communication of management with workers in terms of their commitment, support and 
motivation can have a positive (or negative) influence on workers’ perceptions, attitudes, 
competence, and behaviors towards safety. O’Toole (2002) proposed that there is a 
connection between management’s approach to safety and employees’ perception of how 
important safety is to the management team. For instance, the management approach to 
safety generates as well as reinforces employee perceptions about what gets rewarded, 
supported and expected in a particular setting. Neal et al. (2000) identified two distinct 
management approaches to safety: 1) safety compliance, which involves requiring 
adherence to safety procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner, and 2) safety 
participation, which involves supporting and helping workers, promoting the safety 
program within the workplace, demonstrating initiatives, and putting efforts into safety 
for improving the safety performance. Hence the management approach/ attitude towards 
safety must be taken into account while addressing the safety performance of a 
construction organization. 
For the purpose of this study, the evaluation of safety attitude of management in the 
industry was done by conducting a safety attitude survey in construction organizations 
that examined the management approaches and practices as a predictive tool to 
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demonstrate how safety is operational within the construction organizations in the 
industry. A survey was designed and distributed  to contractor and subcontractor top 
management for assessing the overall safety attitudes in their companies by taking into 
account  their safety policy, commitment and support , responsibility structures, 
communication and authority, decision making, training and orientation, administration 
and procedures, inspections, accident investigation and reporting, and safety non-
performance issues. Conclusions drawn from this research will strengthen or weaken the 
argument that the top management in construction organizations in the U.S. is generally 
focused towards safety compliance rather than safety participation.  
From the perspective of the overall objective of this dissertation, the underlying 
objective of this study on contractor top management was to collect and analyze data on 
top management attitudes and practices, which served as a basis to establish the rationale 
of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety management framework in the 
construction industry to achieve continuous safety improvement.  
4.4.1.2.Methodology 
Structured surveys were conducted to achieve the study objectives. The methodology 
of survey development and administration was the same as discussed in section 3.2.2.3. 
The following sections illustrate the major findings of the research conducted for the 
key question at hand: Are the strategies, approaches, methods and operations currently 
employed by contractor top management helping in strategically improving safety in the 
construction industry?  
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4.4.1.3.Data Collection 
On the basis of literature review, six key constructs (factors) were identified along 
with a number of associated indicators (observable items in terms of survey questions) to 
analyze contractor top management attitudes and approaches with respect to strategically 
improving safety in their organizations. The constructs are described in the following 
sub-section. 
4.4.1.3.1. Constructs 
The following six constructs (factors) were used to analyze the various facets of 
contractor top management attitudes and approaches towards safety.  
4.4.1.3.1.1.Safety Policy 
This construct consisted of various indicators determining the nature of safety 
policies in construction organizations, such as, presence of a written safety program 
manual and field manual, constituent elements of the policy, communication of the policy 
to the workforce, policy review and revision procedures, and safety criterion in 
recruitment policy of workers, managers, supervisors, subcontractors, suppliers, and 
vendors.  
4.4.1.3.1.2.Management Commitment and Support 
The role management plays in promoting safety cannot be overemphasized. 
Management’s role has to go beyond organizing and providing safety policies and 
working instructions. Several studies show that the management’s commitment and 
involvement in safety is the factor of most importance for a satisfactory safety level 
(Jaselskis et al. 1996). Langford et al. (2000) found that when employees believe that the 
management cares about their personal safety, they are more willing to cooperate to 
 76
improve safety performance. Thus, the greater the level of management commitment 
toward safety, the more improved the safety performance. This construct consisted of a 
number of indicators determining the nature and extent of management commitment and 
support towards safety in construction organizations. These included demonstrated 
emphasis of safety over productivity, setting of corporate safety goals, executive 
management involvement in safety activities, executive management review process on 
safety, employee empowerment to providing feedback on health and safety matters, 
continuous support for updating health and safety procedures, presence of a safety 
responsibility structure at the organizational level, presence of project safety committees, 
delegation of authority to safety officers to respond independently in case of unsafe acts, 
provision of appropriate safety support personnel on work sites, and safety performance 
evaluation of supervisors. 
4.4.1.3.1.3.Safety Communication and Decision Making  
Management is expected to use a variety of formal and informal means of 
communication to promote and communicate its commitment to safety (Baxendale and 
Jones 2000). Simon and Piquard (1991) suggests that both management communication 
and employee feedback are critical for suggesting safety improvements and reporting 
near misses as well as unsafe conditions and practices. Thus, the more effective the 
organizational communication dealing with safety issues, the more improved the safety 
performance. This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature 
and effectiveness of safety communication and decision making by top management in 
construction organizations. These included requirement of site managers and supervisors 
engage themselves in regular safety talks with operatives, presence of formal behavior 
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observation programs on work sites, encouragement provided to workers to raise safety 
concerns with their supervisors, a work environment provided by management wherein 
safety problems are openly discussed between workers and supervisors, involvement of 
workers in preparation of site safety plans, communication of lessons learned from 
accidents to workers, and involvement of workers and subcontractor representatives in 
site safety decisions 
4.4.1.3.1.4. Safety Training and Orientation 
Training is a major component of safety. Safety training can modify worker safe 
behavior; the workers can understand the work potential hazard such that they can 
prevent it (Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009). This construct consisted of a number of 
indicators determining the nature and effectiveness of safety training and orientation 
procedures provided by management in construction organizations. These included 
presence of a health and safety training program/ plan, review and revision process of the 
training program, levels of training focused in the program, inclusion of safety training as 
a line item in project budget, requirement for conductance of site safety orientation for 
every new person to a job site, requirement of safety training meetings for each 
supervisor (foreman and above), requirement for holding tool box/ tailgate safety 
meetings focused on specific work operations/exposures, emphasis on site managers and 
supervisors in meetings to maintain a positive attitude towards safety so that workers take 
safety on the site seriously, requirement of equipment operation/certification training, 
requirement for conductance of safety inductions for site visitors, requirement for 
subcontractor workers to attend formal standard safety orientation, requirement for 
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subcontractors to hold regular safety meetings, and monitoring of the effectiveness of 
health and safety training checking new skills.  
4.4.1.3.1.5.Safety Administration and Procedures 
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature and 
effectiveness of safety administration and procedures provided by management in 
construction organizations. These included constituent administrative procedures of 
company’s written safety program,  documentation of safety work rules for various site 
operations, review and revision process of work rules, requirement for pre-task safety 
meetings, discussion of safety at all preconstruction and progress meetings, requirement 
to perform site layout planning before commencement of work, maintaining first aid 
facilities on work sites, conductance of emergency response drills, provision of safety 
bulletin boards, safety signs and posters, system of incentive mechanisms, system of 
disincentive (penalty) mechanisms,  established mechanism to recognize safety 
accomplishments, maintaining Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) on work sites, 
procedures to ensure proper use of PPE, requirement to maintain a site hazard register 
containing hazards, impacts and preventive measures, conducting regular job site safety 
inspections, conducting routine safety inspection of equipment, maintaining jobsite safety 
checklists (or similar tools) for inspection, a system to monitor the effectiveness and 
thoroughness of safety inspection, s system to collect and analyze the results of safety 
inspections, and a system to ensure that action is taken as a result of the findings of safety 
inspections. 
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4.4.1.3.1.6.Accident Investigation and Reporting 
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature and 
effectiveness of accident investigation and reporting procedures employed by 
management in construction organizations. These included presence of a procedure to 
investigate accidents, a system to ensure that appropriate steps be taken to prevent similar 
accidents in future, requirement to report incidents/ near misses in your reporting system, 
investigation of near misses to help prevent accidents, keeping of organizational safety 
records and logs, and a system to effectively use safety records and logs to enhance safety 
performance.  
4.4.1.3.2. Questionnaire 
A quantitative research method was chosen to examine the contractor top 
management attitudes and approaches toward safety, since it was exploratory in nature. 
Questionnaire survey was used in order to facilitate the collection of information from 
construction organizations. All indicators (observed variables) were measured through a 
five-point Likert-type response format. Items, relating to each of the constructs, were 
used in the form of statements to measure individual constructs under investigation. 
Participants were asked to endorse the statements using a five-point Likert-type scale 
(from 1=‘‘strongly disagree’’ to 5=‘‘strongly agree’’). Questionnaire survey is presented 
in Appendix A. 
To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft 
questionnaires were constructed and pretested via face-to-face meetings with select 
professionals including short-listed experts from construction contracting organizations 
representing their top management and middle/ project management, all having expertise 
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in or exposure to safety issues. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire. 
The questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 97 statements about contractor 
top management attitudes and approaches toward safety. The research targeted top 
management personnel for general contractors and subcontractors as the survey sample.  
Based on all the gathered information, quantitative analysis was performed and the 
results are discussed in the following section. 
4.4.1.4.Data Analysis 
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the survey were assumed to reflect the 
unobserved, underlying construct, with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the 
observed measures. For example, constructs such as management commitment & 
support, and safety communication & decision making are typically viewed as underlying 
factors that give rise to something that is observed. Accordingly, their indicators tend to 
be realized as reflective. 
4.4.1.4.1. Assessment of Data Reliability and Validity 
Prior to data analysis, the reliability and validity of data was assessed using the 
methodology adopted in similar research (such as Mohamed, 2002). Specifically, three 
measurement properties need to be examined to ensure that the data has a satisfactory 
level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). The first of these is the 
individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations) of the items on their 
respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point (Fornell and Larcker 
1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the item’s variance is 
due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with all loadings in the 
range of 0.75–0.90, demonstrating the satisfactory level of individual item reliability. 
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Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or 
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is 
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is 
listed in Table 4.7. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70 
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).  
The third measurement property is the discriminant validity – that is, the extent to 
which each construct differs from other constructs in the analysis. It is assessed by using 
the average variance extracted (Av), suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table 4.7). 
This measure should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and other 
constructs in the model (i.e., the squared correlation between two constructs). This can be 
demonstrated in the correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.8, which includes the 
correlations between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the 
matrix, and the square root of the average variance extracted (Av) calculated for each of 
the constructs along the diagonal. Having all of the diagonal elements greater than any 
other corresponding row or column implies adequate discriminant validity. 
Having satisfied the three measurement properties, it can be concluded that the 
constructs are measured with adequate precision. 
Table 4.7: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs 
Construct 
 
Cronbach’s alpha 
 
Average variance
extracted (Av) 
1. Safety Policy 0.912 0.71 
2. Management Commitment and Support 0.875 0.73 
3. Safety Communication and Decision Making 0.832 0.69 
4. Safety Training and Orientation 0.901 0.67 
4. Safety Administration and Procedures 0.854 0.74 
5. Accident Investigation and Reporting 0.873 0.78 
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Table 4.8: Discriminant Validity Analysis 
Construct  
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Safety Policy 0.84 - - - - - 
2. Management Commitment and 
Support 
0.09 0.85 - - - - 
3. Safety Communication and Decision 
Making  
0.13 0.18 0.83 - - - 
4. Safety Training and Orientation 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.82 - - 
5. Safety Administration and 
Procedures 
0.17 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.86 - 
6. Accident Investigation and 
Reporting 
0.19 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.88 
 
4.4.1.4.2. Results and Conclusion 
This section presents the results of the survey. Contractor top management attitudes 
and approaches towards safety were determined by six independent constructs – safety  
policy, management commitment & support, safety communication & decision making, 
safety training & orientation, safety administration & procedures, and accident 
investigation and reporting, Strictly speaking, support was found for the impact of 
contractor top management safety policy, commitment & support, communication & 
decision making, training & orientation, administration & procedures, and accident 
investigation and reporting on the strategic safety improvement in the construction 
industry.  
Descriptive analysis was performed to analyze the results. To assess the extent of 
impact of each of the measured indicators (survey items) with respect to top 
management’s approach to safety, the mean values of survey responses for each item 
were used. A mean score of 5 in the final analysis represented best performance on the 
measured indicator, while a mean score of 1 represented worst performance on the 
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measure under consideration. A mean response score of 4.50 was considered least 
significant in terms of that particular measure generating (minimal) negative impact on 
the related construct. In order to distinguish the measures with respect to their extent of 
impact, the following indicator criticality indexing and zoning criteria was used (Table 
4.9). 
Table 4.9: Indicator Criticality Indices & Zones 
Mean Score 
Range 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone 
<=2 6 Major High 
2.01-2.50 5 Major Low 
2.51 – 3.00 4 Moderate 
High 
 
3.01-3.50 
3 Moderate 
Low 
3.51 – 4.00 2 Minor High 
4.01 – 4.50 1 Minor Low 
4.51 – 5.00 0 Non-
Critical 
 
Tables 4.10-4.15 show the mean response scores and indicator criticality indices for 
all the items measured in the survey, organized under their respective constructs. The 
tables have been sorted in descending order of criticality of the indicators measured 
(based on their mean values). 
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Table 4.10: Safety Policy Construct 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)  
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
I Safety Policy 
1 The company has safety related criterion for 
subcontractor selection (e.g. past safety 
records). 
2.23 5 Major 
Low 
2 The company has safety related criterion for 
workers’ recruitment (e.g. experience, safety 
training). 
2.32 5 Major 
Low 
3 The company has safety related criterion for 
managers’ & supervisors’ recruitment (e.g. 
experience, safety training). 
2.38 5 Major 
Low 
4 The revisions (where relevant) are promptly 
brought to the attention of all employees. 
2.51 4 Moderate 
High 
5 The review arrangement includes feedback 
from employees at all levels. 
2.56 4 Moderate 
High 
6 The safety policy clearly states that decisions 
on other priorities should give due regard to 
construction safety requirements. 
2.61 4 Moderate 
High 
7 There are effective arrangements for 
reviewing the health and safety policy at least 
once a year. 
2.61 4 Moderate 
High 
8 The company has a well-written substance 
abuse program. 
3.76 2 Minor 
High 
9 The company has a well-written light-duty, 
return-to-work policy. 
3.96 2 Minor 
High 
10 The policy endeavors to set targets (corporate 
safety goals) for health and safety 
performance including a commitment to 
progressive improvement. 
4.01 1 Minor 
Low 
11 The policy identifies key senior personnel for 
overall coordination and implementation of 
the policy. 
4.11 1 Minor 
Low 
12 The company has a well established 
disciplinary process for enforcement of safety 
program/safety plan. 
4.11 1 Minor 
Low 
13 The company has a well-written safety field 
manual. 
 
4.16 1 Minor 
Low 
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Table 4.10: Safety Policy Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)  
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
14 As part of company policy, workers are given 
a booklet containing work rules, 
responsibilities, and other appropriate 
information. 
4.16 1 Minor 
Low 
15 The company has a well-written personal 
protective equipment (PPE) policy. 
4.16 1 Minor 
Low 
16 The policy is explained to new employees as 
part of their training and orientation before 
entry to a work on-site. 
4.21 1 Minor 
Low 
17 The company has a well-written policy on 
accident reporting and investigation. 
4.5 1 Minor 
Low 
18 The policy explicitly commits the 
organization to full compliance with all 
relevant health and safety legislation. 
4.55 0 Non-
Critical 
19 The company has a well-written safety 
program manual/ safety plan. 
4.8 0 Non-
Critical 
1based on Table 4.9 
4.11: Management Commitment & Support Construct 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
II Management Commitment & Support 
20 The number of safety officers delegated 
on a site depends on the perceived/ 
evaluated hazards and complexity of the 
site. 
0.79 6 Major 
High 
21 The management emphasizes on having 
project safety committees. 
1.58 6 Major 
High 
22 Safety is a mandatory part of the 
supervisor’s performance evaluation. 
1.63 6 Major 
High 
23 There are effective arrangements to 
collect and review worker feedback on 
health and safety matters. 
1.78 6 Major 
High 
24 The executive management reviews 
accident reports. 
1.83 6 Major 
High 
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4.11: Management Commitment & Support Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
25 The safety officers are delegated the 
responsibility and authority to suspend 
work if there are unsafe acts. 
1.88 6 Major 
High 
26 The executive management involves 
itself in promoting safety by giving 
directions/ motivation. 
2.38 5 Major 
Low 
27 The executive management involves 
itself in enacting incentive schemes to 
encourage staff and subcontractors to 
observe safety  
2.7 4 Moderate 
High 
28 The executive management involves 
itself in attending or chairing safety 
committees. 
2.72 4 Moderate 
High 
29 The management clearly emphasizes 
safety over productivity. 
2.86 4 Moderate 
High 
30 The number of safety officers delegated 
on a site depends on the accident records. 
3.22 3 Moderate 
Low 
31 The executive management reviews 
safety statistics. 
3.37 3 Moderate 
Low 
32 The number of safety officers delegated 
on a site depends on the requirements of 
the law/ the contract. 
3.66 2 Minor 
High 
33 The executive management reviews 
inspection reports. 
3.81 2 Minor 
High 
34 The executive management involves 
itself in requiring and facilitating regular 
safety inspection on sites. 
3.81 2 Minor 
High 
35 The names and positions with 
responsibility lines for safety 
performance management are explicitly 
identified (such as an organization chart). 
3.81 2 Minor 
High 
36 The management sets corporate safety 
goals. 
4.01 1 Minor 
Low 
37 The management always keeps someone 
in charge of updating health and safety 
including changes to regulations, new 
codes of practice, newly identified 
hazards, and new work practices. 
4.16 1 Minor 
Low 
1based on Table 4.9 
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Table 4.12: Safety Communication & Decision Making Construct 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
III Safety Communication & Decision Making  
38 Management strongly emphasizes that 
safety problems be openly discussed 
between workers and supervisors.  
1.73 6 Major 
High 
39 Management strongly emphasizes that 
workers be involved in site safety 
decisions.  
1.83 6 Major 
High 
40 As per management directives, a formal 
behavior observation program exists on 
work sites. 
2.72 4 Moderate 
High 
41 Management strongly encourages workers 
to raise safety concerns with their 
supervisors. 
2.91 4 Moderate 
High 
42 Management emphasizes that workers be 
involved in preparation of site safety 
plans. 
2.96 4 Moderate 
High 
43 Management strongly emphasizes that 
subcontractors/ subcontractor safety rep/ 
subcontractor staff be involved in site 
safety decisions.  
3.21 3 Moderate 
Low 
44 Management communicates lessons from 
accidents to workers in order to improve 
safety performance.             
3.26 3 Moderate 
Low 
45 As per management directives, site 
managers and supervisors are required to 
engage themselves in regular safety talks 
with operatives. 
3.26 3 Moderate 
Low 
1based on Table 4.9 
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Table 4.13: Safety Training & Orientation Construct 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
IV Safety Training & Orientation  
46 The safety program requires subcontractors 
to hold regular safety meetings. 
1.88 6 Major 
High 
47 The effectiveness of health and safety 
training is monitored by the company by 
checking new skills. 
1.93 6 Major 
High 
48 Management strongly emphasizes on site 
managers and supervisors in meetings to 
maintain a positive attitude towards safety 
so that workers take safety on the site 
seriously. 
2.43 5 Major 
Low 
49 The safety program requires all subcontract 
workers to attend a formal standard safety 
orientation. 
2.77 4 Moderate 
High 
50 The health and safety training program/ 
plan exists at the managerial level. 
2.87 4 Moderate 
High 
51 The safety program requires holding tool 
box/ tailgate safety meetings focused on 
specific work operations/exposures. 
2.87 4 Moderate 
High 
52 The safety program requires conducting 
safety inductions for site visitors. 
3.12 3 Moderate 
Low 
53 The health and safety training program/ 
plan exists at the supervisory level. 
3.32 3 Moderate 
Low 
54 Safety training is always a line or 
compulsory item within the budget. 
3.51 2 Minor 
High 
55 The health and safety training program/ 
plan exists at the workforce level. 
3.61 2 Minor 
High 
56 The safety program requires conducting 
site safety orientation for every person new 
to the job site. 
3.71 2 Minor 
High 
57 The safety program requires safety training 
meetings for each supervisor (foreman and 
above). 
4.16 1 Minor 
Low 
58 The company has a well-documented 
health and safety training program/ plan  
4.16 1 Minor 
Low 
59 The safety program requires equipment 
operation/certification training. 
4.75 0 Non-
Critical 
1based on Table 4.9 
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Table 4.14: Safety Administration & Procedures Construct 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
V Safety Administration & Procedures  
60 The company has an established system 
to recognize safety accomplishments 
(such as award given out on a regular 
basis with recognition given for good 
safety performance. 
1.58 6 60 
61 Any non-compliance to wearing 
appropriate PPE is required by the 
management to be investigated.  
1.63 6 61 
62 Management motivates workers to work 
safely by providing incentives/ awards/ 
recognitions for good safety 
performance (e.g. monetary incentives). 
1.93 6 62 
63 The work rules are regularly updated.  2.18 5 63 
64 There are appropriate arrangements to 
monitor the effectiveness and 
thoroughness of safety inspection. 
2.23 5 64 
65 There are appropriate arrangements to 
collect and analyze the results of safety 
inspections. 
2.28 5 65 
66 There are appropriate arrangements to 
ensure that action is taken as a result of 
the findings of safety inspections. 
2.62 4 66 
67 The safety program requires having pre-
task meetings before executing an 
activity. 
2.67 4 67 
68 The safety program requires performing 
site layout planning before start of work.
2.72 4 68 
69 The management discusses safety at all 
preconstruction and progress meetings. 
2.82 4 69 
70 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety communications 
procedures. 
3.27 3 70 
71 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety risk identification and 
management procedures. 
3.27 3 71 
72 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety planning procedures. 
3.27 3 72 
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Table 4.14: Safety Administration & Procedures Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
73 Management disciplines workers to 
work safely by imposing disciplinary 
action (e.g. penalties) for safety non-
performance. 
3.27 3 73 
74 The safety program requires conducting 
emergency response drills.  
3.32 3 74 
75 The company’s written safety program 
addresses physical controls and rules. 
3.38 3 75 
76 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety organization and 
responsibilities. 
3.42 3 76 
77 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety implementation, 
monitoring and control procedures. 
3.42 3 77 
78 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety training and awareness 
procedures.  
3.56 2 78 
79 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safe work procedures. 
3.61 2 79 
80 Safety bulletin boards are provided and 
located so that every employee will see 
them during working days.   
3.66 2 80 
81 The safety program requires 
maintaining a site hazard register 
containing hazards, impacts and 
preventive measures. 
3.71 2 81 
82 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety reporting procedures.  
3.76 2 82 
83 Safety signs and posters are prominently 
displayed on work sites. 
3.81 2 83 
84 The company maintains jobsite safety 
checklists (or similar tools) for 
inspection. 
3.86 2 84 
85 The company’s written safety program 
addresses accident and emergency 
response mechanisms. 
3.91 2 85 
86 The safety program requires conducting 
regular job site safety inspections/ 
audits. 
3.97 2 86 
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Table 4.14: Safety Administration & Procedures Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
87 The company has documented safety 
work rules/ procedures for all site 
operations performed by the company 
(such as excavation works, trenching 
works, high rise work etc.). 
4.01 1 87 
88 Site safety inspections are required to 
include routine safety inspection of 
equipment (e.g., scaffold, ladders, fire 
extinguishers, etc.). 
4.11 1 88 
89 There are established procedures to 
ensure the proper use of PPE as well as 
its training and inspection. 
4.31 1 89 
90 The company maintains PPE facilities 
on worksites. 
4.44 1 90 
91 The company maintains continuous 
supply of first aid facilities on work 
sites.  
4.5 1 91 
1based on Table 4.9 
Table 4.15: Accident Investigation & Reporting Construct 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
VI Accident Investigation & Reporting  
92 The company has a system to effectively 
use safety records and logs for 
enhancing safety performance. 
2.37 5 Major 
Low 
93 Management requires investigating near 
misses to help prevent accidents. 
2.64 4 Moderate 
High 
94 Management requires reporting 
incidents/ near misses in the company’s 
reporting system. 
2.85 4 Moderate 
High 
95 After each accident, appropriate steps 
are taken to prevent similar accidents in 
future. 
 
2.96 4 Moderate 
High 
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Table 4.15: Accident Investigation & Reporting Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
96 The company always investigates 
accidents. 
2.98 4 Moderate 
High 
97 Management requires keeping safety 
records and logs (such as in a database 
that logs injuries on past projects). 
3.9 2 Minor 
High 
1based on Table 4.9 
After analyzing Tables 4.10-4.15, the major critical contractor top management safety 
non-performance indicators (with criticality indices = 5 or 6), ranked in descending order 
of criticality (based on mean response score), are shown in Table 4.16. Table 4.16 also 
provides mean response rate, associated constructs, and indicator criticality ranking for 
these key safety non-performance indicators. The first column in Table 4.16 provides the 
serial number of these indicators as given in Tables 4.10-4.15. 
Table 4.16: Key Top Management Safety Non-Performance Indicators – All Constructs 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety 
Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
20 The number of safety officers 
delegated on a site depends on the 
perceived/ evaluated hazards and 
complexity of the site. 
0.79 Management 
Commitment & 
Support 
1 
21 The management emphasizes on 
having project safety committees. 
1.58 Management 
Commitment & 
Support 
2 
60 The company has an established 
system to recognize safety 
accomplishments (such as award 
given out on a regular basis with 
recognition given for good safety 
performance. 
 
1.58 Safety 
Administration & 
Procedures 
3 
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Table 4.16: Key Top Management Safety Non-Performance Indicators – All 
Constructs (continued) 
 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety 
Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
22 Safety is a mandatory part of the 
supervisor’s performance 
evaluation. 
1.63 Management 
Commitment & 
Support 
4 
61 Any non-compliance to wearing 
appropriate PPE is required by 
the management to be 
investigated.  
1.63 Safety 
Administration & 
Procedures 
5 
38 Management strongly emphasizes 
that safety problems be openly 
discussed between workers and 
supervisors.  
1.73 Safety 
Communication & 
Decision Making 
6 
23 There are effective arrangements 
to collect and review worker 
feedback on health and safety 
matters. 
1.78 Management 
Commitment & 
Support 
7 
24 The executive management 
reviews accident reports. 
1.83 Management 
Commitment & 
Support 
8 
39 Management strongly emphasizes 
that workers be involved in site 
safety decisions.  
1.83 Safety 
Communication & 
Decision Making 
9 
25 The safety officers are delegated 
the responsibility and authority to 
suspend work if there are unsafe 
acts. 
1.88 Management 
Commitment & 
Support 
10 
46 The safety program requires 
subcontractors to hold regular 
safety meetings. 
1.88 Safety Training & 
Orientation 
11 
47 The effectiveness of health and 
safety training is monitored by 
the company by checking new 
skills. 
1.93 Safety Training & 
Orientation 
12 
62 Management motivates workers 
to work safely by providing 
incentives/ awards/ recognitions 
for good safety performance (e.g. 
monetary incentives). 
1.93 Safety 
Administration & 
Procedures 
13 
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Table 4.16: Key Top Management Safety Non-Performance Indicators – All 
Constructs (continued) 
S. 
No. 
Top Management Safety 
Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
63 The work rules are regularly 
updated.  
2.18 Safety 
Administration & 
Procedures 
14 
1 The company has safety related 
criterion for subcontractor 
selection (e.g. past safety 
records). 
2.23 Safety Policy 15 
64 There are appropriate 
arrangements to monitor the 
effectiveness and thoroughness of 
safety inspection. 
2.23 Safety 
Administration & 
Procedures 
16 
65 There are appropriate 
arrangements to collect and 
analyze the results of safety 
inspections. 
2.28 Safety 
Administration & 
Procedures 
17 
2 The company has safety related 
criterion for workers’ recruitment 
(e.g. experience, safety training). 
2.32 Safety Policy 18 
92 The company has a system to 
effectively use safety records and 
logs for enhancing safety 
performance. 
2.37 Accident 
Investigation & 
Reporting 
19 
3 The company has safety related 
criterion for managers’ & 
supervisors’ recruitment (e.g. 
experience, safety training). 
2.38 Safety Policy 20 
26 The executive management 
involves itself in promoting 
safety by giving directions/ 
motivation. 
2.38 Management 
Commitment & 
Support 
21 
48 Management strongly emphasizes 
on site managers and supervisors 
in meetings to maintain a positive 
attitude towards safety so that 
workers take safety on the site 
seriously. 
2.43 Safety Training & 
Orientation 
22 
 
 95
Further assessment of Tables 4.10-4.15 – to identify construct criticality ranking 
(based on a value of weighted mean response score for each construct) – results in Table 
4.17. Table 4.17 has been arranged in descending order of construct criticality, and also 
provide construct criticality ranking and criticality zone. 
Table 4.17: Construct Criticality Ranking & Zone 
 
The major contractor top management safety non-performance indicators (with an 
indicator criticality index = 5 or 6) constitute 22 out of a total of 97 indicators i.e. 
22.68%. The moderate contractor top management safety non-performance indicators 
(with an indicator criticality index = 3 or 4) constitute 36 out of a total of 97 indicators 
i.e. 37.11%. Minor contractor top management safety non-performance indicators (with 
an indicator criticality index = 1 or 2) constitute 36 out of a total of 97 indicators i.e. 
37.11%. The remaining 3 indicators (3.09%) are not perceived by the industry as negative 
aspects of contractor top management safety performance.  
Safety communication and decision making, management commitment and support, 
accident investigation and reporting, safety training and orientation are all important 
Construct 
Weighted Mean 
Response Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Criticality  
Ranking Criticality  Zone 
Safety Communication & 
Decision making 
2.74 1 Moderate High 
Management Commitment & 
Support 
2.78 2 Moderate High 
Accident Investigation & 
Reporting 
2.95 3 Moderate High 
Safety Training & Orientation  3.22 4 Moderate Low 
Safety Administration & 
Procedures 
3.27 5 Moderate Low 
Safety Policy 3.56 6 Minor High 
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components of a strategic total safety environment. Lack of performance of top 
management on these areas undoubtedly indicate that contractor top management is not 
performing well in terms of achieving strategic safety improvement in the construction 
industry. Hence it can be concluded that the strategies, approaches, methods and 
operations adopted by contractor top management are not helping as they should in 
strategically improving safety in the construction industry. 
4.4.2. Survey 2: Assessment of current safety attitudes and approaches of 
supervisors and foremen in the construction industry 
4.4.2.1.Survey Description 
The construction supervisor/ foreman is typically the key person of contact for 
workers in the field on a construction project. He is responsible for the direct daily 
supervision of activities and his key task is to see that all work elements are fitted 
together in the right sequence and at the right time. He plays an important role in 
organizing and managing productivity, quality, and safety outcomes. In regards to safety, 
it is critical for a supervisor to be equipped with the training, knowledge, and skills to not 
only carry out the safety management practices but to instill safety in the workers’ 
attitudes and behaviors. The role supervisors play in promoting safety cannot be 
overemphasized. Supervisory commitment is a central element of construction safety; a 
supervisor with a positive safety attitude is vital in maintaining a safe work environment. 
Many key elements dictate a safety conscious working environment, which the supervisor 
initiate and instill. The attitude, interaction and communication of supervisors with 
workers in terms of their commitment, support and motivation can have a positive (or 
negative) influence on workers’ perceptions, attitudes, competence, and behaviors 
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towards safety.  Furthermore, supervisor is an important link between the workforce and 
management. As referenced earlier, Neal et al. (2000) identified two distinct management 
approaches to safety: 1) safety compliance, which involves requiring adherence to safety 
procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner, and 2) safety participation, which 
involves supporting and helping workers, promoting the safety program within the 
workplace, demonstrating initiatives, and putting efforts into safety for improving the 
safety performance. Based on management preference, the supervisors’ attitude and 
approach towards safety can have a significant impact on workers’ safety preferences and 
attitudes because the supervisor acts as a bridge between workers and management. For 
instance, the supervisor’s attitude to safety generates as well as reinforces employee 
perceptions about what gets rewarded, supported and expected in a particular setting. 
Hence a supervisor’s attitude towards safety must be taken into account while addressing 
the safety performance of a construction organization. This dimension of research is 
significant not only to understand supervisors’ role in strategically improving safety in 
the construction industry but also to determine how construction supervisors impact 
safety performance and hence the worker safety behavior through their management 
attitudes and practices.  
For the purpose of this study, the evaluation of safety attitude of supervisors in the 
industry was done by conducting a safety attitude survey in construction organizations 
that examined the supervisory approach and practices as a predictive tool to demonstrate 
how safety is operational on sites within the construction organizations in the industry. A 
survey was designed and distributed to contractor and subcontractor supervisory staff 
(including foremen and line managers) for assessing the overall safety attitudes on sites 
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by taking into account their safety commitment and support, safety training and 
orientation approach, disciplinary approach towards safety, safety communication, 
authority and decision making, and approach towards maintaining a safe work 
environment and a positive worker safety attitude. Conclusions drawn from this research 
will strengthen or weaken the argument that the supervisors in construction organizations 
in the U.S. are generally focused towards safety compliance rather than safety 
participation.  
From the perspective of the overall objective of this dissertation, the underlying 
objective of this research study on construction supervisors was to collect and analyze 
data on supervisor attitudes and practices, which would serve as a basis to establish the 
rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety management 
framework in the construction industry to achieve continuous safety improvement.  
4.4.2.2.Methodology 
Structured surveys were conducted to achieve the study objectives. The methodology 
of survey development and administration was the same as discussed in section 3.2.2.3. 
The following sections illustrate the major findings of the research conducted for the 
key question at hand: Are the strategies, approaches, and methods currently employed by 
supervisors helping in strategically improving safety in the construction industry? 
4.4.2.3.Data Collection 
On the basis of literature review, seven key constructs (factors) were identified along 
with a number of associated indicators (observable items in terms of survey questions) to 
analyze supervisor attitudes and approaches with respect to strategically improving safety 
in construction organizations. The constructs are described in the following sub-section. 
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4.4.2.3.1. Constructs 
The following seven constructs (factors) were used to analyze the various facets of 
supervisor attitudes and approaches towards safety.  
4.4.2.3.1.1.Training and Orientation 
Safety training is a major component of jobsite safety. Even skilled and experienced 
workers need a firm-specific safety and health orientation and training. Safety training 
can modify worker safe behavior; the workers can understand the work potential hazard 
such that they can prevent it (Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009). Supervisors play a 
significant role in the training and orientation process of workers. This support comes in 
the form of explaining safety operations and rules to workers, holding regular safety 
meetings, coaching workers, providing job-specific safety training, and holding toolbox 
safety meetings focused on specific work operations and exposures. The greater the level 
of supervisory commitment toward worker safety training and orientation, the better 
would be the site safety performance. This construct consisted of various indicators 
determining the nature and extent of support provided by supervisors in terms of worker 
safety training and orientation.  
4.4.2.3.1.2.Safety Administration 
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature and 
effectiveness of safety administration as provided & facilitated by supervisors in 
construction organizations. Aspects of administering safety in the workplace include 
taking unsafe tools out of production, reporting and investigating accidents, maintaining a 
continuous supply of first aid facilities on site, establishing inspection teams for hazard 
analysis, inspecting work, and correcting unsafe conditions and acts.  
 100
4.4.2.3.1.3.Maintaining Discipline 
The aim in maintaining discipline in the workplace is to produce a functional working 
environment that will maximize productivity and minimize risks. Sites where discipline 
in the workplace has been adequately maintained are more likely to provide a high level 
of safety performance ((Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009). This construct consisted of a 
number of indicators determining the nature and effectiveness of the discipline 
maintained by supervisors in construction organizations. Aspects of maintaining 
discipline in the workplace include issuing warnings to workers, recommending 
promotion or demotion to a worker, granting pay raises to workers, requiring workers to 
report any unsafe behaviors by a fellow worker, enforcing the use of personal protective 
equipment whenever needed,  and conducting emergency response drills.  
4.4.2.3.1.4.Safety Communication 
Supervisors are expected to use a variety of formal and informal means of 
communication to promote safety in the workplace (Baxendale and Jones 2000). Simon 
and Piquard (1991) suggests that both management communication and employee 
feedback are critical for suggesting safety improvements and reporting near misses as 
well as unsafe conditions and practices. This construct consisted of a number of 
indicators determining the nature and effectiveness of the safety communication by 
supervisors in construction organizations. Aspects of supervisor-level communication 
include authorizing timely maintenance/ repairs of equipment, making informed 
suggestions to improve safety, discussing safety issues with the top management, 
recommending changes in safety policies and procedures if needed, improving work 
procedures through worker involvement, keeping an open-door policy on safety issues, 
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encouraging feedback from workers on safety issues, and communicating workers’ safety 
concerns to top management.  
4.4.2.3.1.5.Safety Commitment and Support 
Supervisory commitment and support are central to maintaining a safe work 
environment. Supervisor’s role has to go beyond organizing and providing safety 
administration and work rules. Supervisory commitment and involvement in safety is a 
factor of key importance for a satisfactory safety level. Langford et al. (2000) found that 
when employees believe that the management cares about their personal safety, they are 
more willing to cooperate to improve safety performance. Having demonstrated 
supervisory commitment and support to safety develops trust and fosters closer ties 
among workers, and between workers and supervisors. This construct consisted of a 
number of indicators determining the nature and extent of supervisory commitment and 
support towards safety in construction organizations. Aspects of supervisory commitment 
and support include emphasizing a no-blame approach to highlight unsafe work behavior, 
reminding workers to work safely, facilitating in maintaining a safe workplace 
environment, emphasizing on workers to help fellow workers and to maintain good 
working relationships, ensuring that the workload is reasonably balanced among workers, 
emphasizing on workers to achieve high levels of safety performance, play an active role 
in identifying site hazards, report accidents, incidents, and potentially hazardous 
situations, maintaining a positive attitude towards safety during meetings, allowing and 
encouraging workers to act decisively if they find any unsafe situation, emphasizing on 
workers to reflect on safety practice, contribute to accident investigations and job safety 
analysis, participating actively in developing / reviewing health and safety procedures, 
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ensuring good emergency preparedness among workers, providing safe equipment, 
keeping safety as a primary consideration when planning, and identifying potential risks 
and consequences prior to execution.  
4.4.2.3.1.6.Maintaining a Positive Attitude towards Safety 
A positive attitude towards safety refers to the degree of emphasis, encouragement 
and support provided by supervisors to their workers in terms of identifying, reporting, 
solving, advocating, and prioritizing safety concerns and issues. Having a positive 
attitude towards safety by the supervisors demonstrates their unequivocal commitment to 
safety and hence the desired and approved worker behaviors. Langford et al. (2000) 
indicate that the more positive the attitude of supervisors is towards safety, the more 
likely it is that workers will perform safely. This construct consisted of a number of 
indicators determining the role of supervisors in maintaining a positive attitude towards 
safety in construction organizations. Aspects of maintaining a positive safety attitude by 
supervisors include engaging oneself in regular safety talks, discussing safety problems 
openly with workers, welcoming the reporting of safety hazards, resolving safety issues, 
never advocating working around safety procedures to meet deadlines, valuing ideas from 
workers about improving safety, providing the help, authority, information and resources 
workers need to behave safely, having safety as one’s top priority, and always informing 
workers of safety concerns and issues.  
4.4.2.3.1.7.Motivating 
Motivating refers to promoting a feeling of belonging, job satisfaction, care for 
personal problems, and recognition among workers in order to strengthen the workers’ 
positive attitude towards safety. Motivation by supervisors strengthens relationships and 
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fosters closer ties between the supervisors and workers. It also improves the general 
morale and worker attitude towards safety. Motivation may include promoting job 
satisfaction among workers, creating a feeling of belonging among workers, 
demonstrating a commitment of help and care for workers’ personal problems, 
guaranteeing job security, and recommending recognitions and benefits. Langford et al. 
(2000) indicate that the more motivated the workers are, the more likely it is that they 
will perform safely. This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the 
role of supervisors in motivating workers in construction organizations. Aspects of 
motivation by supervisors include promoting a feeling of belonging among workers, 
promoting job satisfaction, caring for workers’ personal problems, guaranteeing job 
security, and recommending recognitions and benefits.  
4.4.2.3.2. Questionnaire 
A quantitative research method was chosen to examine the supervisor attitudes and 
approaches toward safety, since it was exploratory in nature. Questionnaire survey was 
used in order to facilitate the collection of information from construction organizations. 
All indicators (observed variables) were measured through a five-point Likert-type 
response format. Items, relating to each of the constructs, were used in the form of 
statements to measure individual constructs under investigation. Participants were asked 
to endorse the statements using a five-point Likert-type scale (from 1=‘‘strongly 
disagree’’ to 5=‘‘strongly agree’’). Questionnaire survey is presented in Appendix B. 
To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft 
questionnaires were constructed and pretested via face-to-face meetings with select 
professionals including short-listed experts from construction contracting organizations 
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representing their supervisors and foremen, all having expertise in or exposure to safety 
issues. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire. The questionnaire 
contained, in its final form, a total of 68 statements about supervisor attitudes and 
approaches toward safety. The research targeted supervisory level personnel (including 
supervisors, foremen, line managers) from general contractor and subcontractor 
organizations as the survey sample.  
Based on all the gathered information, descriptive analysis was performed and the 
results are discussed in the following section. 
4.4.2.4.Data Analysis 
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the survey were assumed to reflect the 
unobserved, underlying construct, with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the 
observed measures. For example, constructs such as safety commitment & support, and 
safety communication are typically viewed as underlying factors that give rise to 
something that is observed. Accordingly, their indicators tend to be realized as reflective. 
4.4.2.4.1. Assessment of Data Reliability and Validity 
Prior to data analysis, three measurement properties need to be examined to ensure 
that the data has a satisfactory level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
The first of these is the individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations) 
of the items on their respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the 
item’s variance is due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with all 
loadings in the range of 0.80–0.95, demonstrating the satisfactory level of individual item 
reliability. 
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Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or 
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is 
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is 
listed in Table 4.18. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70 
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).  
The third measurement property is the discriminant validity – that is, the extent to 
which each construct differs from other constructs in the analysis. It is assessed by using 
the average variance extracted (Av), suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table 
4.18). This measure should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and 
other constructs in the model (i.e., the squared correlation between two constructs). This 
can be demonstrated in the correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.19, which includes the 
correlations between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the 
matrix, and the square root of the average variance extracted (Av) calculated for each of 
the constructs along the diagonal. Having all of the diagonal elements greater than any 
other corresponding row or column implies adequate discriminant validity. 
Having satisfied the three measurement properties, it can be concluded that the 
constructs are measured with adequate precision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106
Table 4.18: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs 
Construct 
 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
 
Average 
variance 
extracted (Av) 
1. Safety Training & Orientation 0.873 0.75 
2. Safety Administration 0.892 0.70 
3. Maintaining Discipline 0.912 0.73 
4. Safety Communication  0.905 0.69 
5. Safety Commitment and Support 0.868 0.77 
6. Maintaining a Positive Attitude 
towards Safety  
0.887 0.74 
7. Motivating Workers 0.845 0.68 
 
Table 4.19: Discriminant Validity Analysis 
Construct  
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Safety Training & 
Orientation 
0.87 - - - - - - 
2. Safety Administration 0.09 0.84 - - - - - 
3. Maintaining Discipline 0.13 0.18 0.85 - - - - 
4. Safety Communication  0.15 0.15 0.07 0.83 - - - 
5. Safety Commitment and 
Support 
0.17 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.88 - - 
6. Maintaining a Positive 
Attitude towards Safety  
0.19 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.86 - 
7. Motivating Workers 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.82 
 
4.4.2.4.2. Results and Conclusion 
This section presents the results of the survey. Supervisor attitudes and approaches 
towards safety were determined by seven independent constructs— safety training & 
orientation, safety administration, maintaining discipline, safety communication, safety 
commitment & support, maintaining a positive attitude towards safety, and motivating 
workers. Strictly speaking, support was found for the impact of above aspects of 
supervisory support on the strategic safety improvement in the construction industry.  
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Descriptive analysis was performed to analyze the results. To assess the extent of 
impact of each of the measured indicators (survey items) with respect to supervisory 
approach to safety, the mean values of survey responses for each item were used. A mean 
score of 5 in the final analysis represented best performance on the measured indicator, 
while a mean score of 1 represented worst performance on the measure under 
consideration. A mean response score of 4.50 was considered least significant in terms of 
that particular measure generating (minimal) negative impact on the related construct. In 
order to distinguish the measures with respect to their extent of impact, the following 
indicator criticality indexing and zoning criteria was used (Table 4.20). 
Table 4.20: Indicator Criticality Indices & Zones 
Mean Score 
Range 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone 
<=2 6 Major High 
2.01-2.50 5 Major Low 
2.51 – 3.00 4 Moderate 
High 
3.01-3.50 3 Moderate 
Low 
3.51 – 4.00 2 Minor High 
4.01 – 4.50 1 Minor Low 
4.51 – 5.00 0 Non-
Critical 
 
Tables 4.21-4.27 show the mean response scores and indicator criticality indices for 
all the items measured in the survey, organized under their respective constructs. The 
tables have been sorted in descending order of criticality of the indicators measured 
(based on their mean values). 
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Table 4.21: Safety Training and Orientation Construct 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
I Safety Training and Orientation 
1 I am responsible to provide job-
specific safety training 
3.03 3 Moderate 
Low 
2 I am responsible to hold tool box/ 
tailgate safety meetings focused on 
specific work operations/exposures 
3.19 3 Moderate 
Low 
3 I am responsible to hold safety 
meetings 
3.41 3 Moderate 
Low 
4 I am responsible to coach workers 3.51 2 Minor 
High 
5 I am responsible to explain safety 
operations/ rules to workers 
3.62 2 Minor 
High 
6 I am responsible to orient new 
workers 
3.98 2 Minor 
High 
1based on Table 4.20 
Table 4.22: Safety Administration Construct 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
II Safety Administration 
7 I am responsible to establish inspection 
teams for hazard analysis 
2.66 4 Moderate 
High 
8 I am responsible to investigate accidents 3.07 3 Moderate 
Low 
9 I am responsible to correct unsafe 
conditions 
3.19 3 Moderate 
Low 
10 I am responsible to take unsafe tools out 
of production 
3.22 3 Moderate 
Low 
11 I am responsible to correct unsafe acts 3.28 3 Moderate 
Low 
12 I am responsible to report all incidents/ 
near misses 
2.48 5 Major 
Low 
13 I am responsible to authorize regular 
maintenance or repair of equipment 
 
3.77 2 Minor 
High 
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Table 4.22: Safety Administration Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
14 I am responsible to report all accidents 3.81 2 Minor 
High 
15 I am responsible to maintain first aid 
facilities 
3.93 2 Minor 
High 
16 I am responsible to conduct (safety) 
inspection of my own division of work 
3.95 2 Minor 
High 
17 I am responsible to send the injured or 
sick workers for medical attention 
4.01 1 Minor 
Low 
1based on Table 4.20 
Table 4.23: Discipline Construct 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
III Maintaining Discipline  
18 I am responsible to require workers to 
report any malpractice by a fellow 
worker 
2.12 5 Major 
Low 
19 I am responsible to conduct 
emergency response drills 
3.73 2 Minor 
High 
20 I am responsible to report a worker for 
unsafe acts 
2.73 4 Moderate 
High 
21 I am responsible to discharge a 
worker’s duties  
2.95 4 Moderate 
High 
22 I am responsible to recommend 
promotion or demotion to a worker 
3.37 3 Moderate 
Low 
23 I am responsible to issue warnings to 
workers in case of unsafe acts 
3.67 2 Minor 
High 
24 I am responsible to enforce the use of 
personal protective equipment 
whenever necessary 
4.05 1 Minor 
Low 
1based on Table 4.20 
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Table 4.24: Safety Communication Construct 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
IV Safety Communication  
25 I am responsible to recommend 
changes in safety policy 
2.57 4 Moderate 
High 
26 I involve/ consult workers in 
preparation of task safety plan 
2.42 5 Major 
Low 
27 I encourage feedback from workers 
on safety issues 
2.46 5 Major 
Low 
28 I am responsible to improve safe 
work procedures through worker 
involvement 
2.93 4 Moderate 
High 
29 I keep an open-door policy on safety 
issues 
2.93 4 Moderate 
High 
30 I take responsibility to communicate 
workers’ safety concerns to 
management 
3.38 3 Moderate 
Low 
31 I take responsibility to make 
suggestions to improve safety 
3.54 2 Minor 
High 
32 I take responsibility to discuss safety 
problems with the management 
3.62 2 Minor 
High 
1based on Table 4.20 
Table 4.25: Safety Commitment & Support Construct 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
V Safety Commitment & Support  
33 I emphasize on workers to contribute to 
job safety analysis 
2.58 4 Moderate 
High 
34 I ensure good preparedness for 
emergency among workers 
2.61 4 Moderate 
High 
35 I allow workers to act decisively if they 
find any situation contrary to safe 
conditions on site 
1.95 6 Major 
High 
36 I participate actively in developing / 
reviewing health and safety procedures 
 
2.68 4 Moderate 
High 
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Table 4.25: Safety Commitment & Support Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
37 I take responsibility to ensure that the 
workload is reasonably balanced among 
workers 
2.70 4 Moderate 
High 
38 I  emphasize on workers to contribute to 
accident investigations 
2.74 4 Moderate 
High 
39 I continuously emphasize on workers 
that safety rules should not be broken, 
even when worker believes it affects the 
production 
2.75 4 Moderate 
High 
40 I emphasize on a no-blame approach to 
highlight unsafe work behavior  
2.50 5 Major 
Low 
41 I emphasize on workers to achieve high 
levels of safety performance 
2.81 4 Moderate 
High 
42 I take responsibility to provide right 
equipment to the workers so that they 
can do the job safely 
2.84 4 Moderate 
High 
43 I take responsibility to detect potential 
hazards as part of the planning exercise 
2.84 4 Moderate 
High 
44 I often remind workers to work safely  2.93 4 Moderate 
High 
45 I emphasize on workers that everyone 
has the responsibility to reflect on safety 
practice 
2.93 4 Moderate 
High 
46 I emphasize on workers that safety is the 
number one priority while working 
2.98 4 Moderate 
High 
47 I keep safety as a primary consideration 
when planning  
3.02 3 Moderate 
Low 
48 I take responsibility to never allow 
working with defective equipment  
3.03 3 Moderate 
Low 
49 I emphasize on workers to report 
accidents, incidents, and potentially 
hazardous situations 
3.06 3 Moderate 
Low 
50 I emphasize on workers to offer help to 
fellow workers when needed to perform 
the job safely 
2.38 5 Major 
Low 
51 I emphasize on workers to maintain a 
good relationship with fellow workers  
2.40 5 Major 
Low 
52 I emphasize on workers to play an active 
role in identifying site hazards 
3.18 3 Moderate 
Low 
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Table 4.25: Safety Commitment & Support Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
53 I endeavor to maintain a positive attitude 
towards safety during meetings so that 
workers take safety on the site seriously 
3.20 3 Moderate 
Low 
54 I take responsibility to identify potential 
risks & consequences prior to execution 
3.22 3 Moderate 
Low 
55 I emphasize on workers to ensure that 
individuals are not working by 
themselves under risky or hazardous 
conditions 
2.76 4 Moderate 
High 
56 I react strongly against workers who 
break health and safety procedures / 
instructions / rules. 
3.56 2 Minor 
High 
1based on Table 4.20 
Table 4.26: Maintaining a Positive Attitude Construct 
S. 
No. Supervisor Safety Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-
5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
VI Maintaining a Positive Attitude  
57 I engage myself in regular safety talks 
(discuss safety problems openly with 
workers and supervisors) 
2.97 4 Moderate 
High 
58 I never advocate working around safety 
procedures to meet deadlines 
3.20 3 Moderate 
Low 
59 I welcome reporting safety hazards/incidents 3.74 2 Minor High 
60 I gather ideas from workers about improving 
safety when significant changes to work 
practices are suggested 
2.46 5 Major Low 
61 I provide the help, authority, information & 
resources workers need to behave safely 
3.78 2 Minor High 
62 I always inform workers of safety concerns 
and issues. 
3.89 2 Minor High 
63 I take responsibility to solve safety problems 3.92 2 Minor High 
1based on Table 4.20 
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Table 4.27: Motivating Construct 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety Performance 
Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-
5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
VII Motivating  
64 I take responsibility for assuring job 
security of workers under my belt 
1.70 6 Major 
High 
65 I am responsible for recommending 
recognition/ reward for good safety 
performance 
1.97 6 Major 
High 
66 I take responsibility for helping and 
caring for workers’ personal problems 
2.31 5 Major 
Low 
67 I take responsibility for creating 
feeling of belonging among workers 
2.91 4 Moderate 
High 
68 I take responsibility for promoting job 
satisfaction among workers 
3.52 2 Minor 
High 
1based on Table 4.20 
After analyzing Tables 4.21-4.27, the critical supervisor safety non-performance 
indicators (with criticality indices = 3), ranked in descending order of criticality (based on 
mean response score), are shown in Table 4.28. Table 4.28 also provides mean response 
rate, associated constructs, and indicator criticality ranking for these key non-
performance indicators. The first column in Table 4.28 provides the serial number of 
these indicators as given in Tables 4.21-4.27. 
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Table 4.28: Key Supervisor Safety Non-Performance Indicators – All Constructs 
S. 
No. 
Supervisor Safety 
Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
64 I take responsibility for 
assuring job security of 
workers under my belt 
1.70 Motivating 1 
35 I allow workers to act 
decisively if they find any 
situation contrary to safe 
conditions on site 
1.95 Safety 
Commitment and 
Support 
2 
65 I am responsible for 
recommending recognition/ 
reward for good safety 
performance 
1.97 Motivating 3 
18 I am responsible to require 
workers to report any 
malpractice by a fellow 
worker 
2.12 Discipline 4 
66 I take responsibility for 
helping and caring for 
workers’ personal problems 
2.31 Motivating 5 
50 I emphasize on workers to 
offer help to fellow workers 
when needed to perform the 
job safely 
2.38 Safety 
Commitment and 
Support 
6 
51 I emphasize on workers to 
maintain a good relationship 
with fellow workers  
2.40 Safety 
Commitment and 
Support 
7 
26 I involve/ consult workers in 
preparation of task safety plan
2.42 Safety 
Communication 
8 
27 I encourage feedback from 
workers on safety issues 
2.46 Safety 
Communication 
9 
60 I gather ideas from workers 
about improving safety when 
significant changes to 
working practices are 
suggested 
2.46 Maintaining a 
Positive Attitude 
10 
12 I am responsible to report all 
incidents/ near misses 
2.48 Safety 
Administration 
11 
40 I emphasize on a no-blame 
approach to highlight unsafe 
work behavior  
2.50 Safety 
Commitment and 
Support 
12 
 115
Further assessment of Tables 4.21-4.27 – to identify construct criticality ranking 
(based on a value of weighted mean response score for each construct) – results in Table 
4.29. Table 4.29 has been arranged in descending order of construct criticality, and also 
provide construct criticality ranking and criticality zone. 
Table 4.29: Construct Criticality Ranking & Zone 
 
The major supervisor safety non-performance indicators (with an indicator criticality 
index = 5 or 6) constitute 12 out of a total of 68 indicators i.e. 17.64%. The moderate 
supervisor safety non-performance indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 3 or 4) 
constitute 37 out of a total of 68 indicators i.e. 54.41%. Minor supervisor safety non-
performance indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 1 or 2) constitute 19 out of a 
total of 68 indicators i.e. 27.94%.  
Worker motivation, safety commitment and support, safety communication, 
maintaining a positive attitude towards safety, and safety training and orientation are all 
important components of a strategic total safety environment. Lack of performance of 
supervisors on these areas undoubtedly indicates that supervisors and foremen not 
Construct 
Weighted Mean 
Response Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Criticality  
Ranking 
Criticality  
Zone 
Motivating Workers 2.48 1 Major Low 
Safety Commitment and Support 2.82 2 Moderate High 
Safety Communication  2.98 3 Moderate High 
Maintaining Discipline 3.23 4 Moderate Low 
Safety Administration 3.40 5 Moderate Low 
Maintaining a Positive Attitude 
towards Safety  
3.42 6 Moderate Low 
Safety Training & Orientation 3.46 7 Moderate Low 
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performing well in terms of achieving strategic safety improvement in the construction 
industry. Hence it can be concluded that the strategies, approaches, and methods adopted 
by supervisors are not helping as they should in strategically improving safety in the 
construction industry. 
4.4.3. Survey 3: Analysis of the criticism on OSHA with respect to its lack of 
success in acting as a catalyst to incorporate total safety in a construction 
organizations 
4.4.3.1.Survey Description 
In the United States, all construction safety is legislated by the Occupational Safety & 
Health Administration (OSHA), a federal agency that is part of the U.S. Department of 
Labor, which was created by the Congress under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
in 1970. OSHA has claimed credible statistics over the years showing that, since its 
implementation by Congress has had a beneficial influence on US industries by 
significantly reducing workplace accidents. Under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970, Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s role is to “assure safe and 
healthful working conditions for every working man and woman in the Nation; by 
authorizing enforcement of the standards developed under the Act; by assisting and 
encouraging the States in their efforts to assure safe and healthful working conditions; by 
providing for research, information, education, and training in the field of occupational 
safety and health”.  (Ballard and Howell, 1998) 
OSHA develops a series of specific minimum construction standards, and policies for 
enforcing the standards to assist in the safety management process. The construction 
industry standards (29 CFR 1926) are not guidelines, but legal requirements that define 
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the minimum protections construction organizations must provide their workforce on the 
job site. OSHA periodically develops and publishes amendments to standards that 
through time may have become outdated or are in need of additional clarification. It is 
vitally important that all OSHA regulations and requirements be strictly followed or the 
construction organization could be subject to fines and penalties; worker’s compensations 
premium may increase; and this may have a negative impact on the company’s ability to 
prosper in the marketplace. For that very reason, construction organizations typically 
employ a safety manager or a competent person, while larger companies may employ 
outside consultants to develop and enforce safety management procedures. Outside safety 
consultants can become a valuable member of the team by visiting the jobsite to provide 
detailed safety advice, training, and other related safety knowledge as required.  
Whatever the solution, an effective construction safety and health program must be a core 
element of a construction company’s management strategy, with the ultimate goal to 
prevent workplace accidents and reduce occupational injuries. 
Credible statistics reveal that OSHA has had a beneficial influence on the US 
construction industry in terms of reducing workplace accidents and occupational injuries. 
Undoubtedly, OSHA has played a pivotal role in the development of a safer work 
environment over the years. Nevertheless, the agency still has received substantial 
criticism from construction organizations for a number of reasons. Even though the 
number of workplace accidents and casualties has dropped down drastically in the 
construction industry ever since OSHA regulations have been implemented, construction 
firms have viewed OSHA's regulations and standards in a negative light as well. This is 
despite the numerous attempts by the agency to promote training, consultation, and 
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outreach services. “To assure safe and healthful working conditions for every working 
man and woman in the Nation” – the failed mission statement of OSHA is a constant 
reminder of some inherent inefficacies in the strategic operations of the organization.  
One of the more common arguments against OSHA is that its heavy fines and 
burdensome regulations deliver an overbearing and unwanted presence that greatly 
restricts an organization’s ability to develop as well as compete. On one hand, the 
overburdening regulations place a heavy impediment on organizations by forcing 
increased operational fees and the costs associated to retrofit equipment rather than 
investing on improving the processes and culture for achieving long-term (strategic) 
safety objectives. Companies that invest but are still unable to meet the regulations owing 
to their own deficiencies (which may not necessarily be because of their poor attitude 
towards safety) may encounter increased accidents, strict OSHA fines, worker’s 
compensation premium increases, and will ultimately have a negative impact on the 
company’s ability to succeed in the global marketplace. On the other hand, although the 
ultimate goal is safety, the overbearing fines/ penalties have actually put a negative strain 
on the never ending battle to make construction companies and their jobsites safer. The 
heavy penalties compel organizations to concentrate on avoiding penalties and trying to 
“stay away” from OSHA, especially if they are not at par with the standards issued by 
OSHA, rather than investing in maintaining the ultimate goal of safe workplaces. This 
has created an adversarial relationship between the industry and OSHA in general and 
has not allowed OSHA to keep up its role as safety advisors in order to facilitate in 
strategically improving safety in the industry. 
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There are other arguments as well. Observers have questioned whether the reported 
drop in injury rates could be all attributed to OSHA’s enforcement activities. Another 
argument is that the agency is not actively participating in the necessary research to view 
and incorporate safety as an industrial development process, and hence their regulations 
do not support implementing safety as a total management process. Most critics further 
charge that the OSHA's inspection and penalty approach is an inappropriate and 
ineffective way to ensure workplace safety, and OSHA has been accused of being more 
devoted to the numbers of inspections rather than to actual safety and has been criticized 
for taking decades to develop new regulations. 
This research was aimed to identify the aspects of OSHA ‘s regulations, methods and 
approach that seem to provide a negative influx towards developing a strategic safety 
culture in a construction organization, as well as identify the reasons that lead to such a 
criticism to OSHA’s mode of operation. Conclusions drawn from this research will 
strengthen or weaken the argument that OSHA’s current regulations and implementation 
methods compel construction organizations to invest in following procedures rather than 
to invest in achieving long- term strategic safety objectives. The survey will also 
diagnose what the construction contracting organizations feel that OSHA is not putting in 
the needed effort in the research and development process of safety and is mainly acting 
as a watch dog rather than an organization providing mechanisms for achieving total 
safety goals.  
From the perspective of the overall objective of this dissertation, the underlying 
objective of this research study on OSHA was to collect and analyze data on OSHA 
criticism, which would serve as a basis to establish the rationale of this research: need for 
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a strategic zero-accident safety management framework in the construction industry to 
achieve continuous safety improvement.  
4.4.3.2.Methodology 
Since no prior formal information (such as journal papers, conference papers, books, 
published articles, etc.) as to the effectiveness of OSHA in the construction industry was 
available, this research on OSHA criticism was conducted in two steps:  
1. Unstructured interviews. These open-ended discussions were done via face-to-
face meetings and telephonic communication with selected professionals 
including short-listed experts representing contractors and sub-contractors. The 
interviewed audience included top managers, middle/ project managers and 
construction superintendents. A total of 27 interviews were conducted and the 
findings compiled. The primary objective of these interviews was to determine the 
key information parameters to be used in developing a structured survey in the 
next step. 
2. Structured surveys. The results of the open-ended interviews were utilized to draft 
a structured questionnaire to assess OSHA’s non-performance issues. The 
methodology of survey development and administration was the same as 
discussed in section 3.2.2.3. 
The following sections illustrate the major findings of the research conducted for the 
key question at hand: Are the strategies, approaches, methods and operations adopted by 
OSHA helping in strategically improving safety in the construction industry? Firstly, the 
key findings of the unstructured interviews are discussed. This is followed by the results 
of the structured surveys. 
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4.4.3.3.Unstructured Interviews 
The key criticisms on OSHA’s performance as indicated by the interviewees are 
discussed below. 
Criticism 1: OSHA’s methodology of implementing and enforcing its policies has 
flaws. 
OSHA has lately come under wide criticism concerning its methodology of 
implementing and enforcing its policies and the high cost incriminated with the 
compliance of such, as compared to the rate of reduced work related injuries and deaths. 
Most interviewees emphasized that OSHA’s policies can be termed as routine as opposed 
to drawing attention to prevention or taming the root causes of the hazards. They 
advocated for the focus to shift to preventing the root cause, developing channels for 
reporting accidents and conducting detailed scrutiny of the root cause, and rectification to 
completion. It was further suggested that the channels of communication should be 
defined as such to give room for reporting ‘near misses’.  
Criticism 2: OSHA disregards the productivity side of doing business 
A key issue and concern in regards to OSHA has been how OSHA policies affect 
work productivity. Interviewees claimed that work places have suffered from the 
enforcement of OSHA standards in terms of low productivity levels. The argument is that 
OSHA should be enforcing standards that provide safe as well as productive work 
environment for everyone by developing better procedures. The criticism towards OSHA 
is for the failure to create and advance such procedures to be used in work places that will 
not reduce production. As suggested by one respondent and endorsed by many: “OSHA 
only concentrates on safety side of doing business and totally disregards the productivity 
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side. More productive procedures can be safer as well. However, OSHA completely 
disregards this aspect and makes its own recommendations without putting in the 
research needed to drive a high-productivity safety culture.”  
Criticism 3: OSHA is unreasonably slow in incorporating new safety guidelines 
Many companies critic OSHA because it is slow to set or improve on new safety 
guidelines. OSHA has been accused of emphasizing too much time and resources on 
inspections when it should be emphasizing that time and resource on developing new 
regulations. A few comments from interviewees in relation to this aspect were as follows: 
“If OSHA is there to protect us then why does it take so long to enforce new rules such as 
the one for crane lifting? Why the 30 years old lifting regulation is still in effect? OSHA 
needs to understand that enforcing a good safety on crane is highly recommended, to 
protect workers and surrounding area.” “We understand the governmental requirements 
and processes that have to be followed but OSHA needs to work faster on implementing 
rules and regulations.” “OSHA needs to start preventing accidents before they happen, 
and they need to reinforce some of the old safety rules and regulations.” “It is not a good 
way of handling business; OSHA seems to take forever to implement new safety 
guidelines.” “OSHA needs to revise guidelines as technology changes”. Commenting on 
OSHA’s permissible exposure limit (PEL) on noise, one representative of a mechanical 
subcontractor stated: “If OSHA promises us to be safe, how come every other country 
updated their system on PEL and OSHA keeps it at the same rate? Personally, I know a 
couple of people who used to work on the railroad and lost their hearing at an early age.” 
One suggestion given by a number of interviewees was that “the government needs to let 
OSHA to act as a separate agency. The government process will always slow down 
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OSHA on implementing new rules and regulations. It’s time for OSHA to realize that it 
needs to be an agency that does not depend on the government and lawyers to approve 
rules, at least on important safety issues.” 
Criticism 4: OSHA’s regulations do not comprehensively cover major safety and health 
issues 
Unsafe practices that are not listed in the known hazards in the OSHA act are grouped 
under 'general duty'. This is basically a loophole that ends up limiting numerous unsafe 
practices into being classified into general duty. “OSHA lays emphasis to big known 
hazards while ignoring others that are apparently more hazardous. For instance, a law on 
large explosions and major accidents is most visible in the Act, while job-related health 
issues account for more than 80 percent of all problems at the work place.” 
Criticism 5: OSHA’s standards are dated 
Unfortunately, many professionals complain about OSHA’s standards being outdated.  
There are many OSHA standards that are decades old. For example, the standards for 
derricks and hoists are based on the 1943 edition of ANSI B30.2 and the standard for 
woodworking machinery dates to the 1954 edition of ANSI O 1.1. This is a strong 
example indicating how some areas of OSHA have seemed to be untouched.  For years, 
construction industry experts have complained about this problem of old and outdated 
standards.  These outdated standards can drastically affect workers’ safety and put harm 
into their way.  The best resolution to this problem is to have the standards looked over 
and replaced with proper up-to-date standards. 
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Criticism 6: OSHA’s penalty mechanism is ineffective and has created serious doubts 
as to the agency’s sense of purpose 
A major criticism on OSHA has been that, over the years, a pro safety entity has been 
becoming a pro revenue collector. To justify this opinion, respondents referred to data 
depicting that in 1976, 95 percent of OSHA citations were classified as “non-serious” (in 
terms of monetary value) while in 2008, 70 percent of citations were classified as 
“serious”. An accusation by most is that OSHA has stepped up its role as a revenue 
collector for the federal government. As per the interviewees, this is evident from the 
range of OSHA’s maximum allowable penalties which have been increased many-fold 
over recent years, and $900 million in additional revenues are expected over the next five 
years . “OSHA is now implementing expensive citations to the companies that can range 
from 7,000 dollars to 70,000 for a repetitive infraction.” While this increased penalty has 
been justified by OSHA personnel as being an effective means of safety enforcement, this 
has been viewed by the industry, in general, as a move of OSHA from being a safety 
proactive agency to a revenue generation agency for the government. This accusation is 
backed by the fact that every governmental entity in the country has to meet certain 
objective and economical growth goals so that their funds are not lowered significantly 
for the next year. An associated accusation is that OSHA does not respect companies, in 
general, as fair and safe employers and mostly acts as any other law enforcer with 
penalties as their weapons.  
The other side of the picture was depicted by a number of interviewees by reflecting 
that although the maximum penalty for violating an OSHA safety standard is $70,000, 
willfully violating an OSHA safety standard has no extra penalty unless there has been a 
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death of an employee because of that particular violation. In that respect, OSHA’s 
penalty mechanism is ineffective, particularly criminal penalties. OSHA is only able to 
pursue a criminal penalty when a willful violation of an OSHA standard results in the 
death of a worker. The maximum penalty is a misdemeanor with a maximum of 6-months 
in jail. Many condemn this practice and believe the time should fit the crime.  One of the 
respondents, who worked for a government entity as a general contractor, summed up 
this part of the debate perfectly when he said, “If you improperly import an exotic bird, 
you can go to jail for two years.  If you deal in counterfeit money, you’re looking at 20 
years.  But if you gamble with the lives of your employees and one of them is killed, you 
risk only six months in jail.” This is evident by a recent example, which was often cited 
by a number of respondents. On Nov. 28, 2008, a Wal-Mart Employee was trampled to 
death when opening the doors for the day after Thanksgiving Day sale.  Wal-Mart was 
only fined $7,000 for not having proper crowd control management. A recent report by 
OSHA shows that, in 2010, 1,832 fatalities where investigated and the average penalties 
for all convictions came out to $11,543.  Besides the fact that one cannot set a price on a 
person’s life, a measly $11,543 is actually an insult to the deceased and their family 
members.  In fact, in OSHA’s 40 years of existence, they have managed to secure only 12 
criminal convictions of jail time, which, as stated before, is not harsh enough for the 
crime committed. 
Criticism 7: Interpretation of regulations is at most times vague 
Unlike other government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration which 
hire scientists and leaders in the field the agencies enforce, OSHA is run mostly by 
lawyers and senior businessmen.  OSHA has come under considerable criticism with the 
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issue of imposing fines based on the assertion that rules can be interpreted in different 
ways and since lawyers and businessman are not as knowledgeable in construction field 
as construction workers, contractors, subcontractors, etc., their interpretation is usually 
much different then what actual experience and work environment has taught. A related 
example cited by a number of respondents was for the year 2003 in the states of 
Massachusetts and Florida where OSHA issued several citations for scaffolding. The 
violation was for statute 29 CFR 1926 250(b) (5); the prohibition against leaving more 
materials on scaffolding than necessary for immediate operations. The inspector who read 
and issued the citations was taking the rule to mean literally and since he either had no or 
little experience in the construction field, believed that these companies where creating a 
hazardous work environment. It is a common practice in the construction field to leave 
materials on the scaffold for many reasons. When laying bricks, workers would want to 
have a supply of bricks with them so that they can place the guard rail for safety. Having 
to climb up and down continuously to bring bricks up will leave the guard rail unattached 
which increases the chances of a workers falling off of the scaffold. It is also a regular 
practice to leave materials and tools on the scaffold overnight or between shifts as this 
allows the boards to stay in place if a severe gust of wind was to hit the scaffold. Without 
the materials on the scaffold, the boards would fly off and could possibly hurt a worker 
below. In the same light, having the extra weight of the material while workers are on the 
scaffold can help in the stability of the scaffold and that of the board placement. Without 
the extra weight on the boards, as a worker moves around, the lack of weight and the 
constant vibration will cause the board to shift, which may result in a serious accident. 
There are other reasons why extra material on the scaffolds are a good idea and a safe 
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practice although one could understand the possible problems of having too much 
materials on the scaffold with workers. 
Criticism 8: OSHA does not participate enough in research and development 
OSHA is strongly critiqued for its lack of participation in the research and 
development of new and improved safety procedures, methods, and standards. There is a 
constant growth in the working environment and, therefore, a need for continuous study 
and exploration to find new and improved methods for building and sustaining a safe 
working environment for all. 
Criticism 9: OSHA regulations are ambiguous at times 
As per the respondents, OSHA has some regulations that employers do not 
understand or do not know how to make effective. For instance, one respondent 
commented on one OSHA regulation by saying: “OSHA states that plastic gas cans can 
be used on manufacturing work sites, but not on construction sites, even if they have been 
approved by local fire marshals. As weird as it seems, OSHA contradicts what an 
experienced fire marshal allows. This shows a clear contradiction between the two 
entities and would not be beneficial for the industry.” 
Moreover, safety violations are often grouped into the agency’s “general duty” 
clause, allowing inspectors to cite companies for unsafe practices that are not specifically 
regulated. This means that there is broad aspect of violations that does not have specific 
instructions or guidelines of how to prevent them. This can upset some business owners 
who get slapped with fines that they don’t know anything about. This lack of guidelines 
makes business owners lose money while, at the same time, lose production. One general 
contractor argued that OSHA regulations “are generally broad but necessary in the 
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workplaces.” He also stated that while regulations are not thoroughly clear, they are 
essential in maintaining a safe and healthy work atmosphere. He and many other 
respondents argued for clearer regulations.  
Criticism 10: OSHA is not proactive 
OSHA has been criticized for not being proactive in their approach but rather being 
reactive to circumstances. A good argument was given by a respondent who remarked 
that “one reason noise hasn’t gotten the attention it deserves is because it’s not 
immediately life-threatening like many other construction hazards. But loss of one’s 
hearing destroys a worker’s quality of life and creates safety hazards on the job. Without 
OSHA’s support, we’ve had to find other ways to protect people.” One common 
argument given by many respondents was that OSHA does fine for violations, but does 
not follow through nor does it provide instructions on how to improve existing 
conditions. This reactive approach by OSHA was evidenced by a number of citations 
from personal experiences given by many respondents. For instance, an earthwork 
contractor representative alluded to a jobsite he was working on as a field superintendant. 
The foundations to a precast parking structure were under way and were in the excavation 
stage. The backhoe operator hit underground utilities and was nearly electrocuted to 
death as a result of the strike. OSHA immediately arrived on the scene and scrutinized the 
workplace. Soon after, a citation was issued and then the OSHA officials were no longer 
seen on the worksite. Neither did they provide any instructions as to how to improve on 
the safety of the workplace. This shows that a retaliatory action was taken and then safety 
was scrutinized with a fine-toothed comb. However, nothing was done to provide 
assistance/ guidance to the employer to improve on safety. 
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Another argument posed by a number of respondents was that OSHA should leave a 
positive impression on contractors, foreman, and all those involved. “OSHA has set up a 
rulebook. You must follow A, B, C, and D to avoid fines rather than establish a safety 
culture or mindset.” “Don’t slap me on my hand and simply tell me I did this, show me 
how I can be better. Show me how my crews can be better.” Most respondents witnessed 
that they have experienced only few inspections unless involved with a high-priority job. 
“They are so concerned with documenting violations and snapping photos, versus 
mitigating safety. So, naturally, contractors and their subs are going to walk the straight 
and narrow, losing sight of the overall picture of a safe workplace.” “Positive 
reinforcement is the best method to reach a goal.” “At the end of the day, we’re all trying 
to make money. So, reward contractors. Treat them like kindergarten children and reward 
a child with a sticker or piece of candy. Reward the good boys and girls who are safe 
with a reward such as certificate or documentation that they can present to their insurance 
companies to lower their premiums or policy rates. Let their safe track record qualify 
them for specific jobs. Treat it like LEED that has caught like wildfire. In today’s market, 
who can afford to be unsafe? There is no reason why, if the right incentive is present, 
anyone can’t behave in a specified manner.”  
Opinions were gathered wherein the respondents proposed that insurance companies, 
contractors (and subcontractors), and OSHA should be involved with setting safety goals. 
The argument was that it is important to set up long-term objectives that have a reward 
for the contractor. This would change the attitude from trying to avoid OSHA violations 
towards showcasing the safety of all employees and operations on work site. This cannot 
be achieved by merely implementing a reward clause. If this were to be put into effect, it 
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would require public meetings and advertising.  An example of an ideal scenario is on a 
government pre-bid meeting, where an OSHA representative is present to explain the 
new incentives and reinforce as to how beneficial it can be. Owners could partake in this 
by informing contractors that “X amount of accident-free days will result in Y amount of 
added profit.”  
Criticism 11: OSHA does not improvise with changing conditions 
In an interview with a construction project manager, a valid point was made about the 
affect of economy on the safety of work site. The interviewee stated that he has witnessed 
how job assurance has caused an increase in safety hazards on the work site. The current 
economic conditions have become reason for many people to be worried if they have job 
assurance and has forced them to go to great lengths to make sure they will always have a 
working position. He also explained how these lengths have come to include putting the 
employees themselves and/or other employees at risk to get their job done. What is 
upsetting is that despite the obvious hazard nothing has been done upon OSHA’s part to 
attempt to reverse this affect. The economy has unfortunately influenced the work 
environment negatively in this way and an organization such as OSHA should be doing 
something to change this issue into a better solution. 
Criticism 12: OSHA has insufficient funds 
Respondents criticized that OSHA has insufficient funding from the government, 
which could pose to be a big problem for OSHA to be able to function in the way that the 
public would like it to. OSHA’s lack of funds has dated back years and is not a recent 
problem for the association. “OSHA needs to invest more money if they really want to 
protect the public and the area. They need to staff their offices in a way to make the 
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public feel safe.” “Hire enough people and pay them well, to do a better job.” “The more 
money spent in a project the better result will come out of it.” “The more OSHA invests 
on the inspectors the better they will be.” 
Criticism 13: OSHA Inspections are Devious 
A growing concern of businessmen is OSHA sneaking up on workers. OSHA is no 
stranger to the courtroom; people are and have been angry towards OSHA for the way 
they operate. “18 state and federal court decisions have been handed down against the 
agency for violating the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unlawful search and 
seizure.” “This is a direct violation of the constitution; they use sneaky tactics to write 
more citations instead of spreading efforts to increase safety in the workplace.” “There is 
plenty of evidence that such tactics simply make enforcement all the harder.” “If the 
OSHA inspector and I could work together to make my place safe, it would be good. But 
if he comes in to get me and fine me, I'm going to hide everything I can from him.” “The 
message should be: let’s work together not against each other.” 
Criticism 14: OSHA does not conduct regular inspections 
Most respondents criticized OSHA for not conducting inspections often enough. It 
was found that companies in certain states had spans of 12 years between OSHA 
inspections. That’s an outrageous length of time between inspections, and that isn’t the 
worst, some reached as long as 22 years between inspections. This obviously puts doubt 
into the effectiveness of OSHA if there are such long spans between simple inspections, 
which would probably do a lot of good in helping companies to comply with standards 
more easily. OSHA only enforcing its standards without properly inspecting them is 
somewhat contradictory. Simply surprise inspecting every several years without making 
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sure companies are taking the proper approach to the standards set by OSHA via 
inspections is not proper operating procedures. A common accusation by respondents was 
that that OSHA takes more into effect about fining and charging companies rather than 
worrying about having a proper number of inspections. OSHA representatives used to 
and still do get paid for the fines that they write for companies that disobey or neglect the 
rules. Lives are at great risks on construction job sites and having more professional 
inspections by OSHA representatives will greatly reduce the risk of injury or death. 
Criticism 15: Some OSHA inspectors lack competence 
A common complaint from contractor representatives against OSHA inspectors was 
that some OSHA inspectors arriving at construction sites are transfers from other OSHA 
areas who do not have any construction experience/ exposure. “The hazards in 
construction are much different than those in a plant. That’s one thing that OSHA should 
consider with very much attention because if they hire someone without construction 
knowledge and/ or experience, they should not expect that person to know what needs to 
be done and how it is done correctly.” Apparently, OSHA does not always send qualified 
inspectors to jobsites. “Anytime an OSHA inspector comes into one of the facilities 
where we are working as mechanical contractors, it is probably the first time they have 
ever seen such a large commercial building project at work. The OSHA inspector usually 
doesn’t know where to start. In every case, the inspector will invariably find a guard off, 
or some other minor, readily apparent violation on the site, but will pass by our process 
equipment which, if it failed, could blow up the facility.”  This comment surely tells that 
people in charge of maintaining safety for a certain project do not even know how the 
project participants (various contractors and subcontractors) work. These inspectors have 
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to be prepared in what they would encounter. “On repeated occasions I have seen the 
results of OSHA inspections where the compliance officers were plainly wrong in what 
they were advocating. The issues included misinterpretation of injury data, inappropriate 
use of quantitative methods, and dubious recommendations for task improvement. I am 
referring to individuals who are not ergonomics professionals, rather inspectors who have 
taken a few classes.” “Many of the OSHA field staff have gone their own direction and 
have cited companies in ways that are inappropriate and contrary to the understandings of 
our discussions in preparing that document, when the OSHA personnel in Washington 
D.C. provided sensible interpretations of their intent. I have observed OSHA field staff 
insist on actions that have wasted money without helping any workers.” 
Criticism 16: OSHA has adversarial relation with construction industry 
OSHA’s presence on work sites is mostly viewed as an overbearing organization that 
merely means that safety fines and documented violations are soon to follow. Advice 
given from contractors is to avoid OSHA “like the plague.” Although this is the industry 
attitude towards OSHA, it is not a far stretch of what actually happens once OSHA steps 
foot on a jobsite. There are reasons as to why OSHA has been deemed as such a burden 
on jobsites and has an adversarial relationship with the industry. Industry experts had to 
say the following in relation to OSHA’s relationship with the construction industry. “The 
relations between OSHA and construction industry have been unnecessarily adversarial, 
and I have observed little or no trust, even in companies that have outstanding safety 
efforts.” “I find it sobering when I end up advising companies to set up a two-track 
approach — one for worker safety and the other to satisfy OSHA. This is because OSHA 
is always focusing on the small picture rather than the strategic one. OSHA has created 
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regulations and mandates those would ensure safety, but merely treat them like a 
checklist. This is no way to run the nation’s workplace safety process.” “Congress 
enacted OSHA in 1970 explicitly to serve as police, not as educators or advisors. This 
probably was appropriate then, but not now, and has led to glaringly unsuitable policies.” 
“I was told by an inspector regarding a company with an admirable ergonomics program, 
“I know [this company] has a good ergonomics program; my job is to poke holes in it.” 
OSHA should instead have held a press conference to highlight a success story, but they 
chose to cite the company for some minor shortcomings.”  
Criticism 17: OSHA’s policies are overly demanding 
Data collected revealed that most construction industry individuals strive to meet or 
exceed OSHA’s strict policies because they know that an OSHA compliance officer has 
the authority to enter, at reasonable times, any site, location, or facility where the work is 
taking place without any prior notice to the contractor, and if the OSHA officer has an 
issue with the construction site, he/she has the authority to stop work, give a citation and 
penalize the job depending on the issue in the field. This is fine as long as the policies are 
reasonable as well as implementable. However, the industry had a different opinion. 
“Enforcing the stringent mandated requirements, for example, something as simple as the 
basic housekeeping takes such an effort from all the subcontractors and the enforcement 
from the general contractor on a daily basis that it becomes unreasonable at times.” 
“Enforcing one-hundred percent tie off has been the toughest challenge in my career, 
whether it is on fork lifts, scissor lifts or any equipment higher than five feet. At often 
times, it’s just not practically possible. At other times, there really is no way to 
completely tie off and still maintain a reasonable rate of production.” “Being in the 
 135
construction industry for over 20 years, I have witnessed that OSHA officers usually 
don’t show up on jobsites unless there’s a complaint, and once they do arrive, they often 
ask for implausible resolutions. The actions or steps that they deem required to be taken 
as remediating measures are, at often times, unreasonable in terms of time, money and 
effort required as against their perceived safety benefits, and, at other times, practically 
impossible to implement. Needless to say that the often impracticable OSHA rules are 
usually made by white collar well-suited officers sitting in plush seats somewhere in 
Washington D.C. who do not have any faintest idea about the real time challenges on 
construction work sites.” “OSHA regulations stop us from using another method of safety 
that might be more worthwhile as well as safe for the completion of the project. Instead 
OSHA sticks by their own recommendations and regulations without compromising to an 
idea that makes more sense.” 
“OSHA is helping as well as hurting. It helps by having standards to make a job site 
safer but all job sites are unique, so it’s hard to apply certain regulations tom all sites. 
Some regulations are a bit excessive just like their fines.” “OSHA has overreacted by 
jamming every conceivable danger, however remote, into a code that must be the world's 
most boring reading. With appropriate illustrations, an OSHA manual seems to instruct 
farmers how to avoid slipping on cow dung. In order for people to follow directions or 
codes they must be reasonable.” “OSHA inspectors, at often times, are so over-
demanding that meeting their expectations would require turning an 8-hour job site into a 
16-hour job-site resulting in an eventual collapse of the company. Safety is of prime 
importance and must be implemented to the full extent. However, the implementation 
requirements must not be demanding to an extent that they become unreasonable and 
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overburden. OSHA needs to be more realistic in its approach and the inspectors need to 
be well-trained as well as well-equipped with appropriate, reasonable and implementable 
safety suggestions specific to construction sites.”  
Criticism 18: OSHA has an enforcement/ governance focus rather than a strategic 
improvement focus 
Interviews revealed that most respondents were of the opinion that OSHA’s tact on 
the nation’s work environment is to strongly enforce their standards when the 
association’s calling should be to make sure there are laws protecting employees from 
health and safety hazard incidents in which the corporation is at fault, the development 
and research of better procedures for employees and employers to use, and the assessing 
of certain health & safety issues at hand in order to devise proper solutions. As 
respondents suggested, this “may be related to their lack of funding and improper 
methods”. “The use of enforcing standards strictly has become the main goal to the 
agency when it should be sub-category of core principles built within.”  “OSHA worries 
too much on their inspections and not on implementing new ideas”. “Much of the debate 
about OSHA regulations and enforcement policies revolves around the cost of regulations 
and enforcement, versus the actual benefit in reduced worker injury, illness and death.” A 
former OSHA employee who has worked for OSHA almost since it came into existence  
was not happy with the direction of OSHA and its focus and stated “I heard classic 
bureaucratic answers: more regulations, more staff, more money, more & more & more, 
etc. i.e. more government is the solution to everything. Thousands of years of civilized 
earth history prove that more government creates more problems than it solves. This 
agency is not exactly doing what is needed to make the workplace safer; more 
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government will only lead to a “police state”. OSHA does not promote being creative and 
thinking outside the box; rather they make an army of mindless soldiers with their 
citation book in hand.”  
Majority of the survey respondents were of the opinion that OSHA has not been 
focusing on strategic safety improvement. “There has been much controversy and 
criticism surrounding OSHA and their regulations. Where did a safety agency go wrong? 
The agency has gotten its fair share of criticism just as it got started for mandating that 
businesses furnish safety equipment and have safety training for employees. This may 
sound fine, but imagine how these new regulations that were and still are enforceable by 
law cost these businesses. I would even go as far as saying some small businesses had to 
shut down.  Some ask the question: is OSHA helping or hurting? Some are convinced 
that OSHA is more concerned with the amount of citations and fines than the actual 
reduction to workplace illnesses and accidents. Instead of OSHA fining these companies 
with citations, it would make more sense to use that money for long term safety 
investment. There are companies that are more careless than others and need to be 
showed somehow that they need to better their safety environments. By working with the 
companies and not against them, they can prevent many small businesses from going 
bankrupt and at the same time improve worker safety.” ““OSHA operates against the 
employer instead of with. I feel as if they really want to catch you doing something that 
deserves a citation.” 
“OSHA’s methods restrict construction organizations to invest in following 
procedures rather than to invest in achieving long- term safety objectives. By having 
regulations and standards that are legally enforceable by fines and, in some cases, jail 
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time, the agency cuts profits for companies to grow and improve safety programs. A 
workable solution to this dilemma is that OSHA, instead of being what it has been 
viewed as, becomes a helping hand assisting companies to improve their safety 
performance. Possibly, even reinvesting some or all of the money collected from fines 
into helping the companies improve their safety performance with grants for safety 
equipment or incentives for the companies to compete and improve. Another suggestion 
is to not employ inspectors but rather employ safety personnel whose objective would be 
to assist companies to improve on their safety performance.  
“The amount of money companies spend on citations is a lost cause; imagine half of 
that was put to better use. It would be a great feat to improve on safety with that money 
instead of giving the money to the government. Keeping it mandatory for the company to 
spend the citation amount on training employees on safety, and purchasing safer and/or 
newer equipment would strategically improve the industry level of safety performance 
over time.” 
“If you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day; show him how to catch a fish, you 
feed him for a lifetime. The same rule applies for keeping construction companies safe.  
Rather than inspecting whether or not a contractor is up to par with OSHA regulations, it 
would be much better and strategic to show the contractor how to be safe.” 
A few respondents even suggested that OSHA’s role as a safety enforcement agency 
would become unnecessary if workers’ attitudes and behaviors can be improved by long-
term safety strategic safety investments by companies. “Workers need to be responsible 
on the job site at all times. I never want to see one of “my guys” get hurt. I also believe 
they want to be safe. The trick to “No OSHA” is finding or developing good employees. 
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If your employees are good, and you have a structured and an organized company with a 
strategic concern to safety, OSHA would be completely unnecessary.” 
Criticism 19: OSHA’s penalty system restricts strategic safety improvement 
Although the ultimate goal is safety, the survey respondents strongly suggested that 
overbearing fines and penalties have actually put a negative strain on the never ending 
battle to make construction companies and their jobsites safer.  The argument given was 
that rather than maintaining the ultimate goal of safe workplaces, OSHA has concentrated 
on defining penalties and issuing fines to companies and individuals who are not up to 
par with the standards issued by OSHA. The respondents were of the opinion that this is a 
problem that needs to be addressed by reverting to the fundamentals of what an 
organization like OSHA is to accomplish. Some of the opinions collected were as 
follows: “Congress did not create OSHA to pursue unsafe practices, but to ensure that 
every American on a construction site would not be worried whether or not he or she 
would make it home that day. Safety is what they should sought for, and not issuing 
fines.” “OSHA might make a regulation that one company might break and instead of 
correcting it they are just fined heavily for it. The money that was used to pay off the fine 
could have been used to better whatever problem was there in the first place.” “In the 
instance that a company is fined for misuse of the way they were handling the equipment 
for $500, that money could have easily gone towards something such as training for the 
workers on how to properly and safely use the equipment. Instead, OSHA feels that 
fining these small companies will teach them a lesson and that if they do not want to get 
fined again they will correct it and properly train their employees. In my opinion, this is 
an inappropriate approach. Many companies go out of business just because of all the 
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fines that they have to pay off. All of the money that goes into paying for these fines can 
be used to better the working conditions of the job site and make it safer and easier to 
follow the regulations placed by OSHA.” “Monies spent on the process of issuing fines 
can be channeled towards improving the safety mindset of contractors. If the contractor is 
going to be charged, encourage an improvement in safety, such as investing for 
reinforcing safety on the site and/ or investing in additional safety training of the 
employees. This would direct the potential fine towards everyone’s benefit. The 
contractor will still have to pay, but the benefits would be self-collecting.”  
“If a company were to have an incident in which an employee was injured due to the 
company’s inability to keep up with OSHA’s standards, the company would most likely 
be heavily fined for it. How would that help the company to keep the problem from 
occurring again? Say, the incident occurred because the company couldn’t afford proper 
safety equipment. OSHA’s standard to add a heavy fine on top of whatever would be 
needed to be paid to the employee due to the incident would definitely not help the 
company to obtain the proper equipment that they needed in the first place. So, now the 
company needs to attempt to recover from the incident for one, pay the fines from OSHA 
for two, and endeavor on a mission to come up with the equipment that they were 
supposed to have prior to the whole incident for three.” 
“Even though OSHA may give an employer a couple of warnings before a fine is 
issued, I don't agree with the magnitude of the fines. Most construction companies are 
struggling as it is and certainly do not need unexpected fines sealing their doom. I 
strongly believe that the penalty mechanism from OSHA is not beneficial in any way and 
should be replaced by an alternate system providing incentive as well as support to 
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contractors for performing safely. This would not only instill a care and concern of 
employers not to their employees but would also develop respect and adherence to OSHA 
policies because the contractors would believe that OSHA is an agency working with 
them and for them, and not against them.”  
In an interview with a senior representative from OSHA wherein the respondent was 
asked as to why OSHA chooses to fine companies for breaking an OSHA regulation 
instead of making them use that money to better their safety performance, the response 
was, “In my opinion, OSHA does not want to complicate things too much by making 
these construction companies responsible with using money that would have gone 
towards a fine to better the regulation that they should have been followed in the first 
place”. A senior project manager from a general contractor made the following assertion 
in relation to the agency’s approach too imposing fines: “OSHA has been around for a 
long time and they know what to expect from the companies and job sites that they visit. 
They know how things are supposed to be and to them there is no other way to do them. 
Making a mistake in the workplace or not complying with a safety regulation is out of the 
question. Although there might be many requests for making use of a certain amount of 
citation money to better their conditions, OSHA will most likely never implement 
something like that because it is just easier to fine people and make them pay with cash 
for their faults. Many companies deserve it but that money can easily go towards 
bettering the workplace and correcting whatever problem they were being fined for in the 
first place”. These responses clearly suggest that OSHA is not inclined to work with the 
companies to strategically improve their safety performance, but is rather more concerned 
about seeking violations and imposing fines.  Working with the companies would not 
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only make OSHA easier to comply with but would also keep companies from going out 
of business by throwing away all of their money in fines because of mistakes. 
According to the OSHA compliance guidance center, there are many people that call 
in to complain about OSHA’s standards. One of the employees there was asked what he 
has to say about OSHA’s fines and the criticism it receives. He answered with this, “I get 
many phone calls about people criticizing the fines that they receive and wanting to get 
rid of the fines and use that money to correct whatever they did or did not do in 
accordance to OSHA standards but the matter of the fact is they did not follow safety 
procedure and because of that they were fined. Many people call in and complain about 
how some of the OSHA standards are too strict and some people even call in to complain 
that the standards are not strict enough, the fact still remains that they need to abide by 
these rules despite what they might think and disagree with OSHA”. 
Key Conclusions from Interviews 
In conclusion, OSHA's mission of assuring, for every working man and woman in the 
Nation, a safe and healthy work environment has sunk into the hearts of many as a very 
noble idea. It is actually in agreement with most players in the field of public health like 
Institute of Medicine (IOM). However, it is the adherence to the stated policies that 
players have taken issues with. From the fact that the top management is headed by 
politically appointed individuals with little knowledge on safety, to the methodology of 
the execution of the laws and enforcement which often are irksome to individuals and 
businesses, this exposes loopholes in their operations which makes the construction 
organizations to solely concentrate on following the immediate set regulations to avoid 
law implications, as opposed to adhering to policies that would avert such occurrences in 
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the long term. Disaster avoidance is a major concern to construction organizations. To 
reach that level of safety would call for structures to be put in place to investigate the root 
cause, eliminate the potential of such in the future, sustain the control of the danger by 
keeping a look out on the symptoms of looming illness or injury and carrying out routine 
preventive maintenance on the equipment. To ensure that it remains relevant, therefore, 
OSHA must review its policies to give allowance to statements that curb long term 
dangers so as to place itself as the platform of safety and health protection among 
construction organizations.  OSHA needs to adopt a no-blame approach in order to 
strategically improve safety at the industry level. OSHA was not created to torment 
contractors by appearing on jobsites without notice to see how many violations can be 
seen on a jobsite, but to ensure safety in the long-term. The argument is not to bash 
OSHA or to blatantly state that the organization is not poorly executed, but to merely 
suggest improving the methods that should drive construction companies and their 
employees to be safer. The goal of a contractor is not to execute a single project 
successfully and safely, but to operate as a business successfully and safely. OSHA has 
been at the forefront of safety, but change needs to occur to ensure that their methods do 
not divert contractors from being a safe operating enterprise. 
OSHA is in no way trying to harm companies but without a strategic system of safety 
improvement to go along with the fault identification system currently in place, 
companies would be paying less attention to set and improve long-term safety objectives, 
but rather would be more inclined to hide facts from OSHA’s inspectors so as not to get 
fined. Although the fining system OSHA implemented isn’t the worst one, it obviously 
fails to strategically improve safety at the industry level. OSHA needs to cooperate with 
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companies and replace their fining system with one that makes employers invest in long 
term safety objectives by providing incentives as well as support.  
4.4.3.4.Structured Survey 
On the basis of unstructured interviews as discussed in section 4.4.3.3, three key 
constructs (factors) were identified along with a number of associated indicators 
(observable items in terms of survey statements) to structurally analyze OSHA’s non-
performance issues with respect to strategically improving safety in the construction 
industry. The constructs are discussed below. 
4.4.3.4.1. Constructs 
The following key constructs (factors) were used to analyze the various facets of 
OSHA’s performance as perceived by the construction industry professionals. 
4.4.3.4.1.1.Regulations & Standards 
The regulations provided by OSHA have been criticized for a number of reasons. 
These include, in particular, their lack of clarity, impractical nature, implementation 
difficulty, lack of acceptance by employers and employees, infrequent updating, non-
conformance with new technology, susceptibility to manipulation, overloaded and overly 
strict nature, unreasonable requirement of work hours and capital, high cost-to-benefit 
ratio, and negative impact on worker productivity, worker morale, and construction 
business in general. This part of the survey collected structured industry opinions on the 
above aspects collectively determining the perceived effectiveness of OSHA’s 
regulations in the industry. 
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4.4.3.4.1.2.Enforcement Methods  
OSHA’s safety enforcement methods have been criticized for being ineffective, 
reactive, aimed at rectifying single events rather than improve the industry, insensitive to 
the needs & limitations of employers, oriented entirely towards inspection and penalties 
rather than proactively preventing accidents and identifying problems before they occur, 
and not focused towards positive safety reinforcement. This part of the survey collected 
structured industry opinions on the above aspects collectively determining the perceived 
effectiveness of OSHA’s safety enforcement methods in the industry. 
4.4.3.4.1.3.Vision & Approach 
OSHA has been criticized for adopting, in general, an inappropriate vision towards 
strategic safety improvement in the industry. In this respect, OSHA has been criticized by 
the industry, in particular, for lack of active participating in necessary research activities 
that would have allowed incorporating safety as an industrial development process, lack 
of concentration on positive safety reinforcement, inappropriate focus on the apparent 
causes of accident (such as worker behavior) and not on the underlying factors leading to 
those accidents (such as organizational leadership, work pressure, communication, etc.), 
failure to adopt a proactive approach for developing long term safety measures, failure to 
develop standards effective towards developing a total safety culture in a construction 
organization, and failure to develop methods that would have allowed organizations to: 
invest in strategic safety rather than investing in following day-to-day procedures, invest 
in improving processes rather than investing in products, and invest in long term rather 
than short term. This part of the survey collected structured industry opinions on the 
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above aspects collectively determining the perceived effectiveness of OSHA’s vision for 
strategic and continuous safety improvement in the industry. 
4.4.3.4.2. Questionnaire 
A quantitative research method was chosen to examine the criticism on OSHA, since 
it was exploratory in nature. Questionnaire survey was used in order to facilitate the 
collection of information from construction organizations. All attributes (factors) were 
measured through a five-point Likert-type response format. Items, relating to each of the 
attributes, were used in the form of statements to measure individual attributes under 
investigation. Participants were asked to endorse the statements using a five-point Likert-
type scale (from 1=‘‘strongly disagree’’ to 5=‘‘strongly agree’’). Questionnaire survey is 
presented in Appendix D. 
To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft 
questionnaires were constructed and pretested via face-to-face meetings with select 
professionals including short-listed experts from construction contracting organizations 
representing their top management and middle/ project management, all having expertise 
in or exposure to safety issues. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire. 
The questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 44 statements about OSHA’s 
safety performance for the four attributes diagnosed. Most of the statements presented in 
the scale were negatively worded, as recommended in the measurement literature 
(Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). The research targeted top management, senior project 
managers, safety managers/officers and construction superintendents working for general 
contractors and subcontractors as the survey sample.  
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Based on all the gathered information, descriptive analysis was performed and the 
results are discussed in the following section. 
4.4.3.4.3. Data Analysis 
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the survey were assumed to reflect the 
unobserved, underlying construct, with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the 
observed measures. For example, constructs such as vision and advising support are 
typically viewed as underlying factors that give rise to something that is observed. 
Accordingly, their indicators tend to be realized as reflective. 
4.4.3.4.3.1.Assessment of Data Reliability and Validity 
Prior to data analysis, three measurement properties need to be examined to ensure 
that the data has a satisfactory level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
The first of these is the individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations) 
of the items on their respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the 
item’s variance is due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with all 
loadings in the range of 0.80–0.95, demonstrating the satisfactory level of individual item 
reliability. 
Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or 
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is 
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is 
listed in Table 4.30. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70 
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).  
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The third measurement property is the discriminant validity – that is, the extent to 
which each construct differs from other constructs in the analysis. It is assessed by using 
the average variance extracted (Av), suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table 
4.30). This measure should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and 
other constructs in the model (i.e., the squared correlation between two constructs). This 
can be demonstrated in the correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.31, which includes the 
correlations between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the 
matrix, and the square root of the average variance extracted (Av) calculated for each of 
the constructs along the diagonal. Having all of the diagonal elements greater than any 
other corresponding row or column implies adequate discriminant validity. 
Having satisfied the three measurement properties, it can be concluded that the 
constructs are measured with adequate precision. 
Table 4.30: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs 
Construct 
 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
 
Average 
variance 
extracted (Av) 
1. Regulations & Policies 0.897 0.69 
2. Enforcement Methods 0.818 0.65 
3. Advising Support 0.844 0.67 
4. Vision and Approach 0.921 0.72 
 
Table 4.31: Discriminant Validity Analysis 
Construct  
Construct 1 2 3 4 
1. Regulations & Policies 0.83 - - - 
2. Enforcement Methods 0.12 0.81 - - 
3. Advising Support 0.17 0.08 0.82 - 
4. Vision and Approach 0.13 0.09 0.19 0.85 
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4.4.3.4.3.2.Results  
This section presents the results of the survey. OSHA’s performance was determined 
by three independent constructs—regulations & policies, enforcement methods, and 
vision & approach. Strictly speaking, support was found for the perceived (negative) 
impact of OSHA’s regulations & policies, enforcement methods, and vision & approach 
on the strategic safety improvement in the construction industry.  
Descriptive analysis was performed to analyze the results. To identify the extent of 
negative impact of each of the measured indicators (survey items) with respect to 
OSHA’s influence on strategic safety improvement in the construction industry, the mean 
values of survey responses for each item were used. Since each of the responses were 
measured on a five-point Likert-type scale (from 1 to 5), reverse coding was done for 
some of the statements which were positively worded. Hence a mean score of 5 in the 
final analysis represented worst perceived performance, while a mean score of 1 
represented best perceived performance on the measure under consideration. A mean 
response score of 1.50 was considered least significant in terms of that particular measure 
generating (minimal) negative impact on the related construct. In order to distinguish the 
measures with respect to their extent of negative impact, the following indicator 
criticality index was used (Table 4.32). 
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Table 4.32: Indicator Criticality Indices 
Mean Score 
Range 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index 
Indicator 
Criticality Zone 
>=4 6 Major High 
3.50 – 3.99 5 Major Low 
3.00 – 3.49 4 Moderate High 
2.50 – 2.99 3 Moderate Low 
2.00 – 2.49 2 Minor High 
1.50 – 1.99 1 Minor Low 
1.00 – 1.49 0 Non-Critical 
 
Tables 4.33-4.35 show the mean response scores and indicator criticality indices for 
all the items measured in the survey, organized as per their respective constructs. The 
tables have been sorted in descending order of criticality of the indicators measured 
(based on their mean values). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 151
Table 4.33: Regulations and Standards Construct 
S. 
No. OSHA Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
I Regulations and Standards 
1 OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver 
an overbearing and unwanted presence 
that has a negative impact on worker 
productivity. 
4.57 6 Major 
High 
2 OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver 
an overbearing and unwanted presence 
that has a negative impact on worker 
acceptance to safety policies and 
procedures. 
4.44 6 Major 
High 
3 OSHA takes extraneous amount of 
time to actualize new regulations/ 
standards. 
4.26 6 Major 
High 
4 Existing OSHA procedures are not 
updated timely. 
4.2 6 Major 
High 
5 OSHA health and safety procedures/ 
instructions/ rules are not generally 
practicable (implementable). 
3.71 5 Major 
Low 
6 OSHA health and safety procedures/ 
instructions/ rules generally fail to 
reflect how the job is actually done. 
3.68 5 Major 
Low 
7 OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver 
an overbearing and unwanted presence 
that greatly restricts an organization’s 
ability to develop as well as compete 
3.67 5 Major 
Low 
8 OSHA regulations and standards fail to 
incorporate current technology. 
 
3.58 5 Major 
Low 
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Table 4.33: Regulations and Standards Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. OSHA Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
9 OSHA regulations/ procedures can be 
easily manipulated by some companies.
3.54 5 Major 
Low 
10 OSHA regulations/ standards/ 
procedures are generally burdensome 
(trying to do too much without any 
practical advantage). 
3.32 4 Moderate 
High 
11 OSHA regulations are generally over-
strict. 
3.21 4 Moderate 
High 
12 OSHA regulations/ standards/ 
procedures are generally confusing (not 
very clear to implement). 
3.09 4 Moderate 
High 
13 Substantial amount of capital has been 
needlessly wasted by your organization 
for complying with OSHA standards. 
2.95 3 Moderate 
Low 
14 Substantial amount of working hours 
have been needlessly lost by your 
organization for complying with OSHA 
standards. 
2.81 3 Moderate 
Low 
15 The cost of implementing OSHA 
regulations is usually unjustified as 
against their benefit in achieving 
reduced worker injury. 
2.81 3 Moderate 
Low 
1based on Table 4.32 
 
 
 
 
 153
Table 4.34: Enforcement Methods Construct 
S. 
No. OSHA Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
II Enforcement Methods 
16 The priority of OSHA inspections is 
mostly centered towards imposing 
penalties, rather than preventing accidents 
and/ or identifying problems. 
4.54 6 Major 
High 
17 OSHA fails to provide adequate reward 
mechanisms. 
4.43 6 Major 
High 
18 OSHA performs inadequate number of 
inspections. 
3.89 5 Major 
Low 
19 OSHA generally seems more interested in 
issuing the fine rather than correcting the 
problem. 
3.77 5 Major 
Low 
20 OSHA’s methods are mostly directed 
towards correcting only single events, such 
as the one your company was fined for. 
3.88 5 Major 
Low 
21 The penalties/ fines imposed by OSHA are 
not usually justified in proportion to the 
violation. 
3.86 5 Major 
Low 
22 OSHA inspections are unbalanced 
distributed among construction firms. 
3.65 5 Major 
Low 
23 OSHA inspections are unbalanced 
distributed among different types of 
construction expertise. 
3.59 5 Major 
Low 
24 OSHA training programs are generally 
ineffective. 
3.55 5 Major 
Low 
25 OSHA inspection procedures are generally 
ineffective. 
3.53 5 Major 
Low 
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Table 4.34: Enforcement Methods Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. OSHA Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
26 OSHA is an overbearing bureaucracy with 
methods bearing little or no sensitivity to 
the needs & limitations of employers who 
are struggling to survive in a competitive 
marketplace. 
3.19 4 Moderate 
High 
27 OSHA’s heavy fines restrict an 
organization’s ability to develop as well as 
compete. 
3.12 4 Moderate 
High 
28 OSHA follow-up inspections (after initial 
citations have been issued) are usually 
performed at an unreasonably slower rate. 
2.98 3 Moderate 
Low 
29 OSHA deals with workplace accidents 
usually at an unreasonably slow rate. 
2.84 3 Moderate 
Low 
1based on Table 4.32 
Table 4.35: Vision and Approach Construct 
S. 
No. OSHA Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone 
III Vision and Approach  
30 OSHA has generally failed to take a 
proactive approach in developing long 
term safety measures. 
4.56 6 Major 
High 
31 OSHA standards are mostly 
ineffective in setting up a Total Safety 
Culture on a construction jobsite 
(OSHA is the driving force to 
implement a total safety culture in a 
construction organization). 
4.44 6 Major 
High 
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Table 4.35: Vision and Approach Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. OSHA Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
32 OSHA has not been concentrating 
enough on positive safety 
reinforcement. 
4.42 6 Major 
High 
33 The expenditures made for 
compliance with OSHA regulations 
and/ or paying for fines could be spent 
in a more strategic way that would 
create a safer work environment and a 
better understating of safety. 
4.4 6 Major 
High 
34 OSHA does not focus on the strategic 
picture by taking into consideration 
the underlying factors leading to 
accident (such as leadership, work 
pressure, communication) but rather 
focuses on the apparent causes of 
accident (such as lack of PPE). 
4.23 6 Major 
High 
35 OSHA emphasizes more on 
appointing supervisors to administer 
fines in the workplace, rather than 
appointing personnel to act as health 
and safety advisors. 
3.91 5 Major 
Low 
36 OSHA, as a safety organization, is not 
actively participating in necessary 
research activities to view and 
incorporate safety as an industrial 
development process, which would 
have improved ways construction 
organizations can incorporate safety 
in the industry. 
 
3.85 5 Major 
Low 
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Table 4.35: Vision and Approach Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. OSHA Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
37 OSHA representatives do not usually 
provide follow up information 
pertaining to the incident such as: how 
the accident could be corrected or any 
appropriate training that could be 
utilized to ensure the incident is not 
repeated. 
3.79 5 Major 
Low 
38 OSHA should train their inspectors 
better regarding on how to facilitate 
developing a strategic safety culture 
in a construction organization leading 
to total safety. 
3.75 5 Major 
Low 
39 OSHA representatives do not usually 
provide information about how to 
improve safety strategically in your 
organization. 
3.73 5 Major 
Low 
40 OSHA is more devoted to inspections 
(monitoring) than to safety as a 
strategic concern. 
3.71 5 Major 
Low 
41 OSHA's safety approach restricts your 
organization by compelling it to 
increase investment in following 
procedures rather than investing in 
long-term safety objectives. 
3.45 4 Moderate 
High 
42 OSHA focuses more on the employer 
actions rather than on the employee 
safety, thereby increasing the short 
term expenses of the organization 
instead of the long term investment. 
3.4 4 Moderate 
High 
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Table 4.35: Vision and Approach Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. OSHA Performance Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
43 OSHA places a heavy burden on 
organizations by forcing increased 
operational fees and the costs 
associated to retrofit outdated 
equipment rather than investing on 
improving the processes for achieving 
long-term (strategic) safety objectives.
3.24 4 Moderate 
High 
44 OSHA’s inspection and penalty 
approach of enforcement is an 
inappropriate and ineffective way to 
ensure workplace safety in the long-
term. 
3.18 4 Moderate 
High 
1based on Table 4.32 
After analyzing Tables 4.33-4.35, the key OSHA non-performance indicators (with 
criticality indices = 6), ranked in descending order of criticality (based on mean response 
score), are shown in Table 4.36. Table 4.36 also provides mean response rate, associated 
constructs, and criticality ranking for these key non-performance indicators. The first 
column in Table 4.36 provides the serial number of these indicators as given in Tables 
4.33-4.35. 
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Table 4.36: Key OSHA Non-Performance Indicators – All Constructs 
S. 
No. Non-Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
1 OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver 
an overbearing and unwanted presence 
that has a negative impact on worker 
productivity. 
4.57 Regulations 
and 
Standards 
1 
30 OSHA has generally failed to take a 
proactive approach in developing long 
term safety measures. 
4.56 Vision and 
Approach 
2 
16 The priority of OSHA inspections is 
mostly centered towards imposing 
penalties, rather than preventing 
accidents and/ or identifying problems. 
4.54 Enforcement 
Methods 
3 
2 OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver 
an overbearing and unwanted presence 
that has a negative impact on worker 
acceptance to safety policies and 
procedures. 
4.44 Regulations 
and 
Standards 
4 
31 OSHA standards are mostly ineffective 
in setting up a Total Safety Culture on a 
construction jobsite (OSHA is the 
driving force to implement a total 
safety culture in a construction 
organization). 
4.44 Vision and 
Approach 
5 
17 OSHA fails to provide adequate reward 
mechanisms. 
4.43 Enforcement 
Methods 
6 
32 OSHA has not been concentrating 
enough on positive safety 
reinforcement. 
4.42 Vision and 
Approach 
7 
33 The expenditures made for compliance 
with OSHA regulations and/ or paying 
for fines could be spent in a more 
strategic way that would create a safer 
work environment and a better 
understating of safety. 
4.40 Vision and 
Approach 
8 
3 OSHA takes extraneous amount of time 
to actualize new regulations/ standards 
4.26 Regulations 
and 
Standards 
9 
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Table 4.36: Key OSHA Non-Performance Indicators – All Constructs (continued) 
 
S. 
No. Non-Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
34 OSHA lacks strategic focus on 
underlying factors leading to accident 
(such as leadership, work pressure, 
communication) but rather place 
emphasis on the apparent causes of 
accident (such as lack of PPE). 
4.23 Vision and 
Approach 
10 
4 OSHA’s safety procedures are not 
updated as frequently as needed. 
4.20 Regulations 
and 
Standards 
11 
 
Further assessment of Tables 4.33-4.35 – to identify construct criticality ranking 
(based on a value of weighted mean response score for each construct) – results in Table 
4.37. Table 4.37 has been arranged in descending order of construct criticality and also 
provide construct criticality ranking.  
Table 4.37: Construct Criticality Ranking 
 
 
 
 
 
The major OSHA non-performance indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 5 
or 6) constitute 16 out of a total of 44 indicators i.e. 36.36%. The moderate OSHA non-
performance indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 3 or 4) constitute 18 out of a 
total of 44 indicators i.e. 40.90%. Minor OSHA non-performance indicators (with an 
indicator criticality index = 1 or 2) constitute 6 out of a total of 44 indicators i.e. 13.64%. 
Construct 
Weighted Mean 
Response Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Construct 
Criticality  
Ranking 
Vision and Approach 3.87 1 
Enforcement Methods 3.63 2 
Regulations and Standards 3.59 3 
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The remaining 4 indicators (9.10%) are not perceived by the industry as negative aspects 
of OSHA performance.  
The above results indicate that OSHA is not performing at par in terms of achieving 
strategic safety improvement in the construction industry. The key OSHA non-
performance construct (Vision and Approach) also reinstate the same conclusion, i.e. 
OSHA needs to improve on its vision and approach in order to strategically improve 
safety in the industry. The key change in OSHA’s strategic approach, as reflected from 
the findings, should be “inculcating total safety and continuous improvement through 
teamwork, research and positive reinforcement” as against its current “inspection and 
penalty” approach. OSHA needs to work with the companies and not against them in 
order to achieve the strategic goal of zero accidents in the industry. This is a problem that 
needs to be addressed by reverting to the fundamentals of what an organization like 
OSHA is to accomplish. 
4.4.4. Survey 4: Investigation of the state of adoption and implementation of safety 
as a total management process in a contracting firm’s management system 
4.4.4.1.Description 
Today’s construction projects are growing in complexity and in order to succeed on 
the global level, construction organizations must not approach construction safety and 
health as just another step in avoiding unwanted accidents or federal fines, but as a 
strategic tool, that if implemented effectively, will have the potential to maximize 
competitiveness and profit. This strategic approach to safety can be accomplished via a 
Total Safety management (TSM) philosophy which finds its roots from the Total Quality 
management (TQM) principles. TSM is a performance oriented safety initiative that 
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involves all the members of an organization in establishing and maintaining a work 
environment that is safe and conducive to quality and productivity. The primary purpose 
of TSM is to provide excellence in safety through continuous improvements of products 
and processes by the total involvement and dedication of each individual who is in any 
way a part of that product/process.  It is a structured approach to improvement.  If 
correctly applied, it will assist a construction company in improving its performance. It 
involves a strong commitment to two guiding principles: customer satisfaction and 
continuous improvement. TSM follows the same sets of standards as TQM and provides 
a competitive advantage to the companies that implement it, by establishing a safer 
working place that leads to a continuous and sustainable improvement in peak 
performance, thereby achieving and maintaining the goal of zero accidents.  
As found by other surveys in this research, inspection traditionally has been one of 
the key attributes of a safety system in the construction industry. In regards to inspection 
related to quality, Deming says, “Routine 100% inspection is the same thing as planning 
for defects - acknowledgement that the process cannot make the product correctly, or that 
the specifications made no sense in the first place.  Quality comes not from inspection, 
but from improvement of the process. The same philosophy is applicable to safety as 
well. In terms of safety, this does not mean that inspection ceases.  Instead, it means that 
more effort should be put into preventing errors and injuries.   
The construction industry has been following a path that has led to lack of trust and 
confidence, adversarial relations, unsafe behaviors, and increased arbitration and 
litigation.  The industry has become increasingly reliant on burdensome specifications 
and compliance. This has led the owners and regulatory agencies to shift more of the 
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risks to the contractors. The net outcome is that the construction industry has been 
bogged down with paperwork, defensive posturing, and generally tends to have a hostile 
attitude towards regulatory agencies and other participants. TSM can help reverse this 
trend.  Although, not a magic pill or panacea for all illnesses, it will, if properly 
implemented, help construction companies improve on a sustainable basis in order to 
achieve the goal of zero accidents, as well as help all the parties to come closer.   
Although ‘Total Safety Management’ has been a magic word for a while now, 
methods and techniques to implement safety as a total management process in 
construction Industry are still to be developed. TSM places emphasis on prevention and 
not correction. The goal is work that is 100% free of errors and free of accidents. To do 
this, it is necessary to focus on “processes” and not “end results”. The primary purpose of 
this part of the research was to investigate the adoption and implementation of TSM in 
the construction industry. Literature review highlighted that no accurate information 
regarding the extent of usage of safety as a total management process in the construction 
industry was available. Hence this survey was conducted wherein the contractors and 
subcontractors were asked to identify the extent of adoption and implementation of TSM 
as a process in their businesses. The results of the survey included measurements on the 
extent of knowledge of the industry personnel about TSM, and the use of techniques of 
implementing TSM in the construction industry. The survey further reflected industry 
opinions as to the benefits and obstacles of the application of TSM techniques to the 
construction industry in terms of achieving and sustaining the goal of zero accidents. This 
dimension of research is significant not only to understand the role of TSM in 
strategically improving safety in the construction industry but also to determine how 
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TSM approaches positively impact safety performance and the worker safety behaviors 
through an organization’s ability to translate, integrate, and ultimately institutionalize 
TSM behaviors into everyday practice on the job.  
For the purpose of this study, the evaluation of the current state of safety 
improvement strategies in use by the construction organizations and the readiness of the 
organizations to adopt and implement safety as a total management process in their 
routine works was done by conducting a structured survey in the construction industry. 
This survey examined the perception, approaches and practices of construction firms as a 
predictive tool to demonstrate how safety is operational as a total management process 
within these organizations. A survey was designed and distributed to contractor and 
subcontractor managerial staff (including top management and middle/ project 
management) for assessing the aforementioned aspects by taking into account the 
organizations’ perception towards safety as a total management process, the use of safety 
improvement strategies in the companies, the state of employee involvement and 
empowerment, the state of safety improvement training, the perceived benefits and 
obstacles of TSM, and the readiness of the companies to implement safety as a total 
management process in their routine works. Conclusions drawn from this research will 
strengthen or weaken the argument that the safety improvement strategies currently 
adopted by construction organizations in the U.S. are generally focused towards safety 
compliance rather than total safety management.  
From the perspective of the overall objective of this dissertation, the underlying 
objective of this research study was to collect and analyze data on safety improvement 
practices, and TSM adoption and readiness, which would serve as a basis to establish the 
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rationale of this research: need for a strategic zero-accident safety improvement 
framework in the construction industry to achieve continuous and sustainable safety 
improvement. There is no intent on the part of the author to imply that the identified main 
and sub causes (factors) of lack of TSM adoption in the construction industry are in any 
way statistically significant. 
4.4.4.2.Methodology 
Structured surveys were conducted to achieve the study objectives. The methodology 
of survey development and administration was the same as discussed in section 3.2.2.3. 
The following sections illustrate the major findings of the research conducted for the 
key question at hand: Are the safety improvement strategies currently adopted by 
construction organizations instrumental in nurturing safety as a total management process 
in their organizations (in order to strategically improve safety in the construction 
industry)? 
4.4.4.3.Data Collection 
On the basis of literature review, six key constructs (factors) were identified along 
with a number of associated indicators (observable items in terms of survey questions) to 
analyze the current state of adoption and the state of readiness of construction 
organizations in implementing safety as a total management process in their routine 
operations. The constructs are described in the following sub-section. 
4.4.4.3.1. Constructs 
The following five constructs (factors) were used to analyze the various facets of the 
state of implementation of safety as a total management process in construction 
organizations.  
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4.4.4.3.1.1.Knowledge of TSM 
This construct consisted of various indicators determining the knowledge of the 
industry in relation to safety as a total management process in construction businesses. 
Aspects diagnosed included knowledge of existing construction industry programs 
implementing TSM, perceived methods of implementing TSM, and perception of the 
factors significant in developing and implementing a TSM program. 
4.4.4.3.1.2.Strategic Vision of Safety  
This construct consisted of various indicators determining the strategic vision of the 
industry in regards to appreciating safety as a total management process in construction 
businesses. Aspects diagnosed included perceived strategic impacts of poor safety 
performance, perceived effectiveness of a TSM program, perceived effectiveness of 
OSHA regulations in terms of implementing TSM, company’s view of safety as an 
integral business value, company’s view of safety as a strategic tool to achieve zero 
accidents and to attain competitive advantage, and the company’s strategic policy 
towards safety. 
4.4.4.3.1.3.Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement  
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature of safety 
improvement programs in construction organizations with respect to their strategic focus 
towards TSM. Aspects diagnosed included employee awareness of the program, strategic 
focus of the program, factors motivating the initiation of the program, key objectives of 
the program, steps taken in the program development and implementation, level of 
success of the program in terms of improved worker safety behaviors and improved 
relationships with customers and suppliers, company strategy to determine the 
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effectiveness of the program, personnel support to implement the program, orientation of 
safety training towards TSM, provision of formal training in TSM or other safety 
improvement philosophies to employees, and emphasis of training on process 
improvement; data gathering & analysis; teamwork; communication; and zero accident 
strategies. 
4.4.4.3.1.4.Employee Involvement and Empowerment 
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the nature and extent 
of employee involvement and empowerment in company’s safety improvement program. 
Aspects diagnosed included level of empowerment of employees to make significant 
safety improvement suggestions and changes to operations, availability of an anonymous 
way for employees to make safety improvement suggestions, importance of employee 
input in the company’s safety improvement program, extent to which the employees 
provide input that is useful in making continual safety improvements to the organization, 
inclusion of employee feedback in the safety decision making process, presence of a 
mentoring program for new employees to develop safe working habits, presence of 
incentive programs to reward workers; supervisors; superintendents; or specific teams for 
outstanding safety performance and/or for generating ideas to reduce the number of 
accidents, level of feedback collected from employees for various safety related areas, 
and methods adopted in the company to encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM. 
4.4.4.3.1.5.Readiness to Embrace TSM 
This construct consisted of a number of indicators determining the readiness of 
construction organizations to embrace safety as a total management process in their 
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businesses. Aspects diagnosed included characteristics of company’s culture promoting 
safety conscience, involvement of various organizational levels in safety efforts, 
company support to implement safety as a total management process, desirable worker 
behaviors under work pressure, company strengths in safety, significance of safety in 
company’s strategic plan and mission statement, knowledge and understanding by all 
members of the organization of the following: company’s safety mission, team’s safety 
goal; team’s success definition; how team decisions are made; responsibilities and 
authorities of all team members; desirable behaviors in case of unforeseen inhibitors 
impeding progress; and how unsafe team members will be guided for improvement, 
openness and honesty policy in the organization, decision support by all levels of 
employees, involvement of whole organization to accomplish safety and health goals, 
involvement of whole organization to assess the safety precautions and rules, 
involvement of whole organization in taking the responsibility of the accidents and their 
effects, peer pressure among workers to work in a safe and healthy manner, recognition 
and reward for safe practices, independent (cold eye) safety reviews and ratings, use of 
positive reinforcement for good safety practices, and viewing at the past safety 
performance (safety history) of the subcontractors/ suppliers and prospective employees 
as an important criterion for selection & hiring. 
4.4.4.3.2. Questionnaire 
A quantitative research method was chosen to investigate the state of adoption and 
implementation of safety as a total management process in the construction industry, 
since it was exploratory in nature. Questionnaire survey was used in order to facilitate the 
collection of information from construction organizations. All indicators (observed 
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variables) were measured through a five-point Likert-type response format. Items, 
relating to each of the constructs, were used in the form of statements to measure 
individual constructs under investigation. Participants were asked to endorse the 
statements using a five-point Likert-type scale (from 1=‘‘strongly disagree’’ to 
5=‘‘strongly agree’’). Questionnaire survey is presented in Appendix D. 
In addition to the five constructs described above, a number of measures determining 
the perceived benefits and obstacles in implementing TSM in the construction industry 
were also included in the questionnaire. This last part of the questionnaire was aimed at 
collecting industry perceptions in relation to TSM benefits including: increased profits; 
improved performance; improved safety records; increased employee morale; provision 
of a check-and-balance mechanism at different stages of a project lifecycle; avoidance of 
costly redesign or project delay by addressing hazard issues as early as possible; and 
provision of traceable and effective hazard management, and industry perceptions in 
relation to TSM obstacles including: changing attitudes and behaviors; schedule and cost 
pressures; conflicts with short-term targets; lack of education and training to drive the 
improvement process; lack of top-management commitment/ understanding; lack of 
employee commitment/ understanding; tendency to cure symptom rather than cause; lack 
of expertise/ resources in TSM (or continuous safety improvement); and current bidding 
climate. 
To achieve acceptable levels of measurement reliability and validity, draft 
questionnaires were constructed and pretested via face-to-face meetings with select 
professionals including short-listed experts from construction contracting organizations 
representing their top managers and middle/ project managers, all having expertise in or 
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exposure to safety issues. Their input was used to refine the original questionnaire. The 
questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 139 statements (124 statements about 
the state of adoption and implementation of safety as a total management process, and 15 
statements about the perceived benefits and obstacles towards implementing safety as a 
total management process). The research targeted top management and middle/ project 
management personnel from general contractor and subcontractor organizations as the 
survey sample.  
Based on all the gathered information, descriptive analysis was performed and the 
results are discussed in the following section. 
4.4.4.4.Data Analysis 
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the survey were assumed to reflect the 
unobserved, underlying construct, with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the 
observed measures. For example, constructs such as strategic approach to safety 
improvement, and employee involvement & empowerment are typically viewed as 
underlying factors that give rise to something that is observed. Accordingly, their 
indicators tend to be realized as reflective. 
4.4.4.4.1. Assessment of Data Reliability and Validity 
Prior to data analysis, three measurement properties need to be examined to ensure 
that the data has a satisfactory level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
The first of these is the individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations) 
of the items on their respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the 
item’s variance is due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with all 
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loadings in the range of 0.75–0.90, demonstrating the satisfactory level of individual item 
reliability. 
Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or 
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is 
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is 
listed in Table 4.38. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70 
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).  
The third measurement property is the discriminant validity – that is, the extent to 
which each construct differs from other constructs in the analysis. It is assessed by using 
the average variance extracted (Av), suggested by Fornell and Larcker (1981) (Table 
4.38). This measure should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and 
other constructs in the model (i.e., the squared correlation between two constructs). This 
can be demonstrated in the correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.39, which includes the 
correlations between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the 
matrix, and the square root of the average variance extracted (Av) calculated for each of 
the constructs along the diagonal. Having all of the diagonal elements greater than any 
other corresponding row or column implies adequate discriminant validity. 
Having satisfied the three measurement properties, it can be concluded that the 
constructs are measured with adequate precision. 
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Table 4.38: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs 
 
Construct 
 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
 
Average 
variance 
extracted (Av) 
1. Knowledge of TSM 0.846 0.72 
2. Strategic Vision of Safety  0.875 0.74 
3. Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement  0.864 0.78 
4. Employee Involvement & Empowerment 0.891 0.67 
5. Readiness to Embrace TSM 0.821 0.70 
 
Table 4.39: Discriminant Validity Analysis 
Construct  
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Knowledge of TSM 0.85 - - - - 
2. Strategic Vision of Safety  0.18 0.86 - - - 
3. Strategic Approach to Safety 
Improvement  
0.07 0.14 0.88 - - 
4. Employee Involvement & 
Empowerment 
0.20 0.09 0.15 0.82 - 
5. Readiness to Embrace TSM 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.84 
 
4.4.4.4.2. Results and Conclusion 
This section presents the results of the survey. State of adoption and implementation 
of safety as a total management process in construction organizations was determined by 
five independent constructs— knowledge of TSM, strategic vision of safety, strategic 
approach to safety improvement, employee involvement & empowerment, and readiness 
to embrace TSM. Strictly speaking, support was found for factors impeding the strategic 
adoption and implementation of safety as a total management process in construction 
organizations. Additionally, industry perception was collected as for the benefits and 
obstacles in TSM implementation in the construction industry. 
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Descriptive analysis was performed to analyze the results. To assess the extent of 
impact of each of the measured indicators (survey items) with respect to the state of 
adoption and implementation of safety as a total management process in construction 
organizations, the mean values of survey responses for each item were used. Except for 
the TSM benefits and obstacles data collected (the analysis procedure of which will be 
described later), a mean score of 5 in the final analysis represented best performance on 
the measured indicator, while a mean score of 1 represented worst performance on the 
measure under consideration. A mean response score of 4.50 was considered least 
significant in terms of that particular measure generating (minimal) negative impact on 
the related construct. In order to distinguish the measures with respect to their extent of 
impact, an indicator criticality indexing and zoning criteria was used (Table 4.40). 
Table 4.40: Indicator Criticality Indices & Zones 
Mean Score 
Range 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone 
<=2 6 Major High 
2.01-2.50 5 Major Low 
2.51 – 3.00 4 Moderate 
High 
3.01-3.50 3 Moderate 
Low 
3.51 – 4.00 2 Minor High 
4.01 – 4.50 1 Minor Low 
4.51 – 5.00 0 Non-
Critical 
 
It is important to note here that that owing to the nature of some of the statements 
provided in the questionnaire, a high mean response score for these statements, although 
represented better performance on the measure, actually represented poor performance in 
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terms of that particular measure affecting the related TSM construct. For instance, the 
statement in the questionnaire: My company’s safety policy can be best defined as 
“implementation of a set of safety rules by the company with punitive measures for 
violators” received a mean response score of 3.56 on a scale of 4. This can be interpreted 
as having 3.56 out of every 5 respondents agreed to this statement. However, since this 
statement actually interprets that the company’s safety policy is oriented towards safety 
compliance only and not strategic safety improvement, a high mean response on this 
measure, in fact, indicates a high negative impact on the company’s safety policy being 
conducive to TSM. Hence the result of this and such statements needed to be reversed in 
order to correctly interpret their level of criticality in terms of positively or negatively 
affecting the TSM culture in a construction organization, which was the primary factor to 
be assessed. Consequently, the mean response rate of 3.56 was reversed to 1.44 
(equivalent to 5-3.56) in order to assess that measure in terms of the overall objective 
(TSM performance). This is indicated in brackets under the “Mean” column in the 
proceeding tables depicting the results. This is done for all such statements. 
Tables 4.41-4.45 show the mean response scores and indicator criticality indices for 
all the items measured in the survey, organized under their respective constructs. The 
tables have been sorted in descending order of criticality of the indicators measured 
(based on their mean values). 
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Table 4.41: Knowledge of TSM Construct 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
I Knowledge of TSM 
1 TSM can be achieved by measuring 
and keeping records of the number of 
accidents and incidents and applying 
punitive measures to workers that are 
caught violating safety rules.  
3.65 
(1.35) 
6 Major 
High 
2 I am aware of construction industry 
programs implementing TSM.  
1.44 6 Major 
High 
3 TSM programs should be based on 
scientific decision making. 
2.54 4 Moderate 
High 
 
 
4 TSM can be achieved by making and 
maintaining a safe and healthy 
workplace as part of the company’s 
strategic plan. 
3.08 3 Moderate 
Low 
5 TSM can be achieved by ensuring safe 
working through positive 
reinforcement and advice and 
improving by adopting good practice 
that exceeds legislative requirements. 
3.27 3 Moderate 
Low 
6 TSM programs should be strategically 
focused.  
3.38 3 Moderate 
Low 
7 TSM can be achieved by motivating 
staff through a measurement and 
reward scheme and providing the skills 
and information to enable staff to work 
safely via training and its intranet. 
3.65 2 Minor 
High 
8 TSM programs should focus on peak 
performance.  
3.65 2 Minor 
High 
9 TSM programs should have unity of 
purpose.  
3.96 2 Minor 
High 
10 TSM programs should be committed to 
employee empowerment. 
4.04 1 Minor 
Low 
11 TSM programs should be committed to 
continual improvement. 
4.08 1 Minor 
Low 
12 TSM programs should be performance 
and process oriented. 
4.15 1 Minor 
Low 
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Table 4.41: Knowledge of TSM Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
13 TSM programs are largely dependent 
on executive-level commitment. 
4.15 1 Minor 
Low 
14 TSM programs should contain 
comprehensive, ongoing training.  
4.31 1 Minor 
Low 
15 TSM programs should be teamwork 
oriented. 
4.38 1 Minor 
Low 
1based on Table 4.40 
Table 4.42: Strategic Vision of Safety Construct 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
II Strategic Vision of Safety 
16 My company views safety as a tool to 
increase profits. 
 
2.2 5 Major 
Low 
17 My company views safety as a 
competitive advantage. 
 
2.22 5 Major 
Low 
18 My company’s safety policy can be 
best defined as “Implementation of a 
set of safety rules by the Company 
with punitive measure for violators.” 
 
3.56 
(1.44) 
6 Major 
High 
19 My company’s safety policy can be 
best defined as “a set of processes 
developed to manage safety aspects 
of a project including encouraging, 
measuring and rewarding behavior 
that creates a safe working 
environment rather than catching 
people who break the rules.” 
 
 
 
 
 
2.44 5 Major 
Low 
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Table 4.42: Strategic Vision of Safety Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
20 My company’s safety policy can be 
best defined as “a performance-and-
process-control oriented approach to 
safety and health management that 
gives organization sustainable 
competitive advantage in the 
marketplace by establishing a safe 
and healthy work environment that is 
conducive to consistent peak 
performance and that is improved 
continually.” 
2.23 5 Major 
Low 
21 Poor safety performance decreases 
productivity and organizational 
performance.  
2.55 4 Moderate 
High 
22 The company management strongly 
believes that excellence in safety 
would positively affect the ability to 
achieve excellence in other areas; e.g. 
production, etc. 
2.64 4 Moderate 
High 
23 My company views safety and health 
as an integral part of its business. 
2.83 4 Moderate 
High 
24 My company believes that poor 
safety performance restricts strategic 
organizational growth.  
2.86 4 Moderate 
High 
25 OSHA regulations provide a driving 
force to implementing TSM.  
2.9 4 Moderate 
High 
26 My company views safety as 
achieving zero accidents. 
2.95 4 Moderate 
High 
27 My company views safety as 
elimination of hazards. 
3.22 3 Moderate 
Low 
28 A TSM program is (will be) 
beneficial for my organization.  
4.04 1 Minor 
Low 
1based on Table 4.40 
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Table 4.43: Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement Construct 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
III Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement  
29 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “A dollar value has 
been assigned to the cost of unsafe 
behaviors”. 
2.02 5 Major 
Low 
30 “Obtaining client satisfaction” is a 
major objective of my organization’s 
safety improvement program. 
2.26 5 Major 
Low 
31 Training currently emphasizes: data 
gathering & analysis. 
2.28 5 Major 
Low 
32 “Pressure from competitors” was a 
key factor that provided the 
motivation to start the safety 
improvement program. 
2.33 5 Major 
Low 
33 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “Benchmarks for 
improvement have been defined”. 
2.38 5 Major 
Low 
34 “Environmental 
issues/considerations” was a key 
factor that provided the motivation to 
start the safety improvement program. 
2.49 5 Major 
Low 
35 “Increasing productivity” is a major 
objective of my organization’s safety 
improvement program. 
2.51 4 Moderate 
High 
36 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “Organizing a multi-
disciplinary team”. 
2.55 4 Moderate 
High 
37 Company’s safety training is oriented 
towards TSM (or continuous safety 
improvement). 
2.59 4 Moderate 
High 
38 The company’s safety improvement 
program is centered on Total Safety 
Management and/ or zero accident 
strategies. 
 
2.65 4 Moderate 
High 
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Table 4.43: Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
39 “Safety of processes” was a key factor 
that provided the motivation to start 
the safety improvement program. 
2.67 4 Moderate 
High 
40 Training currently emphasizes: 
process improvement. 
2.69 4 Moderate 
High 
41 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “Data has been 
collected to measure the safety 
performance”. 
2.72 4 Moderate 
High 
42 “Demanding customers” was a key 
factor that provided the motivation to 
start the safety improvement program. 
2.78 4 Moderate 
High 
43 “Need to reduce costs and improve 
performance” was a key factor that 
provided the motivation to start the 
safety improvement program. 
2.82 4 Moderate 
High 
44 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “An educational 
program has been implemented”. 
2.84 4 Moderate 
High 
45 “My company’s chief executive” was 
a key factor that provided the 
motivation to start the safety 
improvement program. 
2.88 4 Moderate 
High 
46 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “Safety problems 
have been identified”. 
2.88 4 Moderate 
High 
47 Training currently emphasizes: 
teamwork. 
2.9 4 Moderate 
High 
48 Training currently emphasizes: 
communication. 
2.92 4 Moderate 
High 
49 “Achieving zero accidents” was a key 
factor that provided the motivation to 
start the safety improvement program. 
 
 
2.94 4 Moderate 
High 
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Table 4.43: Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
50 “Ensuring involvement of employees 
in the safety building effort” is a 
major objective of my organization’s 
safety improvement program. 
2.96 4 Moderate 
High 
51 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “An internal 
awareness program is underway”. 
2.98 4 Moderate 
High 
52 Training currently emphasizes: zero 
accident strategies.  
2.98 4 Moderate 
High 
53 Formal training in TSM or other 
safety improvement philosophies is 
given to employees. 
3.11 3 Moderate 
Low 
54 After the implementation of my safety 
improvement program, the 
relationship with my customers and 
suppliers has improved. 
3.13 3 Moderate 
Low 
55 My organization’s safety 
improvement program can be 
described as formal with widespread 
employee awareness. 
3.14 3 Moderate 
Low 
56 As part of the management team, we 
have a TSM Steering Committee/ a 
TSM Facilitator/ a safety 
improvement project team. 
3.16 3 Moderate 
Low 
57 The company provides feedback loops 
to determine if the safety 
improvement practices are working. 
3.23 3 Moderate 
Low 
58 After the implementation of my safety 
improvement program, worker 
behaviors have improved. 
3.29 3 Moderate 
Low 
59 “Employee safety” was a key factor 
that provided the motivation to start 
the safety improvement program. 
3.42 3 Moderate 
Low 
60 “Health and Safety agencies (like 
OSHA)” was a key factor that 
provided the motivation to start the 
safety improvement program. 
3.89 2 Minor 
High 
1based on Table 4.40 
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Table 4.44: Employee Involvement & Empowerment Construct 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
IV Employee Involvement & Empowerment  
61 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or 
continuous safety improvement) 
include: serving effectively on 
improvement teams”. 
2.05 5 Major 
Low 
62 There is an anonymous way for 
employees to make safety 
improvement suggestions. e.g. drop 
box.   
2.34 5 Major 
Low 
63 The company has a mentoring 
program for all new employees to 
develop safe working habits. 
2.56 4 Moderate 
High 
64 The company has incentive programs 
to reward workers, supervisors, 
superintendents, or specific teams for 
outstanding safety performance and/or 
for generating ideas to reduce the 
number of accidents. 
2.68 4 Moderate 
High 
65 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or 
continuous safety improvement) 
include: “practicing hazard 
identification techniques constantly”. 
2.71 4 Moderate 
High 
66 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for 
setting safety goals. 
2.76 4 Moderate 
High 
67 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for 
selecting safe projects.  
2.79 4 Moderate 
High 
68 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or 
continuous safety improvement) 
include: “encouraging fellow 
employees to work safely”. 
2.89 4 Moderate 
High 
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Table 4.44: Employee Involvement & Empowerment Construct (continued) 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5)
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
69 The extent to which the employees 
provide input that is useful in making 
continual safety improvements to the 
organization is very significant. 
2.94 4 Moderate 
High 
70 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for 
measuring safety improvement. 
2.94 4 Moderate 
High 
71 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for 
identifying solutions. 
 
2.96 4 Moderate 
High 
72 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or 
continuous safety improvement) 
include: “setting positive examples of 
working safely”. 
3.16 3 Moderate 
Low 
73 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or 
continuous safety improvement) 
include: “recommending accident 
prevention strategies”. 
3.16 3 Moderate 
Low 
74 Employee feedback is almost always 
included in the safety decision making 
process. 
3.28 3 Moderate 
Low 
75 Employees are empowered to make 
significant safety improvement 
suggestions and changes to operations. 
3.42 3 Moderate 
Low 
76 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for 
identifying safety issues. 
3.44 3 Moderate 
Low 
77 The importance of employee input in 
my company’s safety improvement 
program is very high. 
3.54 2 Minor 
High 
1based on Table 4.40 
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Table 4.45: Readiness to Embrace TSM Construct 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
V Readiness to Embrace TSM  
78 All team members understand how 
unsafe team members will be guided 
for improvement. 
2.12 5 Major 
Low 
79 Decisions are supported by all in my 
organization.  
2.42 5 Major 
Low 
80 All team members understand how 
team decisions are made. 
2.54 4 Moderate 
High 
81 “Company executives/ managing 
directors” are involved in safety 
management efforts/ activities. 
2.54 4 Moderate 
High 
82 “Appropriate storage practices” are 
my company’s strength in terms of 
safety. 
2.58 4 Moderate 
High 
83 Company looks at the past safety 
performance (safety portfolio) of a 
prospective employee as an important 
criterion for selection. 
2.72 4 Moderate 
High 
84 “Consistent commitment to 
improvement” promotes safety 
conscience in my company. 
2.74 4 Moderate 
High 
85 The organization has a mission 
statement with specific 
responsibilities for approval of 
recommendations for improvement of 
the work environment. 
2.82 4 Moderate 
High 
86 My company provides (or strives to 
provide): safety information. 
2.82 4 Moderate 
High 
87 In my company, we would never 
compromise safety to meet deadlines. 
2.86 4 Moderate 
High 
88 “Employee participation” promotes 
safety conscience in my company. 
2.86 4 Moderate 
High 
89 The organization has a mission 
statement with specific 
responsibilities for building safety 
and health concerns into the strategic 
plan. 
 
2.88 4 Moderate 
High 
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Table 4.45: Readiness to Embrace TSM Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone 
90 The responsibility of the accidents 
and their effects belongs to the whole 
organization. 
2.88 4 Moderate 
High 
91 “Management leadership” promotes 
safety conscience in my company. 
2.88 4 Moderate 
High 
92 Team’s success is understood by all 
team members in my organization. 
2.88 4 Moderate 
High 
93 Team’s goal is understood by all team 
members in my organization. 
2.92 4 Moderate 
High 
94 “An active TSM steering committee/ 
safety improvement team” is my 
company’s strength in terms of safety.
2.96 4 Moderate 
High 
95 All team members understand their 
authority within the team and that of 
all other team members. 
2.96 4 Moderate 
High 
96 All team members know the 
responsibilities of all other team 
members. 
3.02 3 Moderate 
Low 
97 “A capable and committed safety 
director” is my company’s strength in 
terms of safety. 
3.12 3 Moderate 
Low 
98 When unforeseen inhibitors impede 
progress all members know what to 
do. 
3.12 3 Moderate 
Low 
99 The whole organization is responsible 
to follow and get involved in the 
safety & health mission 
accomplishment. 
3.12 3 Moderate 
Low 
100 My company provides (or strives to 
provide): management 
encouragement towards safety. 
3.12 3 Moderate 
Low 
101 Company uses the method of positive 
reinforcement for good safety 
practices. 
3.14 3 Moderate 
Low 
102 Safety practices are recognized and 
rewarded. 
3.17 3 Moderate 
Low 
103 The whole organization is responsible 
to assess the safety precautions and 
rules. 
3.17 3 Moderate 
Low 
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Table 4.45: Readiness to Embrace TSM Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
104 Company follows independent (cold 
eye) safety reviews and ratings.  
3.19 3 Moderate 
Low 
105 My company provides (or strives to 
provide): safe working environment. 
3.23 3 Moderate 
Low 
106 “Company administration and 
support” are involved in safety 
management efforts/ activities. 
3.24 3 Moderate 
Low 
107 “Self accountability” promotes safety 
conscience in my company. 
3.25 3 Moderate 
Low 
108 My company provides (or strives to 
provide): clearly defined mission 
statement. 
3.25 3 Moderate 
Low 
109 “Commitment by senior 
management” is my company’s 
strength in terms of safety. 
3.27 3 Moderate 
Low 
110 “Individual employees” are involved 
in safety management efforts/ 
activities. 
3.28 3 Moderate 
Low 
111 Peer pressure exists among workers 
to work in a safe and healthy manner. 
3.28 3 Moderate 
Low 
112 Everyone is open and honest with 
each other in my organization. 
3.32 3 Moderate 
Low 
113 Safety mission is understood by all 
team members in my organization. 
3.32 3 Moderate 
Low 
114 Company looks at the past safety 
performance (safety history) of the 
subcontractors/ suppliers as an 
important criterion for selection. 
3.36 3 Moderate 
Low 
115 The organization has a mission 
statement with specific 
responsibilities for regular review of 
the safety and health program in order 
to keep up with the safety best 
practices. 
3.43 3 Moderate 
Low 
116 “A comprehensive safety and health 
plan” is my company’s strength in 
terms of safety. 
 
 
3.48 3 Moderate 
Low 
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Table 4.45: Readiness to Embrace TSM Construct (continued) 
 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
117 My company provides (or strives to 
provide): safety manager or safety 
committee. 
3.54 2 Minor 
High 
118 “Safe facilities” are my company’s 
strength in terms of safety. 
3.54 2 Minor 
High 
119 “Up-to-date safety procedures” is my 
company’s strength in terms of safety.
 
3.55 2 Minor 
High 
120 My company provides (or strives to 
provide): formal, written statement of 
corporate safety policies and 
objectives. 
3.85 2 Minor 
High 
121 “Safe equipment” is my company’s 
strength in terms of safety. 
4.28 1 Minor 
Low 
122 “Project managers” are involved in 
safety management efforts/ activities. 
4.3 1 Minor 
Low 
123 “Site managers” are involved in 
safety management efforts/ activities. 
4.42 1 Minor 
Low 
124 My company provides (or strives to 
provide): personal protective 
equipment. 
4.52 0 Non-
Critical 
1based on Table 4.40 
For the TSM benefits and obstacles data collected, a mean score of 5 in the final 
analysis represented maximum perceived impact by the measured indicator, while a mean 
score of 1 represented minimum perceived impact by the measured indicator. Note that a 
mean score of 5 represents maximum perceived benefit by a benefit measure while the 
same mean score of 5 represents maximum barrier to TSM implementation by an 
obstacle measure. A mean response score of 3.01 or above (3 represents a neutral 
response) was considered significant in terms of that particular measure being considered 
as a benefit or obstacle to TSM implementation. In order to distinguish the measures with 
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respect to their extent of impact, the following measure impact index was used (Table 
4.46). The results are depicted in Tables 4.47-4.48. 
Table 4.46: Measure Impact Indices and Zones 
Mean Score 
Range 
Impact 
Index 
Impact Zone 
<=2 0 No 
Significant 
Impact 
2.01-2.50 1 Minor Low 
2.51 – 3.00 2 Minor High  
3.01-3.50 3 Moderate 
Low 
3.51 – 4.00 4 Moderate 
High 
4.01 – 4.50 5 Major Low 
4.51 – 5.00 6 Major High 
 
Table 4.47: TSM Benefits  
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Measure 
Impact 
Index1 
Measure 
Impact 
Zone1 
VI TSM Benefits   
125 TSM improves performance. 4.36 3 Major 
126 TSM increases employee morale. 4.28 2 Moderate
127 TSM increases profits.  4.15 2 Moderate
128 TSM provides the opportunity to avoid 
costly redesign or project delay by 
addressing hazard issues as early as 
possible. 
3.98 2 Moderate
129 TSM provides traceable and effective 
hazard management system. 
3.91 2 Moderate
130 TSM provides a check-and-balance 
mechanism at different stages of a 
project lifecycle.  
3.79 2 Moderate
1based on Table 4.46 
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Table 4.48: TSM Obstacles 
S. 
No. TSM Statement 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Index1 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Zone1 
VI TSM Obstacles  
131 “Changing attitudes and behaviors” is an 
obstacle in TSM implementation. 
4.47 3 Major 
132 “Emphasis on short-term objects” is an 
obstacle in TSM implementation. 
4.42 3 Major 
133 “Lack of top-management commitment/ 
understanding” is an obstacle in TSM 
implementation. 
4.37 3 Major 
134 “Lack of education and training to drive 
the improvement process” is an obstacle 
in TSM implementation. 
4.12 2 Moderate 
135 “Schedule and cost treated as the main 
priorities” is an obstacle in TSM 
implementation. 
4.11 2 Moderate 
136 “Current bidding climate” is an obstacle 
in TSM implementation. 
4.05 2 Moderate 
137 “Lack of employee commitment/ 
understanding” is an obstacle in TSM 
implementation. 
3.79 2 Moderate 
138 “Lack of expertise/resources in TSM” is 
an obstacle in TSM implementation. 
3.64 1 Minor 
139 “Tendency to cure symptom rather than 
eradicate the root cause” is an obstacle in 
TSM implementation. 
3.53 1 Minor 
1based on Table 4.46 
After analyzing Tables 4.41-4.45, the major critical indicators reflecting lack of 
adoption and implementation of TSM in construction contracting organizations (with 
criticality indices = 5 or 6), ranked in descending order of criticality (based on mean 
response score), are shown in Table 4.49. Table 4.49 also provides mean response rate, 
associated constructs, and indicator criticality ranking for these key TSM impeding 
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indicators. The first column in Table 4.49 provides the serial number of these indicators 
as given in Tables 4.41-4.45. 
Table 4.49: Key TSM Impeding Indicators – All Constructs 
S. 
No. TSM Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
1 TSM can be achieved by measuring 
and keeping records of the number of 
accidents and incidents and applying 
punitive measures to workers that are 
caught violating safety rules.  
3.65 
(1.35) 
Knowledge of 
TSM 
1 
2 I am aware of construction industry 
programs implementing TSM.  
1.44 Knowledge of 
TSM 
2 
18 My company’s safety policy can be 
best defined as “Implementation of a 
set of safety rules by the Company 
with punitive measure for violators.” 
3.56 
(1.44) 
Strategic Vision 
of Safety 
3 
29 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “A dollar value has 
been assigned to the cost of unsafe 
behaviors”. 
2.02 Strategic 
Approach to 
Safety 
Improvement 
4 
61 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or 
continuous safety improvement) 
include: serving effectively on 
improvement teams”. 
2.05 Employee 
Involvement and 
Empowerment 
5 
78 All team members understand how 
unsafe team members will be guided 
for improvement. 
2.12 Readiness to 
Embrace TSM 
6 
16 My company views safety as a tool to 
increase profits. 
2.2 Strategic Vision 
of Safety 
7 
17 My company views safety as a 
competitive advantage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.22 Strategic Vision 
of Safety 
8 
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Table 4.49: Key TSM Impeding Indicators – All Constructs (continued) 
 
S. 
No. TSM Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
20 My company’s safety policy can be 
best defined as “a performance-and-
process-control oriented approach to 
safety and health management that 
gives organization sustainable 
competitive advantage in the 
marketplace by establishing a safe 
and healthy work environment that is 
conducive to consistent peak 
performance and that is improved 
continually.” 
2.23 Strategic Vision 
of Safety 
9 
30 “Obtaining customer/ client 
satisfaction” is a major objective of 
my organization’s safety 
improvement program. 
2.26 Strategic 
Approach to 
Safety 
Improvement 
10 
31 Training currently emphasizes: data 
gathering & analysis. 
2.28 Strategic 
Approach to 
Safety 
Improvement 
11 
32 “Pressure from competitors” was a 
key factor that provided the 
motivation to start the safety 
improvement program. 
2.33 Strategic 
Approach to 
Safety 
Improvement 
12 
62 There is an anonymous way for 
employees to make safety 
improvement suggestions. e.g. drop 
box   
2.34 Employee 
Involvement and 
Empowerment 
13 
33 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement 
program include: “Benchmarks for 
improvement have been defined”. 
2.38 Strategic 
Approach to 
Safety 
Improvement 
14 
79 Decisions are supported by all in my 
organization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.42 Readiness to 
Embrace TSM 
15 
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Table 4.49: Key TSM Impeding Indicators – All Constructs (continued) 
 
S. 
No. TSM Performance Indicator 
Mean 
Response 
Score 
Construct 
Indicator 
Criticality 
Ranking 
19 My company’s safety policy can be 
best defined as “a set of processes 
developed to manage safety aspects of 
a project including encouraging, 
measuring and rewarding behavior 
that creates a safe working 
environment rather than catching 
people who break the rules.” 
2.44 Strategic Vision 
of Safety 
16 
34 “Environmental 
issues/considerations” was a key 
factor that provided the motivation to 
start the safety improvement program.
2.49 Strategic 
Approach to 
Safety 
Improvement 
17 
 
Further assessment of Tables 4.41-4.45 – to identify construct criticality ranking 
(based on a value of weighted mean response score for each construct) – results in Table 
4.50. Table 4.50 has been arranged in descending order of construct criticality, and also 
provide construct criticality ranking and criticality zone.  
Table 4.50: Construct Criticality Ranking & Zone 
 
Construct 
Weighted Mean 
Response Score 
(Scale 1-5) 
Criticality  
Ranking 
Criticality  
Zone 
Strategic Vision of Safety 2.66 1 Moderate High 
Strategic Approach to Safety 
Improvement 2.82 2 
Moderate 
High 
Employee Involvement & 
Empowerment 2.92 3 
Moderate 
High 
Readiness to Embrace TSM 3.18 4 Moderate Low 
Knowledge of TSM 3.43 5 Moderate Low 
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The major TSM impeding indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 5 or 6) 
constitute 17 out of a total of 124 indicators i.e. 13.71%. The moderate TSM impeding 
indicators (with an indicator criticality index = 3 or 4) constitute 87 out of a total of 124 
indicators i.e. 70.16%. Minor TSM impeding indicators (with an indicator criticality 
index = 1 or 2) constitute 19 out of a total of 124 indicators i.e. 15.32%. The remaining 1 
indicator (0.09%) is not perceived by the industry as an inhibiting measure towards TSM 
adoption and implementation.  
Strategic vision of safety, strategic approach to safety improvement, employee 
involvement and empowerment, and organizations’ readiness to embrace TSM are all 
important components of a strategic total safety environment. Lack of performance of 
organizations in these areas undoubtedly indicates that contracting firms are not 
performing well in terms of achieving strategic safety improvement in the construction 
industry. Hence it can be concluded that the strategies currently adopted by construction 
organizations are not generally instrumental in nurturing safety as a total management 
process in their organizations (in order to strategically improve safety in the construction 
industry). 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed phase I of the data analysis, which was undertaken to achieve 
objective 1 of the study, i.e. to establish the need for addressing safety as a total 
management process in construction contracting organizations in order to achieve the 
goal of zero accidents. Four (4) safety key areas of concern were identified and 
researched as part of data collection process. Descriptive analysis was performed to reach 
key conclusions. It was found that construction organizations generally lack in the 
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following areas of safety performance at the various levels of the organization (Table 
4.51): 
Table 4.51: Ares of Safety Performance at the various Levels of the Organization 
Organizational/ 
Performance Level 
Key Non-Performance Areas 
Strategic 1. Strategic vision of safety 
2. Strategic approach to safety improvement 
3. Employee involvement and 
empowerment  
4. Readiness to embrace Total Safety 
Management 
Management 1. Safety communication and decision 
making  
2. Management commitment and support  
3. Accident investigation and reporting 
4. Safety training and orientation 
Supervisory 1. Worker motivation  
2. Safety commitment and support 
3. Safety communication 
4. Maintaining a positive attitude towards 
safety 
5. Safety training and orientation 
 
In addition, it is also concluded that OSHA is not performing at par in terms of 
achieving strategic safety improvement in the construction industry and needs to improve 
on its vision and approach in order to strategically improve safety in the industry. 
OSHA’s strategic approach, as reflected from the findings, should be “continuous 
improvement through positive reinforcement” as against “inspection and penalty” 
approach. OSHA needs to work with the companies and not against them in order to 
achieve the strategic goal of zero accidents in the industry. 
Based on the above findings, it can be concluded that construction industry 
(construction organizations and enforcement agencies) is not performing well in terms of 
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strategically approaching safety. Hence there is a dire need for a framework that would 
allow the industry to strategically and continuously improve safety so as to attain and 
sustain the goal of zero accidents. Such a framework would be instrumental in generating 
a total safety environment in the industry, which would promote safety for the sake of 
safety and not for the safe of “compliance” or “penalty avoidance”. This framework 
would require an integral approach to safety with commitment and participation from all 
levels as well as sectors of the industry. The next chapter discusses the development of 
such a strategic framework for continuous safety improvement in the industry. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA ANALYSIS PHASE II   
5.1 Introduction 
Phase I of the data analysis process (discussed in chapter 4) concluded that the 
construction industry lacks a strategic focus towards safety and hence established the 
need of a strategic safety improvement framework for the construction industry. As 
discussed later in this chapter, it is hypothesized that this strategic safety improvement 
framework should be based on an integral approach to safety that allows approaching 
safety as a total organizational process. This chapter discusses phase II of the data 
analysis process, which was undertaken to achieve objective 2 of the study, i.e. to identify 
the factors (latent variables/ constructs) determining the total safety environment of a 
construction contracting organization, which are most suitable and appropriate for 
measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role in achieving and sustaining 
the goal of zero accidents. 
This phase of data analysis begins by presenting and critically discussing the integral 
approach to safety as adopted by this research. This discussion highlights the highest 
level of the hierarchy that decomposes total safety into four principal dimensions, viz., 
person, culture, behavior and process. Section 5.3 provides this discussion. 
Defining the interior as well as exterior pursuits to safety is a complex task. The study 
endeavors to decompose safety dimensions into measurable attributes using a 
multiattribute analysis technique pioneered by Miller (1970) and used by researchers in 
similar research (e.g. Molenaar et al., 2009) The study briefly describes the multiattribute 
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hierarchy used to measure total safety, which was defined through exhaustive literature 
review and expert interviews on the basis of which the four principal dimensions of total 
safety (safety categories) were divided into 22 subcategories, and were finally 
decomposed into 83 measurable safety characteristics that formed the basis of a 
questionnaire to measure total safety. This multiattribute analysis is discussed in sec. 5.4. 
Following this, the study attempts to reach a consensus as to the selection of safe 
work behavior, which will be utilized as a measure of a company’s safety performance 
for the study. This is done in section 5.5. 
Using 686 questionnaire responses from construction companies with above average 
safety records, statistical relationships between total safety dimensions and safety 
performance (measured by safe work behavior) are revealed through a series of six latent 
variables (factors) that describe the total safety environment of a construction 
organization. This was achieved using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) which reduced 
the attribute space from a larger number of sub-categories (22) to a smaller number of 
underlying dimensions/ factors (6). This combination of variables, in this case, aspects of 
safety dimensions, provided a way to simplify subsequent analysis (Hamilton 1992; SPSS 
2001). A principal factor analysis (PFA) using the varimax rotation method with Kaiser 
normalization was utilized for the same. The survey development, administration and 
validation process is discussed in detail in the sections 5.6 - 5.8. The confirmatory factor 
analysis is detailed in section 5.9. 
The data collected from this phase of the research forms the basis of a strategic safety 
improvement model for the construction industry, the development and utility of which is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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5.2 Research Hypothesis Revisited 
As mentioned earlier, it is the premise of this research that individual intentions, 
commitments, group culture, and work behaviors have as much, or more, to do with the 
safety performance than the safety management system. Based on the findings of phase I 
of the data analysis process (chapter 4) and extensive literature review, this research 
develops itself on an integral approach to safety (as explained in section 5.3) that 
collectively define the interior and exterior pursuits necessary to determine the true total 
safety environment of a construction organization. It is hypothesized that all safety 
dimensions offer complementary, rather than contradictory, perspectives. Hence an 
integral view of construction safety can only be achieved if integration is made of these 
areas of knowledge through an acknowledgement of them as the fundamental dimensions 
of safety. It is further hypothesized that all four pursuits by their very nature cultivate 
successful safety performance. While these hypotheses seem intuitive, little research has 
been conducted to specifically identify and measure critical characteristics as related to 
all the dimensions that, in integration, define as well as influence total safety. This is the 
core objective of this research. 
5.3 An Integral Model for Safety 
Ken Wilber (Wikipedia, 2011) defines four dimensions for every entity. Each entity 
or unit of reality that is both a whole and a part of a larger whole, has an interior and an 
exterior. It also exists as an individual and (assuming more than one of these entities 
exists) as a collective. Observing the entity from the outside constitutes an exterior 
(objective) perspective on that entity. Observing it from the inside is the interior 
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(subjective) perspective, and so forth. If these four perspectives are mapped into 
quadrants, these constitute four quadrants, or dimensions.  
The above concept leads to defining four dimensions of construction safety with 
respect to a construction worker as an entity (Figure 5.1):  1) Behavioral i.e. exterior 
individual (or, in the diagram, the upper-right) quadrant; 2) Intentional i.e. interior 
individual (upper-left) perspective; 3) Cultural i.e. interior collective (lower-left) 
dimension; and 4) Process i.e. exterior collective (lower-right) quadrant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Integral Model for Safety (adapted from the work of Ken Wilber) 
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All four pursuits – intentional, cultural, behavioral and process – offer 
complementary, rather than contradictory, perspectives. It is possible for all to be correct 
and necessary for a complete account of human existence. Also, each by itself offers only 
a partial view of reality. Further, according to Wilber, these four perspectives are equally 
valid at all levels of existence. Hence an integral view of construction safety can be 
achieved if integration is made of these four areas of knowledge through an 
acknowledgement of them as the four fundamental dimensions of safety. 
Note that the right sides of the quadrants are concerned with empirical observation—
what does it do? The left sides of the quadrants focus on interpretation—what does it 
mean? 
This integral approach to safety provides a more complete view of reality. It allows a 
study of what drives safety performance, highlights the importance of the human side of 
safety and hence provides a mechanism to achieve incident and injury free environment. 
A major intent of viewing safety from the integral perspective is that it provides the 
capability with intentionally viewing from all aspects so that a complete and 
comprehensive view of safety can be achieved that enables quality decision making and 
actions. This integral approach to safety forms the basis of this research. 
Traditionally, organizations tend to implement change through systems – a process 
approach to safety, or by improving workers’ behaviors – a behavior based approach to 
safety. They focus on measures to control hazards (via systems), and means to control 
workers’ behaviors so that they comply with prescribed safe practices. This approach 
emphasizes (1) organizational policies, systems and procedures to prevent unsafe 
conditions and (2) workers’ training and motivation to prevent unsafe behaviors. Safety 
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programs – such as subcontractor selection, training, inspections, motivation, 
enforcement, etc., as well as efforts towards behavior-based safety aim at increasing the 
workers’ compliance with prescribed ‘safety rules’ and ‘safe behaviors.’ This approach 
has resulted in significant improvements, but has still not succeeded in achieving the 
zero-accident goal. The reasons are intuitive as identified below. 
While the traditional application of this “exterior” approach to safety aims at creating 
safe work behaviors, it ignores how the interior characteristics of the individual and the 
organizations influence the work behaviors and affect the possibility of errors and 
accidents. On one hand, it does not account for the personal factors that collectively 
define a worker’s intention for safety such as, level of self-commitment, interpretation of 
being safe, the perceived value of safety, the natural tendency for least effort, and the 
individual response under production and economic pressures for efficiency. On the other 
hand, the approach does not account for the cultural factors that shape the work 
environment such as, the team values, beliefs, norms, practices, and collective response 
under production and economic pressures for efficiency. These factors generate the 
situations the workers face, and the individual as well as crew’s ability to cope with these 
situations (Mitropoulos et al., 2009).  
From a practical perspective, a key concern is that at the work level, there is a 
continuous tension between safety and production or costs; in the short term, such 
conflicts are usually resolved in favor of production, because production efforts have 
relatively certain outcomes and receive rapid and rewarding feedback (Reason 1990). A 
recent study of safety on international projects (Mahalingam and Levitt 2007) also 
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illustrated that economic pressures were stronger determinants of work behavior than the 
safety systems.  
As a result of these “interior” characteristics, efforts to improve safety through 
objective assessments and advancements (new methods/ improved safety features and 
controlled behaviors) tend to be ineffective because the behavior change is only 
temporary and is not usually sustainable (Mitropoulos et al., 2009). The current safety 
strategies in construction, which are largely oriented towards systems advancements and 
behavior control, hence prove to be inadequate to achieve the zero-accident goal because 
of this fundamental flaw in their approach.  
The key challenge for researchers and practitioners is to develop total safety systems 
that are simultaneously highly productive and highly reliable and can function effectively 
in the dynamic, complex, and competitive conditions that construction projects face. This 
requires a treatment of safety from an integral perspective taking into consideration all 
four dimensions of safety and their inter-dependence. This treatment will allow a 
fundamental understanding of the individual and organizational characteristics that 
govern both the safe behaviors of workers and the effectiveness of safety systems, and 
will aid in determining the underlying factors that control the true total safety 
performance of a company. 
5.4 Multiattribute Heirarchy 
Employing multiattribute analysis, the problem of approaching safety as an integral 
perspective can be decomposed into three interdependent sets of factors – person, culture 
and process, defining total safety and one set of factor – behavior, defining safety 
performance. Person is integral to defining, for a worker, the interior characteristics such 
 201
as intentions, commitments, interpretations, values and emotions, as well as the exterior 
characteristics such as actions, behaviors, body language and the like. The second 
category, culture, is integral to defining, for an organization, the interior characteristics of 
a corporation such as norms, shared values, collective beliefs, and shared understanding. 
The third category, process, is integral to defining the exterior organizational (group) 
characteristics such as collective actions, social interactions, safety systems and the like. 
A good safety process is necessary for a company to properly communicate its safety 
goals. The major subcategories for each of these three categories are defined in the 
following sub-sections. Note that the fourth principal safety dimension – behavior, which 
has been selected as the safety performance measure for this study, is discussed in section 
5.5. 
5.4.1. Person 
5.4.1.1. Intention 
A person’s intention in performing an action is his or her specific purpose in doing so, 
the end or goal that is aimed at, or intended to accomplish. By setting an intention, one 
makes it clear to oneself and others, just what one plans to do. Lacking intention, one 
sometimes strays without meaning or direction. When one sets a positive intention and 
then acts on it to demonstrate commitment (such as before entering the workplace, one 
can intend to learn something new or be helpful), this has a positive impact not only one 
one’s own behavior but also on the behavior of surrounding team members. Intention can 
also give fortitude for dealing with tough times. For instance, with all the challenges 
construction sites generally offer, if one’s intention is to live through this process each 
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day with health and safety, this intention would help maintain composure, sanity, and on 
a good day, a sense of humor. 
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.1.2. Commitment 
Worker commitment to safety is a central element of incident and injury free 
environment. This commitment reflects the interactions of a worker with people and 
environment dominated by one’s obligations. Individual commitment includes personal 
commitment, which is often a pledge or promise to ones' self for personal growth and 
preferences, and commitment as a member of an organization, which is often a reflection 
of the expectations of top management as communicated to and perceived by the worker. 
This commitment may or may not be explicitly stated, although an explicit statement of 
individual commitment to safety brings its own advantages. Explicit commitment has the 
obvious advantage of accountability. Making a voluntary public commitment to safety 
not only increases the likelihood of the person making the commitment to follow through 
with it but also gives the right to fellow team members to explicitly remind to that person 
at some point in time if the person is not fulfilling what he/ she committed. Strategically, 
this would help generate an environment where commitment would not be something 
temporary but would rather be everlasting in that everyone would want (and not required) 
to live up to their voluntary commitment. It is also important to note here that periodic 
renewal of commitment is also important to sustain an environment fostering 
commitment. When people genuinely make a commitment and mean it when they make 
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it, they continue to live up to that commitment. What happens usually is that over the 
years, people do not renew their commitments and hence may need to be reminded again. 
The importance of obtaining worker commitment to safety for achieving and 
consistently maintaining incidence and injury free environment cannot be 
overemphasized. When employees are personally committed to safety, they are more 
willing to cooperate among each other as well as with the management to continuously 
improve the safety performance. Although 100% commitment from all employees is not 
a must to reach the goal of incident and injury free, it would be a lot easier if this could 
be achieved. The minimum needed is a level of commitment from the workers that when 
they see a fellow worker putting himself/ herself at risk, they would go and talk to that 
person to make sure that the person gets the appropriate help and does not get injured.  
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.1.3. Value 
A personal value is an absolute or relative ethical value, the assumption of which can 
be the basis for ethical action. Value is the foundation upon which measures of integrity 
are based. Values tell people what is good, beneficial, important, useful, beautiful, 
desirable, constructive, etc. They answer the question of why people do what they do. A 
value is not something one merely knows about or has observed in others that lacks 
guiding influence in one’s life. Values are those principles that are so ingrained in one’s 
personality that they become the determinants of how one thinks, acts, and finally what 
one says and how one says it. 
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Values can be defined as broad preferences concerning appropriate courses of action 
or outcomes. As such, values reflect a person’s sense of right and wrong or what “ought” 
to be. Values tend to influence attitudes and behavior. For example, if a person values 
safety and goes to work for an organization that demonstrates evident lack of 
commitment to workers’ safety, that very person may form the attitude that the company 
is an insecure place to work; consequently, he or she may not produce well or may 
perhaps leave the company. It is likely that if the company had had a stronger 
demonstrated commitment to safety, the attitude and behaviors would have been more 
positive. 
Everyone develops a set of values, as they become adults. These values are what 
everyone looks to for guidance in the decisions they make in life – decisions in the home, 
in the family, in relationships, in friendships, and in our occupations and business. 
Values in the human personality have basically one of three aspects: moral values, 
neutral values, and immoral values. A moral value is a principle that one lives by. A 
moral value is an absolute. It is not negotiable. Other values, such a neutral values, are 
less important, like obtaining a good product when one purchases something. The realm 
of immoral values is that need to be examined, such as common temptations to a person. 
Immoral values are not always based on ethical standards, but may be of a questionable 
source or may not be concerned with fairness, honesty, or integrity. 
The key question is: In which realm are one’s safety values? Safety values in the 
neutral realm include a situation where one knows about safety and can work safe if one 
wants to, but for some reason (e.g. production pressures) one chooses to ignore safe work 
procedures because they are not convenient. If one is lucky, one may not be injured in 
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this realm. But in thinking about noncompliant safety practices one has to recognize that 
taking unnecessary risks is a poor example to others, especially when a less experienced 
individual copies your work approach and is injured. In this way, as far as safety is 
concerned, operating in a neutral realm is borderline immoral because one at least 
contributes to an Injury of another person if not of oneself. 
Safety values in the immoral realm are seen in those who purposely work recklessly 
and give no regard to safe work procedures and resist good safety practices. It is both the 
neutral and the immoral safety values that need to be eliminated.  
If one takes a moral approach to managing safety, it then becomes one’s personal 
value. In such a case, one’s safety values provide guidance in one’s actions so that the 
person and those around him or her are safer by the very influence of one’s personal 
safety values. If this is true then one’s safety values are in the moral realm. 
The researcher would like to take the position that although the value system for a 
person might fall in the neutral or immoral realm, there is still a common denominator for 
all: nobody would want to get hurt; everyone would like to go home each and every night 
with no injury.  
For achieving incident and injury free environment, safety cannot be a priority; it 
must be a value. The reason is simple: priorities change, while values don’t. For instance, 
on a project with safety as a top priority, production pressures might lead to tighter 
schedules and suddenly safety may no longer be at the top of priority list. In order to 
increase productivity, unsafe acts and behaviors may become suddenly acceptable (rather 
desirable) and since increased productivity would most probably lead to increased cost 
while the pressure of maintaining a minimum quality is still on, safety suddenly drops to 
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the very bottom of the priority list. This is why safety must be a personal value if incident 
and injury free environment is to be achieved as well as sustained. In fact, safety needs to 
be such a highly held personal value that one doesn’t even think about it while one is 
prioritizing one’s activities.  
Two (2) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.1.4. Attitudes 
Attitudes are a direct reflection of a person’s character traits. These may be attributed 
to intentions (the specific purpose of doing what the person is doing) and emotions (the 
state of mind). Cox and Cox (1991) argue that employees’ attitudes toward safety are one 
of the most important indices of safety performance. These attitudes may be positive, 
negative or often in between, depending on the situation. Positive attitudes lead to safe 
behaviors, while negative attitudes can lead to unsafe behaviors or risk exposure. Most of 
these attitudes are established through training, while others are gained from peer groups. 
Individuals differ in their attitudes and hence their behaviors.  
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.1.5. Perception 
Perception is the process of attaining awareness or understanding. Perceptions vary 
from person to person. Different people perceive different things about the same 
situation. But more than that, they assign different meanings (interpretations) to what 
they perceive. Perceptions (and their interpretations) may change over time.  Perceptions 
may be positive, negative or often in between, depending on the situation. Positive 
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perceptions lead to positive interpretations and hence safe and healthy behaviors, while 
negative perceptions can lead to misinterpretations and hence unhealthy and unsafe 
behaviors and/ or risk exposures. Perceptions are usually driven by personal experience 
and training. Individuals differ in their perceptions and hence their behaviors. 
Personal risk perception has been found to be closely associated with attitudes toward 
safety (Rundmo 1997). Individuals, however, differ in their perception of risk and 
willingness to take risks, as demonstrated by March and Shapira (1992). Also, 
perceptions inherently lead to interpretations or misinterpretations. Interpretation refers to 
a particular view or explanation, as of the environment, procedures, performance, events, 
etc., provided by the use of personal experience, etc. It also refers to the conception of 
another person's behavior. Results of interpretations lead to specific emotions (such as 
happiness, anger, anxiety, etc.) and hence behaviors. Misinterpretation usually leads to 
unhealthy and unsafe (negative) emotions and hence behaviors. That is, when one has a 
positive perception and then acts on it to demonstrate the same (such as one can have a 
better perception of risk in terms of low willingness to take risk), this has a positive 
impact not only one one’s own behavior but also on the behavior of surrounding team 
members because it is interpreted as such.  
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.1.6. Interpretation 
Interpretation refers to a particular view or explanation, as of the environment, 
procedures, performance, events, etc., provided by the use of personal experience, etc. It 
also refers to the conception of another person's behavior.  
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Results of interpretations lead to specific emotions (such as happiness, anger, anxiety, 
etc.). Misinterpretation usually leads to unhealthy (negative) emotions. 
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.1.7. Emotion 
Emotion is the complex psycho-physiological experience of an individual's state of 
mind as interacting with biochemical (internal) and environmental (external) influences. 
Emotion is associated with mood, temperament, personality and disposition, and 
motivation. 
Results of emotions are principally behaviors and emotional expressions. People 
often behave in certain ways as a direct result of their emotional state. For instance, in 
case of a safety emergency (such as fire), the emotional expressions and behaviors of 
people might be anxiety, anger, fear, loneliness, sadness, disappointment, or depression. 
Emergency emotions are typically negative responses. Unless adequately regulated, 
emergency emotions are often a source of suffering. 
Right or wrong, one’s mind automatically attaches emotional meaning to events. If 
the level of emotions “fit” the situation, a proportionate response will likely follow and 
things will run smoothly. However, over or under responses usually lead to some form of 
negative impact on overall levels of happiness and relationships with others. 
For example, if a supervisor happens to mention safety as a major concern repeatedly 
in his or her conversation with a worker, the worker will react according to his or her own 
interpretation. The interpretation that the supervisor “cares about my safety” may cause a 
feeling of security, while an interpretation that the supervisor is “over-emphasizing 
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safety” may cause anxiety or anger. If feeling secured, the worker may continue with the 
conversation while actively participating. If anxious, the worker may stop talking and 
search for a quick exit. If angry, the worker might criticize the supervisor and/or wait to 
point out a flaw of his/ her. In reality, the supervisor might actually care about safety of 
workers. 
As workers pass through various stages of their work lives, they are exposed to many 
experiences: some are positive (e.g., awards, appreciations, recognitions, 
accomplishments) and others are negative (e.g., injuries, illnesses, accidents). 
Organizations are one of the best sources of support during stressful times. A major way 
that organization members support each other is through the appropriate expression of 
emotions.  
In order for organization members to respond to one another with appropriate 
emotions, it is very important to be involved in each other's work lives (and personal 
lives to some extent). This requires an effort on the part of each team member to be 
concerned with how the others are doing, whether physically, emotionally, or spiritually. 
For example, members should be observant to how their fellow workers are approaching 
safety in terms of their actions and behaviors, and when they see a fellow worker putting 
himself/ herself at risk, they would go and talk to that person to make sure that the person 
gets the appropriate help and does not get injured. Members who are tuned in to what is 
going on in each other’s work lives will be able to respond more quickly and more 
appropriately. 
In healthy organizations, members make a special point of listening to what others in 
the team have to say, whether they be subordinates or supervisors. Sometimes one may 
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not be able to fully understand why another person is experiencing a certain emotion, 
such as anger or sadness. However, by asking questions and carefully listening, one can 
gain a better understanding of the other person's feelings, and can thus respond in a more 
helpful way.  
Empathy, which is the ability to experience as one's own the feelings of another, is a 
major asset in being able to respond with appropriate emotions for a given situation. For 
example, a supervisor who is able to take the perspective of a worker who has just been 
injured will be better equipped to respond emotionally to him or her than someone who is 
very disconnected. By putting oneself in another member's shoes, one will be a better 
source of strength and encouragement in both positive and negative situations. 
While anger is a common emotion, if not kept under control it can lead to many 
problems, including conflict, and other serious issues. When one becomes angry over a 
particular incident, it is very important that the person takes some time to think about the 
situation before acting. In healthy organizations, individual members express their anger 
in a calm, constructive, and assertive manner. 
Being able to respond to other team members with a wide range of emotions, 
appropriate for each situation, is a key to successful organizational functioning. Persons 
who become proficient in this area are better equipped to build strong relationships and to 
deal with stressful work events as they occur. 
Two (2) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
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5.4.1.8. Proficiency 
Proficiency is the ability of an individual to perform a job properly. Proficiency can 
be seen as a combination of knowledge, qualifications, skills and behavior used to 
improve performance; or as the state or quality of being adequately or well qualified, 
having the ability to perform a specific role. Proficiency is sometimes thought of as being 
shown in action in a situation and context that might be different the next time a person 
has to act. In emergencies, competent people may react to a situation following behaviors 
they have previously found to succeed. To be competent a person would need to be able 
to interpret the situation in the context and to have a repertoire of possible actions to take 
and have trained in the possible actions in the repertoire. Regardless of training, 
proficiency would grow through experience and the extent of an individual to learn and 
adapt. 
Proficiency is a major factor influencing safety levels (Simon and Piquard 1991; 
Jaselskis et al., 1996; Mohamed, 2002). For achieving incident and injury free 
environment, workers must have the confidence that they have the necessary knowledge, 
skills and experience to perform a particular job safely. When employees have 
confidence in their proficiency, they have more positive attitudes towards safety and are 
more willing to cooperate among each other as well as with the management to 
continuously improve the safety performance.  
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
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5.4.2. Culture 
It is easy to recognize that there are intrinsic differences among organizations in how 
people interact and the values that are reflected in their work. In every organization, there 
are "right ways" to do things – organizational norms. Because these characteristics 
influence the way things get done in an organization, it is reasonable to assume they have 
an impact on safety.  
Corporate culture is instrumental in an organization’s success. It provides the 
workplace environment for the employees of an organization. When people work in an 
environment that they perceive as rewarding, they are more likely to perform more safely 
and more productively.  
The definition of corporate culture is complex when all of the facets above are 
considered. For purposes of this study, corporate culture is defined as the norms, shared 
values, collective beliefs, and shared understandings that are consistent throughout all 
members of the corporation. These norms, values, beliefs and understandings must be 
consistent throughout upper management, middle management, and field employees. 
5.4.2.1. Management Commitment & Involvement 
This section measures the level to which management acknowledges the significance 
of safety and becomes involved in it. The role management plays in promoting safety 
cannot be overemphasized. Management both creates and controls the environment in 
which construction accidents occur (Smallwood 1996). Management’s commitment is a 
central element of the safety environment (Zohar 1980). Management’s role has to go 
beyond organizing and providing safety policies and working instructions. Several 
studies show that the management’s commitment and involvement in safety is the factor 
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of most importance for a satisfactory safety level (Jaselskis et al. 1996). Langford et al. 
(2000) found that when employees believe that the management cares about their 
personal safety, they are more willing to cooperate to improve safety performance. 
Management safety commitment and involvement provide the strategic environment 
conducive to achieving and sustaining incident and injury free.  
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.2.2. Workers’ Commitment & Involvement 
Workers in field operations can benefit the most from safe conditions. This section 
measures workers’ commitment to safety and involvement in it. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that it is not just management participation and involvement in safety activities 
that is important, but the extent to which management encourages the involvement of the 
workforce (Niskanen 1994). Moreover, management must be willing to devolve some 
decision-making power to the workforce by allowing them to become actively involved 
in developing safety policies, rather than simply playing the more passive role of the 
recipient (Williamson et al. 1997). Workers’ involvement includes such issues as 
procedures for reporting injuries and potentially hazardous situations. Workers’ safety 
commitment and involvement provide the work environment conducive to achieving and 
sustaining incident and injury free.  
Five (5) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
 
 
 214
5.4.2.3. Supervisory Commitment and Involvement 
A successful safety management system is based on the premise that safety is both a 
management responsibility and a line function. While managers help develop and 
implement the program, its actual success depends upon the ability of supervisory 
personnel to ensure that the program is carried out during daily operations (Agrilla 1999). 
Langford et al. (2000) indicate that the more relationship-oriented supervisors are, the 
more likely it is that operatives will perform safely. This section measures supervisory 
commitment to safety and their involvement in it. Supervisory support in terms of 
coaching, mentoring and training workers, providing them with the right equipment at the 
right time, caring for their personal safety, demonstrated commitment to safety, 
empowering workers to actively participate in highlighting unsafe conditions and 
proposing solutions, motivating workers, etc., is a key element in developing a safe work 
environment conducive to incident and injury free.  
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.2.4. Subcontractor Commitment & Involvement 
Subcontractors are often an integral part of construction projects and can have a direct 
bearing on company safety. This section measures subcontractors’ involvement in the 
process and their commitment to safety. Subcontractor involvement in terms of attending 
safety meetings, orienting and training their employees for safety, providing their 
employees with the right equipment at the right time, caring for their employees’ personal 
safety, encouraging their workers to actively participate in highlighting unsafe conditions 
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and proposing solutions, etc. is a key element in developing a safe work environment 
conducive to incident and injury free.  
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.2.5. Communication 
Management is expected to use a variety of formal and informal means of 
communication to promote and communicate its commitment to safety (Baxendale and 
Jones 2000). Simon and Piquard (1991) suggests that both management communication 
and employee feedback are critical for suggesting safety improvements and reporting 
near misses as well as unsafe conditions and practices.  
Four (4) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.2.6. Work Environment 
Work environment refers to the degree of trust and support within a group of workers, 
confidence that people have in working relationships with coworkers, and the general 
morale. Having a supportive work environment demonstrates workers’ concern for safety 
and fosters closer ties between them. Coworkers’ attitude toward safety has been widely 
included in safety climate studies (Goldberg et al. 1991). These attitudes include helping 
team members stay safe and keep away from unsafe acts, etc.  
Five (5) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
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5.4.2.7. Production Pressure 
This section deals with the degree to which employees feel under pressure to 
complete work, and the amount of time to plan and carry out work (Glendon et al. 1994). 
Ahmed et al. (1999) identify the tight construction schedule as the most serious factor 
that adversely affects the implementation of construction site safety in Hong Kong. This 
is supported by another study (Sawacha et al. 1999), which found that productivity bonus 
pay could lead workers to achieve higher production through performing unsafely. 
Langford et al. (2000) state that supervisors are likely to turn a blind eye to unsafe 
practices on a site due to the pressure to achieve targets set by agreed-upon programs. 
They also argue that such ingrained practices of the industry (i.e., valuing expediency 
over safety) have to be overcome in order for safety management to be effective.  
Seven (7) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.3. Process 
5.4.3.1. Safety Rules and Procedures  
Management commitment to safe and healthy job sites is critical. The most 
significant evidence of management commitment towards safety is a written 
comprehensive safety and health program. Rules and procedures are the core component 
of safety management programs. Several studies show that presence of a comprehensive 
safety program is the most important factor for a satisfactory safety level (Jaselskis et al. 
1996; Langford et al. 2000). A good health and safety program that is effectively 
implanted can save money in a number of different ways including, holding down 
insurance costs, reducing costly litigation, reducing disability claims, increasing 
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productivity of employees, leading to more contracts (good reputation), reducing the 
number of compliance inspections and associated penalties. The program forces the 
construction companies to put their commitment to safety and health in writing; to 
establish policies and set goals for safety and health; and to communicate effectively the 
safety policies, procedures, and goals. Companies without a safety and health program 
experience 30% more accidents than those with the programs (Goetsch, 2011). A major 
factor influencing the safety level is the extent to which workers perceive safety rules and 
procedures as promoted and implemented by the organization (Cox and Cheyne 2000). 
Hood (1994) states that problems related to safety can frequently be traced to 
inconsistently applied or nonexistent operating procedures.  
Five (5) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.3.2. Site Layout Planning 
The aim in site layout planning and facilities is to produce a working environment 
that will maximize efficiency and minimize risks (Gibb and Knobbs 1995). Aspects of 
site layout planning that need to be addressed include access and traffic routes, material 
and storage handling, site offices and amenities, the construction plant, fabrication 
workshops, services and facilities, and the site enclosure (Anumba and Bishop 1997). 
Previous research shows that tidy and well planned (layout) sites are more likely to 
provide a high level of safety performance (Sawacha et al. 1999). For the purpose of this 
study, workplace hazards were defined as tangible factors that may pose risks for possible 
injuries or ailments. Within this definition, hazards do not always result in accidents, but 
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they lurk in work environments, waiting for the right combination of circumstances to 
come together.  
Four (4) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.3.3. Safety Training and Education 
Safety training and education are integral to teaching safe attitudes and to providing 
feedback on the effectiveness of current safety procedures. This section measures the 
level and effectiveness of the safety training in terms of developing and sustaining a work 
environment conducive to incident and injury free. Safety training is a major component 
of jobsite safety. Safety in essence is a team process and continuous teaching and 
learning at all levels is of utmost importance in order to not only keep oneself on track on 
safety but also to sustain a collaborative safe environment on all job sites. As is true in 
most settings, the learning process is never completed. As time goes by and as jobsite 
conditions change, it is necessary to provide additional training to workers. This training 
tends to be focused on the needs of individual field workers. On site specific training can 
provide positive reinforcement; the workers can be informed what deficiency of safety 
practices require improving and rectifying immediately. Prior research indicates that 
safety training can modify worker safe behavior; the workers can understand the work 
potential hazard such that they can prevent it (Hallowell and Gambatese, 2009).  
Four (4) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
 
 
 219
5.4.3.4. Accident Investigation and Reporting  
This section measures the level of effectiveness of the accident investigation and 
reporting system in terms of developing a work environment conducive to incident and 
injury free. The approach to accident investigation can be the difference between safe and 
unsafe behaviors. A no-blame approach to accident investigation (investigating the cause 
of the accident and not the person responsible) would facilitate in instilling positive 
safety behaviors in workers. This approach further helps in isolating and pinpointing the 
cause of the accident. This information can then be used to prevent future accidents, 
which should be the primary purpose of accident investigation. This approach and 
importance of accident investigation has been attested by the following from the Society 
of Manufacturing Engineers: The primary reason for investigating an accident is not to 
identify a scapegoat, but to determine the cause of the accident. The investigation 
concentrates on gathering factual information about the details that led to the accident. If 
investigations are conducted properly, there is the added benefit of uncovering problems 
that did not directly lead to the accident. This information benefits the ongoing effort of 
reducing the likelihood of accidents. As problems are revealed during investigation, 
action items and improvements that can prevent similar accidents from happening in the 
future will be easier to identify than at any (other) time. Hence an effective accident 
investigation and reporting system can provide continuous and sustainable improvement 
in safety.  
Four (4) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
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5.4.3.5. Safety Incentive Mechanisms 
Safety incentives are defined as any gifts or rewards that are given out on a regular 
basis. This can be a variety of rewards from points to earn company merchandise to 
actual cash or cash equivalents. This section measures the company’s use of incentives to 
improve safety performance.  
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
5.4.3.6. Safety Disincentive Mechanisms 
A disincentive is any form of punishment. It can be anything from an oral reprimand, 
to a written reprimand, to garnishment of wages or termination of employment. This 
section measures the company’s use of disincentives for unsafe behaviors to improve 
safety performance. 
One (1) measurable safety characteristic (survey item) was used from this 
subcategory as part of the measure of total safety in a construction organization. 
The three major categories defined above with their corresponding subcategories 
were altogether broken down into 83 measurable characteristics (questionnaire items) 
defining total safety. This is depicted in Table 5.1. 
The next section (section 5.5) provides justification for the selection of safe work 
behavior as the safety performance indicator for the study.  
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Table 5.1: Number of Survey Items Pertaining to Safety Dimension Subcategories 
 
Safety Dimension Subcategory 
 
Survey 
Item(s) 
Personal Intention & Commitment 2 
Personal Value System 2 
Personal Attitude & Perception 2 
Personal Interpretation & Emotion 3 
Personal Proficiency 7 
Management Commitment & 
Involvement 
7 
Workers’ Commitment & Involvement 5 
Supervisory Commitment and 
Involvement 
7 
Subcontractor Commitment & 
Involvement 
3 
Communication 4 
Work Environment 5 
Safety Accountability 2 
Production Pressure 7 
Cultural Norms 3 
Shared Values  3 
Collective Beliefs/ Shared 
Understanding 
2 
Safety Rules and Procedures  5 
Site Layout Planning 4 
Safety Training and Education 4 
Accident Investigation and Reporting  4 
Safety Incentive Mechanisms 1 
Safety Disincentive Mechanisms 1 
 
Total 
 
83 
 
5.5. Safe Work Behavior as Safety Performance Indicator 
This study adopts safe work behaviors (observable actions) as the safety performance 
indicator. The justification for the selection of safe work behaviors as the variable 
measuring safety performance for construction organizations follows. This justification is 
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based on the premise that leading indicators are better measures of safety performance 
than lagging indicators.  
Traditionally, safety performance has been measured by such metrics as the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recordable injury rate (RIR); or 
the experience modification rating (EMR) on workers’ compensation. These have served 
the purpose of providing information by which contractors could assess their safety 
performance in terms of construction industry averages on those metrics or to make 
comparisons with other firms.  These have also been used widely by OSHA, insurance 
companies, facility owners, and other parties involved in the construction industry. 
These traditional measures if safety are after-the-fact measures; namely, that safety is 
measured after injuries have already occurred. These metrics provide historical 
information about some aspect of the safety performance that has occurred and rely 
primarily on some form of accident or injury data.  These measures are labeled reactive, 
trailing, downstream, or lagging indicators because they rely on retrospective data. 
Focusing on these measures (e.g., accident rates and compensation costs) often means 
that the success of safety is measured by the levels of system failure (Cohen 2002). While 
lagging measurements can provide data about incidents after-the-fact, the question 
remains regarding the value of these metrics as a means of predicting workplace safety 
performance. Grabowski et al. (2007) note that a growing number of safety professionals 
question the value of lagging indicators and argue that lagging indicators do not provide 
sufficient information or insight to effectively avoid future accidents. Mengolini & 
Debarberis (2008) support this position stating that past performance is a poor predictor 
of future results. Glendon and Mckenna (1995) identify a number of reasons why 
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accident data, or similar outcome data, are poor safety indicators. The main problems are 
that such data are insufficiently sensitive, of dubious accuracy, retrospective, and they 
ignore risk exposure. Although accident statistics are widely used throughout the 
construction industry, Laitinen et al. (1999) state that it is almost impossible to use 
accidents as a safety indicator for a single construction site. This is because of random 
variation, where many sites will have no accidents, and it is not possible to determine 
whether these sites with zero accidents are safer than sites with four or five accidents. 
Recognizing such shortcomings, many advocate a shift to using proactive, upstream, 
or leading indicators (Flin et al., 2000; Cooper, 2000; Mohamed, 2002; Choudhry and 
Fang, 2005; Hinze, 2005). In contrast, leading indicators are measures which are not 
necessarily historical in nature but rather can be used as predictors of future safety 
performance. Toellner (2001) characterized leading indicators as measurements linked to 
actions taken to prevent accidents. Grabowski et al. (2007) described leading indicators 
as conditions, events, or measures that precede an incident and has a predictive value in 
regards to an accident/incident/unsafe conditions. Hinze et al. (2010) characterize leading 
indicators of safety performance as consisting of a set of selected measures that describe 
the level of effectiveness of the safety process. Leading indicators measure the building 
blocks of the safety culture of a project or company.  When one or more of these 
measures suggest that some aspect of the safety process is weak or weakening, 
interventions can be implemented to improve the safety process and, thereby positively 
impact the safety process before any negative occurrences (injuries) are sustained. 
In view of the above reasons, this study adopts safe work behaviors (observable 
actions) as a leading indicator to measure safety performance. This is based on the 
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premise that unsafe behavior is intrinsically linked to workplace accidents (Thompson et 
al. 1998). It is also supported by findings from studies and models developed based on 
the unsafe behavior concept (Smith and Arnold, 1991; Staley, 1996; Krause, 1997). It is 
noteworthy that more than 80% of all workplace accidents and incidents are attributed to 
unsafe behaviors (HSE, 2005).  
Two (2) measurable safety characteristics (survey items) were used from this 
subcategory as a measure of safety performance in a construction organization. These 
have been adopted from previous research (Mohamed, 2002). 
The survey development, administration and validation process is discussed in detail 
in the next three sections (sections 5.6 - 5.8).  
5.6 Survey Development 
A comprehensive literature review was performed to discover interior and exterior 
characteristics that influence safety. These characteristics were then organized into a 
hierarchical structure and decomposed into measurable charedacteristics using rigorous 
multiattribute techniques (Miller 1970), as previously discussed. A questionnaire was 
then developed from the multiattribute hierarchy through tested survey and attitude 
measurement procedures (Oppenheim 2001). All safety characteristics were measured 
through a five-point Likert-type response format. Items, relating to each of the 
dimensions, were used in the form of statements to measure individual dimensions under 
investigation. To the extent possible, the different statements used in developing the 
questionnaires were drawn upon scales that had been previously used by researchers (Cox 
and Cox 1991; Tomas and Oliver 1995; Glazner et al. 1999; Cox and Cheyne 2000; Lee 
and Harrison 2000, Mohamed, 2002). A limited number of statements, however, were 
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slightly modified to reflect the nature of the construction industry. Participants were 
asked to endorse the statements using a five-point Likert-type scale (from 1=‘‘strongly 
disagree’’ to 5=‘‘strongly agree’’).  
Subsequent to the development of the survey instrument, pilot surveys were 
conducted via face-to-face meetings with select professionals including short-listed 
experts from construction contracting organizations representing their top management, 
middle/ project management, supervisors, foremen and workers, all having expertise in or 
exposure to safety issues. The intent of these pilot surveys was to pretest the 
questionnaire on select professionals so as to obtain such version of the survey (after 
appropriate modification as and if needed) that would achieve acceptable levels of 
measurement reliability and validity. With input from these local industry professionals, 
the questionnaires were appropriately modified to best capture the information specific to 
research needs. The questionnaire contained, in its final form, a total of 85 statements (83 
statements listed in Part I to measure safety and 2 statements listed in Part II to measure 
safety performance). A number of negatively worded statements were presented in the 
scale, as recommended in the measurement literature (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991).  
5.7 Survey Administration 
5.7.1. Method 
A quantitative research method was chosen for the study, since it was exploratory in 
nature. A survey methodology was selected to collect data regarding the four dimensions 
of safety because it offered the best opportunity to capture a cross section of the beliefs, 
values, systems and behaviors in multiple companies in a timely and efficient manner. 
Data gathering is complex. So, the decision on which survey method to use depends on 
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the particular research topic, characteristics of the sample, and availability of staff and 
resource (Fowler 1993). Assessing the methodologies for data collection against the 
objective of this phase of the research led to the determination that questionnaires send by 
electronic mail and postal mail with as-necessary follow-up telephone calls were the most 
suitable for this phase of research work.  Because of the nature of structured interviews, it 
was determined that these would best be achieved by in-person interviews, However, 
because of geographic constraints many were done by telephone. For data gathering, 
telephone or facsimile correspondence were used only when the response to the 
questionnaire was behind scheduled due dates, or when the respondents contacted the 
researcher with questions or requests for further information. 
An exhaustive list of industry contractors was prepared as a first step of survey 
administration. Various published and unpublished sources were used to develop a list of 
commercial construction contractors in the U.S. construction industry. This identification 
was done, in particular, from the following sources: 
1. Engineering News Record (ENR) publications, including the list of Top 500 U.S. 
Contractors; 
2. The general contractors list published by the Associated General Contractors 
(AGC) of America; and  
3. A customized list of general contractors and subcontractors prepared from the 
yellow pages, trade magazines and other published and unpublished sources. 
5.7.2. Data Sample 
The theoretical population of this phase of research was the top management, senior 
project managers, safety managers/officers, supervisors, foremen, and construction 
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workers of all general contracting firms as well as subcontracting firms in the United 
States. No limits on the size of construction firms or annual turnover of the construction 
firm were established. There were not a minimum number of years of experience an 
individual should have to qualify to be a participant. This population description is in line 
with the major objective of the research – developing a strategic safety improvement 
model for construction contracting (and subcontracting) firms in the United States based 
on an integral approach to safety.  
The final data sample was selected by a combination of sampling methods. The 
researcher first used purposive sampling. In purposive sampling “the participants are 
hand-picked from the accessible population” (Gliner & Morgan, 2000). The participants 
were selected because of their experience as senior corporate and project managers for 
commercial construction firms. Firstly, the liaison of Florida International University 
(FIU) with the local construction industry was utilized for selecting appropriate 
construction companies.  Secondly, since many of the government organization (counties 
and cities) employees are students at FIU Construction Management (CM), Civil and 
Environmental Engineering (CEE) and other engineering departments, these employees 
were approached first hand for their voluntary contribution in the research. Thirdly, the 
CM department at FIU also has an advisory committee made up of a number of large 
commercial construction contractors in the South Florida region. These advisory 
committee members were also approached first hand with the request to voluntarily 
contribute to the research. 
Convenience sampling was also used to solicit participants for this phase of the 
research. In convenience sampling, “the participants are selected on the basis of 
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convenience rather than chosen in a serious attempt to select participants who are 
representative of the theoretical population” (Gliner & Morgan, 2000). Senior managers 
working for companies in Florida to which the researcher had access were given the 
opportunity to volunteer for participation. In some cases the companies were known to 
the researcher and in other cases the companies were randomly selected from the three 
sources identified above. 
Snowball sampling was also used. “Snowball sampling is a modification of 
convenience or accidental sampling …. People are asked for additional references” 
(Gliner & Morgan, 2000). 
The major chunk of data was collected using random sampling. According to good 
survey practice (Tull and Hawkins, 1990), a letter was sent to the Chief 
Executive/Managing Director of companies randomly selected from the three sources of 
identification indicated above. This letter was sent to introduce the research and request 
voluntary input. Referred to in the letter was a request for names of the key personnel 
associated with safety management processes and safety decision making in the 
companies, who would subsequently be canvassed for opinions.  
5.7.3. Delimitations  
The focus was delimited to general contractors and specialty contractors with major 
experience in commercial building construction. In future studies, research may be 
expanded to other types of construction such as residential, heavy-civil, or industrial.  
5.7.4. Survey Distribution and Response 
The surveys were carried out over the period extending from August 2009 to March 
2010.  The questionnaires were posted to named individuals in the months of August-
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December 2009, with a suggested date for return at the end of October 2009-February 
2009. Questionnaire returns were received over the next few months, in some cases after 
a phone call reminder. 
The final data sample included general contractors, structural steel contractors, 
poured concrete contractors, precast concrete contractors, masonry contractors, electrical 
contractors, mechanical and HVAC contractors, etc. representing 97 different companies 
(31 general contractors and 66 specialty contractors) working in the building construction 
sector (commercial and institutional). These 97 companies selected shared many common 
traits. They were mostly medium to large size firms on the basis of their employee counts 
and annual turnovers; they all performed all or some of their own work (such as 
carpentry, concrete placement, masonry work, etc.); they all primarily concentrate on 
large commercial buildings; and all were willing to actively take part in data collection.  
It is worth mentioning here that 69 of the 97 (71%) companies which responded to 
the survey were the same as for surveys conducted in phase I of the research (chapter 5). 
Thus good consistency of data was maintained through the two phases of the research.  
Over 2200 questionnaires were distributed to the companies. A total of 723 
questionnaires were returned. However, 37 questionnaires were either determined to be 
outliers or were discarded owing to possibility of bias. A total of 686 questionnaires were 
input into a database to be modeled for analysis. Overall survey response rate is depicted 
in Table 5.2. Table 5.3 provides a breakdown of responses in terms of organizational 
participation. 
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Table 5.2: Breakdown of Responses 
Total 
questionnaires 
distributed 
Questionnaires 
returned  
Total number 
of potential 
responses 
Total valid 
responses 
received 
Percentage 
of valid 
responses 
2200 723 723 686 33.53% 
 
Table 5.3: Breakdown of responses with respect to type of organization 
Type of Organization Approached Responded Response 
% 
General Contractor 147 31 28.91% 
Subcontractor 195 66 35.52% 
Total 311 102 32.80% 
 
The survey response rates depicted in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (34.81% for individual 
participation and 32.80% for organizational participation) are very good for a 
construction industry questionnaire survey and should not be considered as biased 
(Akintoye and Macleod). In similar type of surveys, Panthi et al. (2007) received a 
response rate of 19.4%, Ahmed and Azhar (2004) received 30.4% and Wang et al. (2004) 
received a very low response rate of 7.75%. Baker (1998) reported that statistically 
reliable conclusions can be obtained from a sample size of 20 or more. Moreover, the 
conclusions drawn on the basis of the responses were further verified through interviews 
with experts, and hence can be considered as unbiased. 
Figure 5.2 depicts information about distribution of respondent organizations in terms 
of their nature of work.  
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Figure 5.2: Type of Respondent Organizations 
Figure 5.3 depicts information about the size of respondent organizations. The 
organization size is decided on the basis of number of employees as follows: 0-
50small; 51-250medium; and >250large. The results indicate that the majority of 
respondents are medium and large size companies. The annual turnover of these 
companies varies from $5 million to over $500 million. 
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Figure 5.3: Size of Respondent Organizations 
 
Field personal (supervisors, foremen, front line workers and helpers), middle 
management, and upper management all completed the questionnaire. Table 5.4 provides 
a share of respondents with respect to their work positions and organization type. 
Table 5.4: Share of respondents with respect to their work positions and organization type 
Respondent Share (No. of respondents)  
Type of 
Organization 
Upper 
Management 
Middle 
Management 
Field 
Personnel Total (%) 
General 
Contractor 44 67 126 237 (34.5%) 
Subcontractor 93 117 239 449 (65.5%) 
Total 
(%) 
137 
(20.0%) 
184 
(26.8%) 
365 
(53.2%)  
 
Demographic information for the survey respondents is presented in Tables 5.5(a) – 
5.5(d). 
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Table 5.5(a): Participants’ Construction Experience (Upper Management) 
 Average 
Years 
Most 
Experience 
Least 
Experience 
Years in Construction 27.13 36 14 
Years as Executives 18.24 28 6 
 
Table 5.5(b): Participants’ Construction Experience (Middle Management) 
 Average 
Years 
Most 
Experience 
Least 
Experience 
Years in Construction 24.67 32 12 
Years as Managers 15.49 24 5 
 
Table 5.5(c): Participants’ Construction Experience (Supervisors/ Foremen) 
 Average 
Years 
Most 
Experience 
Least 
Experience 
Years in Construction 20.42 37 11 
Years as Supervisor/ 
Foremen 
14.68 30 7 
 
Table 5.5(d): Participants’ Construction Experience (Workers) 
 Average 
Years 
Most 
Experience 
Least 
Experience 
Years in Construction 14.78 23 7 
Years in Current Position 13.59 20 4 
 
Table 5.6 presents the educational qualification of the participants. This wide range of 
formal education among the participants did not produce a wide range of differences in 
the data.  
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Table 5.6: Participants’ Education 
 
Number of 
Participants 
Post-
Master’s 
Degree 
Master’s 
Degree 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Associate’s 
Degree 
Some 
College 
(No 
Degree) 
High 
School 
Degree 
Upper 
Management 137 9 33 69 14 8 4 
Middle 
Management 184 12 48 79 22 14 9 
Field 
Personnel 365 0 22 55 188 68 32 
Total 686 21 103 203 224 90 45 
(%)  (3.06%) (15.01%) (29.59%) (32.65%) (13.12%) (6.56%)
 
Table 5.6 shows that almost 80% of the participants had postsecondary degrees. A 
further diagnosis of the major concentrations for the postsecondary degrees held by these 
participants indicated that, including Civil Engineering and Architecture, 64% of the 
participants with a postsecondary degree had that degree in a construction related 
concentration (such as construction management, construction engineering and the like), 
19% of the participants had that degree in business concentration (such as business 
administration and the like), while the remaining had diverse academic backgrounds 
ranging from majors in English, Psychology, Education, etc. 
Overall, the data set (Table 5.6) accounts for a reasonable representation of the 
companies participating in this study, and produces statistically significant results as 
described later in this study.  
It is worth mentioning that although safety perceptions are inherently individual, the 
safety dimensions questionnaire was developed to operate at both the individual and the 
group level. Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) argue that over time and through social 
information processing influences, individual perceptions can become shared and, as a 
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result, can be aggregated and used to describe a group as a whole. In other words, this 
study expects that perceptions of safety and its determinants would be relatively 
homogeneous within the groups, constituting shared perceptions, and therefore could be 
aggregated to the group level of analysis. Therefore, the research model was tested using 
the total sample (combining all responses solicited from all organizations). This same 
approach has been used by previous researchers as well (such as Mohamed, 2002). 
In accordance with established survey procedures and in recognition of the sensitive 
nature of the data collected, strict confidentiality was maintained during this survey 
research and no identities have been divulged. 
5.8. Survey Validation 
Research validation was done in three steps.  
Firstly, it was confirmed that the survey was filled by personnel with appropriate 
profile and experience. Construction industry experience of respondents (Table 5.5) 
ranged from 4 to over 37 years. On the basis of their position and work experience, it was 
inferred that the respondents had adequate knowledge of safety related activities in their 
organizations as well as in the industry and their responses were a reasonable 
representation of required data. 
Secondly, to avoid the problem of bias, it was decided not to use data provided by an 
organization with less than 5 responses survey. Based on this decision, data from nine (9) 
companies was discarded for survey (a total of 23 responses were received from these 
companies).  
Moreover, 14 questionnaires were determined to be outliers and were also decided to 
be discarded. Hence a total of 37 questionnaires were discarded from the analysis. 
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Thirdly, the conclusions drawn on the basis of the responses were further verified 
through interviews with experts to ascertain that they were unbiased. Fourteen (14) face-
to-face unstructured interviews were conducted in the vicinity of Miami, Florida from a 
selected cross-section of local construction industry experts to discuss the results and 
validate the findings. The targeted audience included top management, middle 
management and field personnel representing leading contractors and subcontractors 
working in the commercial building construction sector in the South Florida region. 
The next section (section 5.9) details the employment of confirmatory factor analysis 
technique on the 83 measureable total safety characteristics to uncover the latent structure 
(underlying factors).   
5.9 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
As identified in section 5.4, the three major safety dimensions along with their 
corresponding subcategories were broken down into 83 measurable indicators (survey 
items) defining total safety. The analysis technique used on the data set was structural 
equation modeling (SEM). This is explained in detail in chapter 6 Before the SEM 
analysis began, a rough estimate of the latent variables (constructs) was derived from a 
confirmatory factor analysis. Factor analysis is a tool used to uncover the latent structure 
(underlying dimensions) of a set of variables. It reduces attribute space from a larger 
number of variables to a smaller number of factors. Confirmatory factor analysis seeks to 
determine if the number of factors and the loadings of measured (indicator) variables on 
them conform to what is expected on the basis of pre-established theory. Indicator 
variables are selected on the basis of prior theory and factor analysis is used to see if they 
load as predicted on the expected number of factors. Underlying dimensions (constructs) 
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imply ways to combine variables, in this case, aspects of safety dimensions, thereby 
simplifying subsequent analysis (Hamilton 1992; SPSS 2001). A principal factor analysis 
(PFA) using the varimax rotation method with Kaiser normalization was utilized. The 
rotation converged in 13 iterations. PFA works as follows. 
PFA is used when the research purpose is theory confirmation and causal modeling. It 
analyzes a correlation matrix in which the diagonal contains the communalities. PFA 
accounts for the covariation among variables. Factors reflect the common variance of the 
variables, excluding unique (variable-specific) variance. That is, manifest variables may 
be conceptualized as reflecting a combination of common variance explained by the 
factors, plus unique variance not explained by the factors. Factors seek to reproduce the 
correlations of the variables. That is, PFA accounts for the covariation among the 
variables. PFA seeks the least number of factors which can account for the covariance 
shared by a set of variables. For the first factor, PFA creates a linear equation which 
extracts the maximum covariance from the variables; for the second component PFA 
removes the covariance explained by the first component and creates a second linear 
equation which extracts the maximum remaining covariance; etc., continuing until the 
factors can explain all the covariance in a set of variables. 
In confirmatory factor analysis, loadings should be 0.7 or higher to confirm that 
independent variables identified a priori are represented by a particular factor, on the 
rationale that the 0.7 level corresponds to about half of the variance in the indicator being 
explained by the factor (Fornell and Larcker 1981).  
Based on the factor analysis results, the 83 measureable characteristics defined in the 
22 subcategories of the 3 principal categories of factor sets were reduced into 6 constructs 
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(latent variables/ factors/ underlying dimensions), viz., (1) Safety commitment (C); (2) 
Personal safety character and competence (I); (3) Supportive work environment (E); (4) 
Work pressure (P); (5) Safety program (R); and (6) Safety strategic concern (S).  
Obtained values for the measured items in these 6 constructs exceeded the threshold 
of 0.7, with majority of loadings in the range of 0.75–0.85. Note that the 83 indicators 
(survey items) constituting the six constructs span across multiple branches of the 
multiattribute hierarchy as shown in Table 5.7. The number in each cell of Table 5.7 
indicates the number of responses (indicators/ items in questionnaire) influenced by a 
particular construct. This is established by sound theoretical basis (Molenaar et al., 2009; 
Lo 1996; Groover and Krause 1993; Preston and Topf, 1994; Hodson and Graham, 1998; 
Mohamed, 2002) and confirmed by principal factor analysis.  
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Table 5.7: Safety Dimension Subcategories Constituting the Model Constructs 
                  
                               Model  
                               Constructs 
Safety  
Dimension  
Subcategories 
 
C I E P R S 
Total 
(Items in each 
subcategory) 
Personal Intention & Commitment 1 1     2 
Personal Value System 1 1     2 
Personal Attitude & Perception 1 1     2 
Personal Interpretation & Emotion 1 1  1   3 
Personal Proficiency  7     7 
Management Commitment & 
Involvement 3  2   2 7 
Workers’ Commitment & 
Involvement 2  2   1 5 
Supervisory Commitment and 
Involvement 2  3 1  1 7 
Subcontractor Commitment & 
Involvement   2   1 3 
Communication   2   2 4 
Work Environment   5    5 
Safety Accountability   1   1 2 
Production Pressure    7   7 
Cultural Norms 1  1 1   3 
Shared Values  1  1   1 3 
Collective Beliefs/ Shared 
Understanding   1   1 1 
Safety Rules and Procedures      5  5 
Site Layout Planning   2  1 1 4 
Safety Training and Education  1   2 1 4 
Accident Investigation and 
Reporting   1   2 1 4 
Safety Incentive Mechanisms      1 1 
Safety Disincentive Mechanisms     1  1 
 
Total  
(Items in each construct) 
13 13 22 10 11 14 83 
*C=safety commitment; I=personal safety character and competence; E=supportive work 
environment; P=work pressure; R=safety program; and S = safety strategic concern 
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5.10 Conclusion 
This research has adopted an integral approach to safety as a means of measuring and 
improving total safety in a construction organization. This approach decomposed total 
safety into four principal dimensions, viz., person, culture, behavior and process. 
Extensive literature review and expert input provided the basis to further decompose the 
four safety dimensions into 83 measurable attributes using a multiattribute analysis 
technique, which formed the basis of a questionnaire to measure total safety. Safe work 
behavior was selected as a measure of a company’s safety performance for the study. 
Based on the survey responses, statistical relationships between total safety dimensions 
and safety performance (measured by safe work behavior) were revealed through a series 
of six latent variables (factors) that describe the total safety environment of a construction 
organization. This was achieved using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) which reduced 
the attribute space from a larger number of safety sub-categories to a smaller number of 
underlying factors. These factors (6) have been concluded to be most suitable and 
appropriate for measurement and continuous improvement of total safety in a 
construction organization and hence play a pivotal role in achieving and sustaining the 
goal of zero accidents. These factors (and their corresponding indicators) form the basis 
of a strategic safety improvement model for the construction industry, the development 
and discussion of which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter established the factors (latent variables/ constructs) determining 
the total safety environment of a construction contracting organization, which are most 
suitable and appropriate for measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role 
in achieving the goal of zero accidents. This chapter discusses the development of a 
strategic safety improvement model based on the identified factors and their associated 
indicators.  This constitutes achieving objectives 3 of the study, i.e. to develop a strategic 
model to measure the effect of the key determinants of total safety (the critical factors) on 
a construction organization’s safety performance. 
From data collected in phase II of the research (chapter 5), a research base model was 
developed. Following this, a structural equation model (SEM) was estimated to identify 
latent constructs that describe total safety and to quantify relationships among them and 
between these total safety determinants and safety performance of a construction 
organization. A detailed description of the modeling process is presented as a basis for 
the presentation of the SEM findings. Latent variables that describe total safety are 
discussed and so is the correlation between total safety dimensions and the safety 
performance of a company.  
Finally, the strategic framework is presented along with a discussion of the key 
components of the framework and their utility towards strategically improving safety in 
the construction industry for achieving and sustaining the goal of zero accidents. 
 
 242
6.2 Model Constructs and Hypotheses 
The research base model follows the broad hypothesis that safe work behaviors (and, 
thus, their reciprocal, unsafe behaviors) are consequences of the existing safety 
dimensions in a construction organization, which is determined by the three inter-
dependent sets of factors identified earlier — i.e., person, culture and process. Therefore, 
the model has two distinct components – (1) determinants of safety (person, culture, and 
process sets of factors); and (2) measurement of safety (safe work behaviors). Although a 
number of recent studies have investigated the impact of one or more elements of the 
above factors on construction safety levels (Rowlinson 1997; Lingard and Rowlinson 
1998; Sawacha et al. 1999; Mohamed, 2002; Molenaaar, 2009), their integral relationship 
with safe work behaviors, specifically, has not been measured before. Also, the 
interrelationships among these factors defining total safety, in an integrative or sequential 
fashion, have not been analyzed before. Description of these constructs and the 
hypotheses associated with each path of the model are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
6.2.1. Safety Commitment (C) 
The construct safety commitment influenced the responses to 9 questions on the 
survey questionnaire. These variables span across 8 branches of the multiattribute 
hierarchy, including: personal intention & commitment (1), personal value system (1), 
personal attitude & perception (1), management commitment & involvement (2), 
workers’ commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (1), 
cultural norms (1), and shared values (1) All 9 variables share the common thread of the 
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company’s commitment to safety. Thus, hypothesis 1 – The greater the level of 
company’s commitment toward safety, the more positive the safe work behaviors. 
6.2.2. Personal Safety Character and Competence (I) 
The construct personal safety character and competence influenced the responses to 
7 questions on the survey questionnaire. These variables span across 5 branches of the 
multiattribute hierarchy, including: personal intention & commitment (1), personal value 
system (1), personal interpretation & emotion (1), personal proficiency (3), and safety 
training & education (1). All 7 variables share the common thread of a person’s safety 
character and competence. Thus, hypothesis 2 – The better one’s safety character and 
competence, the more positive the safe work behaviors. 
6.2.3. Supportive Work Environment (E) 
The construct supportive work environment influenced the responses to 10 questions 
on the survey questionnaire. These variables span across 8 branches of the multiattribute 
hierarchy, including: management commitment & involvement (1), workers’ 
commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (2), 
subcontractor commitment and involvement (1), communication (2), safety 
accountability (1), collective beliefs/ shared understanding (1), and site layout planning 
(1). All 10 variables share the common thread of a supportive work environment. Thus, 
hypothesis 3 – The higher the level of support provided by the constituent members of the 
work environment, the more positive the safe work behaviors. 
6.2.4. Work Pressure (P) 
The construct work pressure influenced the responses to 6 questions on the survey 
questionnaire. These variables span across 4 branches of the multiattribute hierarchy, 
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including: personal interpretation & emotion (1), supervisory commitment & 
involvement (1), production pressure (3), and cultural norms (1). All 6 variables share the 
common thread of work pressure. Thus, hypothesis 4 – The higher the perception of 
valuing expediency over safety, the less positive the safe work behaviors. 
6.2.5. Safety Program (R) 
The construct safety program influenced the responses to 8 questions on the survey 
questionnaire. These variables span across 5 branches of the multiattribute hierarchy, 
including: safety rules and procedures (3), site layout planning (1), safety training and 
education (2), accident investigation and reporting (1), and safety disincentive 
mechanisms (1). All 8 variables share the common thread of safety program. Thus, 
hypothesis 5 – The better the implementation of safety program, the more positive the 
safe work behaviors. 
6.2.6. Safety Strategic Concern 
The construct safety strategic concern influenced the responses to 10 questions on the 
survey questionnaire. These variables span across 9 branches of the multiattribute 
hierarchy, including: management commitment & involvement (2), workers’ 
commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (1), 
subcontractor commitment & involvement (1), communication (1), safety accountability 
(1), safety training and education (1), accident investigation and reporting (1), and  safety 
incentive mechanisms. All 10 variables share the common thread of strategic concern to 
safety. Thus, hypothesis 6 – The higher the safety strategic concern, the more positive the 
safe work behaviors.  
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6.2.7. Safe Work Behaviors 
The last construct relates to safe work behavior. The model hypothesizes that total 
safety dimensions affect safe work behavior. Grubb and Swanson (1999) report that 
construction workers acknowledge the difference between unsafe behaviors that might 
result in injury to the individual (who is engaged in the action) and those that might lead 
to others being injured. They conclude that workers are more willing to confront someone 
whose behavior is posing a threat to coworkers’ safety. As a result, two items (Brown et 
al., 2000; Mohamed, 2002) were selected to assess the dependent construct of safe work 
behavior. Respondents were asked to indicate, on average, the percentage of time 
workers and their coworkers follow all of the safety procedures for the jobs that they 
perform. Thus, hypothesis 7 – High level of total safety is positively associated with 
higher level of safe work behavior. 
6.3 Data Modeling 
The research hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling (SEM). The 
SEM is a statistical analysis tool used largely by sociologists and psychologists. It is, 
however, underutilized in construction engineering and management research despite its 
distinct advantages (Molenaar et al. 2009). SEM is a multivariate methodology that 
allows the simultaneous examination of the relationships among independent and 
dependent constructs within a theoretical model (Kilne 1998). The following sub-section 
provides a brief background of the SEM analysis technique. 
6.3.1. SEM Analysis Technique 
Many of the problems, or research issues, in construction engineering and 
management involve the measurement of concepts that are not easily quantified. For 
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instance, personal appreciation of risk, top management commitment, teamwork, 
personal competence, and supervisory support are concepts that previous research has 
proven to be critical to developing a total safety culture in an organization but difficult 
for researchers to measure. There has been a trend toward the use of multivariate 
regression techniques to measure such concepts (Russell and Jaselskis 1992; Sanders and 
Thomas 1993; Diekmann and Girard 1995; and Molenaar and Songer 1998). Although 
standardized multivariate regression analysis techniques have proven successful, there is 
a fundamental flaw with their use. A basic premise of standard regression techniques is 
that independent variables used to build the regression models are measured without 
error. This is often not the case. For instance, top management commitment is not 
directly measurable and is typically measured through ‘‘surrogate’’ variables that make 
up management commitment (i.e., management’s expression of concern to safety issues, 
its decisive actions when a safety concern is raised, its quick response to correct safety 
problems, etc.). Because many of these surrogate variables do not perfectly measure the 
prime variable of interest, technical problems in model estimation arise, resulting in 
diminished ability to conduct statistical inference with a standard regression model. 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis can be thought of as an extension of 
standardized regression modeling that deals explicitly with poorly measured independent 
variables. Structural equation models are ideally suited for many of the research issues 
dealt with in construction engineering and management. 
This research specifically utilizes the application of SEM to construction safety. The 
causes of worker safe (and their reciprocal unsafe) behaviors stem from multiple factors, 
which are not all directly measurable (termed latent variables). The SEM analysis offers a 
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method for modeling latent variables by explicitly including errors of measurement 
brought about by surrogate variables, thus providing insight into the factors that can be 
used to understand the susceptibility of a worker to unsafe behaviors and hence accidents.  
 The use of SEM allows for a richer analysis of the causes of worker unsafe behaviors. 
The SEM analysis of the data set helps identify new relationships among project 
variables that lend new insight into the measurement of construction safety. 
 Structural equation modeling (SEM) encompasses such diverse statistical techniques 
as path analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, causal modeling with latent variables, and 
even analysis of variance and multiple linear regression. The following sub-sections 
feature an introduction to the logic of SEM, the assumptions and required input for SEM 
analysis, and the procedure to perform SEM analyses using the AMOS (Analysis of 
Moment Structures) software, which has been utilized for this study. 
6.3.1.1. SEM Analysis Overview 
The basic approach to performing a SEM analysis is as given in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1: Basic Approach to Performing a SEM Analysis 
The researcher first specifies a model based on theory, then determines how to 
measure constructs, collects data, and then inputs the data into the SEM software 
package. The package fits the data to the specified model and produces the results, which 
include overall model fit statistics and parameter estimates. Note that the same approach 
has been used for the research in hand. 
The SEM process can be schematically shown as Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: SEM Process Schematic 
The input to the analysis is usually a covariance matrix of measured variables such as 
survey item scores in case of this research. In practice, the data analyst usually supplies 
SEM program with raw data (survey item scores), and the program converts these data 
into covariances and means for its own use.  
The model consists of a set of relationships among the measured variables. These 
relationships are then expressed as restrictions on the total set of possible relationships.  
The results feature overall indexes of model fit as well as parameter estimates, 
standard errors, and test statistics for each free parameter in the model.  
6.3.1.2 SEM Nomenclature  
SEM has a language all its own.  
Indicators are observed variables, sometimes called manifest variables or reference 
variables. These variables are directly measured by researchers. In case of this research, 
indicators are items in the survey instrument. 
Four or more indicators are recommended and three are acceptable and common 
practice. The prime consideration in selecting indicators is whether they are theoretically 
sound and reliably measured. By convention, indicators should have pattern coefficients 
(factor loadings) of .7 or higher on their latent factors. In case of research in hand, there 
are a minimum of 6 indicators per factor, and all factor loadings are .7 or higher.  
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Latent variables are the unobserved variables or constructs or factors which are not 
directly measured but are inferred by the relationships or correlations among their 
respective indicators in the analysis. This statistical estimation is accomplished in much 
the same way that an exploratory factor analysis infers the presence of latent factors from 
shared variance among observed variables. Latent variables include independent, 
mediating, as well as dependent variables. The representation of latent variables based on 
their relation to observed indicators is one of the defining characteristics of SEM. In case 
of research in hand, the latent variables defining total safety are: safety commitment, 
personal safety character and competence, supportive work environment, work pressure, 
safety program, safety strategic concern, and safe work behavior. 
It is important to note here that indicators cannot be combined arbitrarily to form 
latent variables. For instance, combining gender, race, or other demographic variables to 
form a latent variable called "background factors" would be improper because it would 
not represent any single underlying continuum of meaning. The confirmatory factor 
analysis step in SEM is a test of the meaningfulness of latent variables and their 
indicators. In case of research in hand, confirmatory factor analysis was done (as given in 
section 5.9) to combine indicators to form latent factors. 
Exogenous or upstream variables are independent variables with no prior causal 
variable (though they may be correlated with other exogenous variables, depicted by a 
double-headed arrow). In fact it is customary to assume that exogenous variables are 
correlated (connected by a double-headed covariance arrow) unless there is theoretical 
reason not to. If two exogenous variables are connected by a covariance arrow, there 
cannot also be a straight (regression path) arrow between them.   
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Endogenous or downstream variables are dependent variables and can be either 
ultimate dependent variables (variables which are effects of other exogenous or 
mediating variables, and are not causes of other endogenous variables), or mediating 
variables (variables which are effects of other exogenous or mediating variables, and are 
also causes of other mediating or ultimate dependent variables). Endogenous variables 
are on the receiving end of single-headed straight arrows indicating a regression path and 
implying a causal relationship. The path to the endogenous variable may come from an 
exogenous variable or another endogenous variable.  
The key distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables comes from the 
fact that whether the variable regresses on another variable or not. As in regression the 
dependent variable (DV) regresses on the independent variable (IV), meaning that the 
DV is being predicted by the IV. In SEM terminology, other variables regress on 
exogenous variables. Exogenous variables can be recognized in a graphical version of the 
model, as the variables sending out arrowheads, denoting which variable it is predicting. 
A variable that regresses on a variable (compare with a DV in regression analysis) is 
always an endogenous variable, even if this same variable is also used as a variable to be 
regressed on (now it can be more appropriately called a mediating endogenous variable). 
Endogenous variables are recognized as the receivers of a single-headed arrow in the 
model. 
In case of research in hand, the exogenous variables defining total safety are: safety 
commitment, personal safety character and competence, supportive work environment, 
work pressure, safety program, and safety strategic concern, and the endogenous variable 
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defining safety performance (in fact an ultimate dependent variable) is safe work 
behavior. 
It is important to note here that SEM is more general than regression. In particular a 
variable can act as both independent and dependent variable. 
6.3.1.3 SEM Modeling Approaches  
SEM is usually viewed as a confirmatory rather than exploratory procedure, using one of 
three approaches:  
1. Strictly confirmatory approach: A model is tested using SEM goodness-of-fit tests 
to determine if the pattern of variances and covariances in the data is consistent 
with a structural (path) model specified by the researcher. However as other 
unexamined models may fit the data as well or better, an accepted model is only a 
not-disconfirmed model.  
2. Alternative models approach: One may test two or more causal models to 
determine which has the best fit. There are many goodness-of-fit measures, 
reflecting different considerations, and usually three or four are reported by the 
researcher. Although desirable in principle, this AM approach runs into the real-
world problem that in most specific research topic areas, the researcher does not 
find in the literature two well-developed alternative models to test.  
3. Model development approach: In practice, much SEM research combines 
confirmatory and exploratory purposes: a model is tested using SEM procedures, 
found to be deficient, and an alternative model is then tested based on changes 
suggested by SEM modification indexes. This is the most common approach 
found in the literature.  
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Regardless of approach, SEM cannot itself draw causal arrows in models or resolve 
causal ambiguities. Theoretical insight and judgment by the researcher is still of utmost 
importance.  
In case of research in hand, model development approach to SEM has been utilized 
because it provides a way to confirmatory and exploratory purposes.  
6.3.1.4 SEM Modeling Process 
The structural equation modeling process centers around two steps: validating the 
measurement model and fitting the structural model. The former is accomplished 
primarily through confirmatory factor analysis, while the latter is accomplished primarily 
through path analysis with latent variables.  
6.3.1.5. The Measurement Model 
The measurement model (Figure 6.3) is that part (possibly all) of a SEM model which 
deals with the latent variables and their indicators. One starts by specifying a model on 
the basis of theory. Each variable in the model is conceptualized as a latent one, 
measured by multiple indicators. Several indicators are developed for each variable, with 
a view to winding up with at least two and preferably three per latent variable after 
confirmatory factor analysis. Based on a large (n>100) representative sample, factor 
analysis (common factor analysis or principal axis factoring, not principle components 
analysis) is used to establish that indicators seem to measure the corresponding latent 
variables, represented by the factors. A pure measurement model is a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) model in which there is unmeasured covariance between each possible 
pair of latent variables, there are straight arrows from the latent variables to their 
respective indicators, there are straight arrows from the error terms to their respective 
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variables, but there are no direct effects (straight arrows) connecting the latent variables. 
Note that "unmeasured covariance" means one almost always draws two-headed 
covariance arrows connecting all pairs of exogenous variables (both latent and simple, if 
any), unless there is strong theoretical reason not to do so. The measurement model is 
evaluated like any other SEM model, using goodness of fit measures. There is no point in 
proceeding to the structural model until one is satisfied that the measurement model is 
valid.  
6.3.1.6. The Structural Model  
The structural model (Figure 6.4) may be contrasted with the measurement model. It 
is the set of exogenous and endogenous variables in the model, together with the direct 
effects (straight arrows) connecting them, and any correlations among the exogenous 
variable or indicators. Two or more alternative models are compared in terms of "model 
fit," which measures the extent to which the covariances predicted by the model 
correspond to the observed covariances in the data. "Modification indexes" and other 
coefficients may be used by the researcher to alter one or more models to improve fit. 
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Figure 6.3: SEM Measurement Model 
 
 
Safety Strategic 
Concern
eE9eE8eE7eE6eE5eE4eE3eE2 eE1eE1
E9 E8 E7 E6 E5 E4 E3 E2 E10 E1 
Supportive 
Work 
Environment
Safe Work 
Behavior
eS2 eS3 eS4 eS5 eS6 eS7 eS8 eS9eS1 eS1
S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S1 S10 
eB1 B1 
B2 
eB2 
 256
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: SEM Structural Model 
6.3.1.7. Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is used to confirm that the indicators sort 
themselves into factors corresponding to how the researcher has linked the indicators to 
the latent variables in the measurement model. Confirmatory factor analysis plays an 
important role in structural equation modeling. CFA models in SEM are used to assess 
the role of measurement error in the model, to validate a multifactorial model, and to 
determine group effects on the factors. CFA has been utilized in the research in hand and 
the results have been given in section 5.9. 
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6.3.1.8. Reliability 
Cronbach's alpha is a commonly used measure testing the extent to which multiple 
indicators for a latent variable belong together. It varies from 0 to 1.0. A common rule of 
thumb is that the indicators should have a Cronbach's alpha of .7 to judge the set reliable. 
Reliability analysis has been performed for the research in hand and the results have been 
given in section 6.3.2.1. 
6.3.1.9. Measurement Error Terms 
A measurement error term refers to the measurement error factor associated with a 
given indicator. Whereas regression models implicitly assume zero measurement error 
(that is, to the extent such error exists, regression coefficients are attenuated), error terms 
are explicitly modeled in SEM and as a result path coefficients modeled in SEM are 
unbiased by error terms, whereas regression coefficients are not. Though unbiased 
statistically, SEM path coefficients will be less reliable when measurement error is high. 
Figure 6.3 shows the measurement error terms in SEM model developed for this research. 
Note that Figure 6.3 is only a partial measurement model developed in this research. 
6.3.1.10. Correlated Error Terms  
Correlated error terms refer to situations in which knowing the residual of one 
indicator helps in knowing the residual associated with another indicator. For instance, in 
survey research many people tend to give the response which is socially acceptable. 
Knowing that a respondent gave the socially acceptable response to one item increases 
the probability that a socially acceptable response will be given to another item. Such an 
example exhibits correlated error terms. Uncorrelated error terms are an assumption of 
regression, whereas the correlation of error terms may and should be explicitly modeled 
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in SEM. That is, in regression the researcher models variables, whereas in SEM the 
researcher must model error as well as the variables (see Figure 6.3).  
6.3.1.11. Structural Error Terms  
The measurement error terms discussed above are not to be confused with structural 
error terms, also called residual error terms or disturbance terms, which reflect the 
unexplained variance in the latent endogenous variable(s) due to all unmeasured causes. 
In Figure 6.4, the "Dist" term is a disturbance term/structural error term. 
6.3.1.12. Metric  
In SEM, each unobserved latent variable must be assigned explicitly a metric, which 
is a measurement range. This is normally done by constraining one of the paths from the 
latent variable to one of its indicator (reference) variables, as by assigning the value of 
1.0 to this path. Given this constraint, the remaining paths can then be estimated. The 
indicator selected to be constrained to 1.0 is the reference item. Typically one selects as 
the reference item the one which in factor analysis loads most heavily on the dimension 
represented by the latent variable, thereby allowing it to anchor the meaning of that 
dimension. Note that if multiple samples are being analyzed, the researcher should use 
the same indicator variable in each sample to assign the metric. 
Alternatively, one may set the factor variances to 1, thereby effectively obtaining a 
standardized solution. This approach of obtaining a standardized SEM solution has been 
employed in the research in hand. 
6.3.1.13. SEM Software Packages 
ISREL, AMOS, and EQS are three popular statistical packages for doing SEM. 
AMOS (Analysis of MOment Structures) is a more recent package which, because of its 
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user-friendly graphical interface, has become popular as an easier way of specifying 
structural models and is the software used in the research in hand.  
6.3.1.14. Sample SEM Model  
As discussed earlier, two main components of models are distinguished in SEM: the 
structural model showing potential causal dependencies between endogenous and 
exogenous variables, and the measurement model showing the relations between latent 
variables and their indicators. Exploratory and Confirmatory factor analysis models, for 
example, contain only the measurement part, while path diagrams can be viewed as an 
SEM that only has the structural part. 
Figure 6.5 shows a partial SEM model (part of the full model) taken from the current 
research in hand. 
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Figure 6.5: Example SEM Model 
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In Figure 6.5, note the following model components: 
a. The exogenous latent variables Safety Strategic Concern and Supportive Work 
Environment, measured by the indicator variables S1-S10 and E1-E10 
respectively.  
b. The endogenous latent variable Safe Work Behavior is measured by indicator 
variables B1-B2 and regressed by the exogenous variables Safety Strategic 
Concern and Supportive Work Environment.  
c. Indicator and other measured variables are depicted as rectangles by convention.  
d. Latent variables are depicted as ovals by convention.  
e. Causal effects are represented by single-headed arrows in the path diagram.  
f. Safety Strategic Concern causes the scores observed on the indicator variables S1-
S10, and Supportive Work Environment causes the scores observed on the 
indicator variables E1-E10, and Safe Work Behavior causes the scores observed 
on the indicator variables B1-B2. Safety Strategic Concern can be conceptualized 
as the variance its 10 indicators S1-S10 share i.e., what the 10 indicators have in 
common. 
g. The single-headed arrows from Safety Strategic Concern to Safe Work Behavior 
and from Supportive Work Environment to Safe Work Behavior hypothesize that 
Safe Work Behavior is caused by Safety Strategic Concern and Supportive Work 
Environment.  
h. eS1 to eS10, eE1 to eE10 and eB1 to eB2 are the error or residual terms 
associated with each indicator variable that also cause response variation in the 
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indicator variables. Since residuals are always unobserved, they are represented 
by ovals. 
i. The two-headed (bidirectional) arrow between Safety Strategic Concern and 
Supportive Work Environment indicates that Supportive Work Environment is 
thought to have a correlation or covariance with Safety Strategic Concern. Note 
that bidirectional arrows represent relationships without an explicitly defined 
causal direction. For instance, Safety Strategic Concern Perform and Supportive 
Work Environment are related or associated, but no claim is made about one 
causing the other. 
j. As is usual, there is a disturbance or error term, Dist, associated with the 
endogenous latent variable, Safe Work Behavior.  
The model in Figure 6.5 depicts that scores or responses on survey items one through 
twenty (S1-S10 & E1-E10) are caused by two correlated factors, along with variance that 
is unique to each item. Some of that unique variance might be due to measurement error.  
6.3.1.15. SEM Advantages 
The following are the specific advantages of SEM that led the researcher to select this 
method as the preferred method of analysis.  
• Assumptions underlying the statistical analyses are clear and testable, giving the 
investigator full control and potentially furthering understanding of the analyses.  
• Use of confirmatory factor analysis to reduce measurement error by having 
multiple indicators per latent variable. 
• Graphical interface software boosts creativity and facilitates rapid model 
debugging.  
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• SEM programs provide overall tests of model fit and individual parameter 
estimate tests simultaneously.  
• SEM models can be used to purge errors, making estimated relationships among 
latent variables less contaminated by measurement error.  
Although multiple regression analysis has most commonly been used to find 
indicators of safety performance (Jaselskis et al. 1996), SEM was selected as the 
analytical tool to measure the effect of safety dimensions on safety performance. In this 
case, regression analysis will have two significant problems. First, safety dimensions 
constitute many unobserved, or latent variables and these variables are likely to be 
interrelated. A fundamental premise of multiple regression analysis is that all variables 
are assumed to be independent. In the case of modeling safety dimensions, there will 
likely be problems of multi-collinearity caused by the interdependency between 
independent variables. The second problem is that standard multiple regression 
techniques ignore measurement error. There is inherent measurement error in survey data 
of this type, stemming from inaccurate ratings on a Likert scale. When measurement 
errors in independent variables are incorporated into a regression equation (via a poorly 
measured variable) in standard fashion, the variances of the measurement errors in the 
regressors are transmitted to the model error, thereby inflating the model error variance 
(Myers 1990). In other words, measurement errors will result in greater estimated model 
variances and measurement errors in independent variables can cause irreconcilable 
technical problems. 
The standardized coefficients in a SEM can possess more reliable estimates of how an 
exogenous variable affects an endogenous variable than what is produced with multiple 
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regression analysis. There are two basic premises in SEM to overcome these problems of 
multiple regression analysis. First, SEM typically incorporates the covariance matrix of 
the independent and dependent variables. It uses a maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure to derive the “most likely” coefficient values, given the actual covariance 
matrix. The second premise is that SEM establishes the relationships between 
unobservable—termed latent variables and attempts to account for random measurement 
error that cannot be employed by multiple regression analysis. 
6.3.1.16. SEM Model Specification 
Model Specification is the process by which the researcher asserts which effects are 
null, which are fixed to a constant (usually 1.0), and which vary. Variable effects 
correspond to arrows in the model, while null effects correspond to an absence of an 
arrow. Fixed effects usually reflect either effects whose parameter has been established in 
the literature (rare) or more commonly, effects set to 1.0 to establish the metric for a 
latent variable. 
6.3.1.17. Model Parsimony  
A model in which no effect is constrained to 0 (hence there is an arrow from every 
variable to every other variable) is one which will always fit the data, even when the 
model makes no sense. The closer one is to this most-complex model, the better will be 
one's fit. That is, adding paths will tend to increase fit. This is why a number of fit 
measures (discussed below) penalize for lack of parsimony. Note lack of parsimony may 
be a particular problem for models with few variables. Ways to decrease model 
complexity are erasing direct effects (straight arrows) from one latent variable to another; 
erasing direct effects from multiple latent variables to the same indicator variable; and 
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erasing unanalyzed correlations (curved double-headed arrows) between measurement 
error terms and between the disturbance terms of the endogenous variables. In each case, 
arrows should be erased from the model only if there is no theoretical reason to suspect 
that the effect or correlation exists. 
The most parsimonious model is the one with the fewest arrows, which means the 
fewest coefficients. However, much more weight should be given to parsimony with 
regard to structural arrows connecting the latent variables than to measurement arrows 
from the latent variables to their respective indicators. Also, if there are fewer variables in 
the model and yet the dependent is equally well explained, that is parsimony also; it will 
almost always mean fewer arrows due to fewer variables. (In a regression context, 
parsimony refers to having the fewest terms (and hence fewest coefficients) in the model, 
for a given level of explanation of the dependent variable.) 
6.3.1.18. Model Comparisons 
Model-building and model-trimming involve comparing a model which is a subset of 
another. Chi-square difference can be used directly for hierarchical models. This is 
because model fit by chi-square is partly a function of model complexity, with more 
complex models fitting better. For non-hierarchical model comparisons, the researcher 
needs to use a fit index which penalizes for complexity (rewards parsimony), such as 
Akaiki information criterion (AIC).  
6.3.1.18.1. Modification Indices   
Modification indices (MI) are related to the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test or index 
because MI is a univariate form of LM. MI is often used to alter models to achieve better 
fit, but this needs to be done carefully and with theoretical justification. In MI, 
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improvement in fit is measured by a reduction in chi-square. In AMOS, the modification 
indexes have to do with adding arrows: high MI's flag missing arrows which might be 
added to a model.  
6.3.1.18.2. Par Change 
Par change  is an effect size measure. AMOS output will list the parameter (which 
arrow to add or to subtract), the chi-square value (the estimated chi-square value for this 
path, labeled "M.I."), the probability of this chi-square (significant ones are candidates 
for change), and the "parameter change," which is the estimated change in the new path 
coefficient when the model is altered (labeled "Par Change"). 'Par change" is the 
estimated coefficient change when adding arrows. The MI and the parameter change 
should be looked at jointly. The researcher may decide not to add an arrow indicated by 
MI if the parameter change is trivial. Likewise, the researcher may wish to add an arrow 
where the parameter change is large in absolute size even if the corresponding MI is not 
the largest one. 
6.3.1.18.3. Covariances 
In the case of modification indexes for covariances, the MI has to do with the 
decrease in chi-square if the two error term variables are allowed to correlate. For 
instance, in AMOS, if the MI for a covariance is 24 and the "Par Change" is .8, this 
means that if the model is respecified to allow the two error terms to covary their 
covariance would be expected to change by .8, leading to a reduction of model chi-square 
by 24 (lower is better fit). If there is correlated error, as shown by high MI's on error 
covariances, causes may include redundant content of the two items, methods bias (for 
example, common social desirability of both items), or omission of an exogenous factor 
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(the two indicators share a common cause not in the model). If MI and Par Change 
indicate that model fit will increase if a covariance arrow is added between indicator error 
terms, this should only be done if strong theoretical evidence suggests as such.  
6.3.1.18.4. Structural (Regression) Weights 
In the case of MI for estimated regression weights, the MI has to do with the change 
in chi-square if the path between the two variables is restored (adding an arrow).  
6.3.1.18.5. Rules of Thumb for MIs 
One arbitrary rule of thumb is to consider adding paths associated with parameters 
whose modification index exceeds 100. However, another common strategy is simply to 
add the parameter with the largest MI (even if considerably less than 100), then see the 
effect as measured by the chi-square fit index. The latter approach is adopted by the 
research in hand for model fit improvement.  
6.3.1.18.6. Chi-Square Difference Test 
Chi-square difference test, also called the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is computed as 
the difference of model chi-square for the larger model (usually the initial default model) 
and a nested model (usually the result of model trimming), for one degree of freedom. LR 
measures the significance of the difference between two SEM models for the same data, 
in which one model is a nested subset of the other. Specifically, chi-square difference is 
the standard test statistic for comparing a modified model with the original one. If chi-
square difference shows no significant difference between the unconstrained original 
model and the nested, constrained modified model, then the modification is accepted on 
parsimony grounds.  
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6.3.1.19. Output 
6.3.1.19.1. Structural or Path Coefficients 
Structural or Path Coefficients are the effect sizes calculated by the model estimation 
program. Often these values are displayed above their respective arrows on the arrow 
diagram specifying a model. In AMOS, these are labeled "regression weights," which is 
what they are, except that in the structural equation there will be no intercept term. 
6.3.1.19.2. Standardized Structural (Path) Coefficients 
When researchers speak of structural or path coefficients in SEM, they often mean 
standardized ones. Standardized structural coefficient estimates are based on standardized 
data, including correlation matrixes. Standardized estimates are used, for instance, when 
comparing direct effects on a given endogenous variable in a single-group study. That is, 
as in regression, the standardized weights are used to compare the relative importance of 
the independent variables. The interpretation is similar to regression: if a standardized 
structural coefficient is 2.0, then the latent dependent will increase by 2.0 standard units 
for each unit increase in the latent independent. In AMOS, the standardized structural 
coefficients are labeled "standardized regression weights," which is what they are. In 
comparing models across samples, however, unstandardized coefficients are used. 
6.3.1.19.3. The Critical Ratio and Significance of Path Coefficients 
When the Critical Ratio (CR) is > 1.96 for a regression weight, that path is significant 
at the .05 level (that is, its estimated path parameter is significant). 
6.3.1.19.4. Goodness of Fit Tests 
Goodness of fit tests determine if the model being tested should be accepted or 
rejected. These overall fit tests do not establish that particular paths within the model are 
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significant. If the model is accepted, the researcher will then go on to interpret the path 
coefficients in the model ("significant" path coefficients in poor fit models are not 
meaningful).  
6.3.1.20. Summary 
This research employs Structural equation modeling (SEM) as the major analysis 
technique. Since SEM is a relatively new analysis technique in construction, an elaborate 
treatment of the mechanics of the SEM analysis technique was given in this section. 
  SEM grows out of and serves purposes similar to multiple regression, but in a more 
powerful way which takes into account the modeling of interactions, nonlinearities, 
correlated independents, measurement error, correlated error terms, multiple latent 
independents each measured by multiple indicators, and one or more latent dependents 
also each with multiple indicators.  
Advantages of SEM compared to multiple regression that compelled the use of the 
former technique for this research include more flexible assumptions (particularly 
allowing interpretation even in the face of multicollinearity), use of confirmatory factor 
analysis to reduce measurement error by having multiple indicators per latent variable, 
the attraction of SEM's graphical modeling interface, the desirability of testing models 
overall rather than coefficients individually, the ability to model error terms, and ability 
to handle difficult data (non-normal data). Moreover, where regression is highly 
susceptible to error of interpretation by misspecification, the SEM strategy of comparing 
alternative models to assess relative model fit makes it more robust.  
The following section describes and discusses the model developed in this research.  
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6.3.2. Model Description 
As described earlier, SEM has two main components, a measurement component and 
a structural component. The measurement model describes how well various exogenous 
variables measure latent variables, i.e. it determines the relation between indicators and 
constructs, and enables the researcher to evaluate whether the constructs are measured 
with satisfactory accuracy. A confirmatory factor analysis is a measurement model, and 
determines how well various variables describe a factor or factors, or latent variables. 
The measurement models within a SEM incorporate estimates of errors of measurement 
of exogenous variables and their intended latent variable.  
The second component of a SEM is the structural component. The structural model 
describes the relationships between latent variables (i.e. constructs), and is used to test 
and analyze the hypothesized relationships. SEM allows for direct, indirect, and 
correlative effects to be explicitly modeled, unlike standard regression models, which 
allow only for explicit modeling of direct effects. It is the structural component of SEM 
that enables the analyst to make substantive statements about the relationships between 
latent variables, and the mechanisms underlying a process or phenomenon. The structural 
component of SEM is akin to a system of simultaneous regression models.  
SEM estimates parameters for both the links between measures (indicators) with their 
respective constructs (i.e., loadings) and the links between different constructs (i.e., path 
coefficients). The loadings can be interpreted as factor loadings, while the path 
coefficients are standardized regression coefficients. The explanatory power of the model 
can be tested by examining the sign, size, and statistical significance of the path 
coefficients between constructs in the model.  
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The nature of the links between constructs and measures (indicators) is referred to as 
an epistemic relationship. Two basic types of epistemic relationships are relevant to 
SEM—reflective indicators and formative indicators (Hulland, 1999; Mohamed, 2002). 
The indicators (questionnaire items) in the model were treated as reflective, as they were 
expected to covary. They were assumed to reflect the unobserved, underlying construct, 
with the construct giving rise to (or ‘‘causing’’) the observed measures. For example, 
constructs such as safety commitment and safety strategic concern are typically viewed as 
underlying factors that give rise to something that is observed. Accordingly, their 
indicators tend to be realized as reflective. 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Mohamed (2002) suggest that both the 
measurement model and the structural model should be assessed sequentially, as this two-
stage approach reduces the likelihood of interpretational confounds because the validity 
of the constructs is established prior to investigating the hypothesized relationships. This 
is the approach followed in this research and is explained in the following sub-sections. 
6.3.2.1. Assessment of Measurement Model 
Prior to structural modeling, two measurement properties were examined to ensure 
that the data has a satisfactory level of reliability and validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
The first of these is the individual item reliability, where loadings (or simple correlations) 
of the items on their respective constructs are assessed, using 0.70 as a cutoff point 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981). Exceeding this value simply implies that less than half of the 
item’s variance is due to error. Obtained values for items exceeded this threshold, with 
majority of loadings in the range of 0.75–0.90, demonstrating the satisfactory level of 
individual item reliability. 
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Convergent validity (also referred to as the homogeneity of the construct or 
composite reliability) is the second measurement property to be examined, and is 
evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained for each construct is 
listed in Table 6.1. All constructs have acceptable convergent validity, as a value of 0.70 
is usually accepted as the minimum desired value of the Cronbach’s alpha (Litwin 1995).  
Having satisfied the two measurement properties, it can be concluded that the 
constructs are measured with adequate precision. 
Table 6.1: Convergent Validity of Independent Constructs 
Construct 
 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
1. Safety commitment 0.923 
2. Personal safety character and competence 0.865 
3. Supportive work environment 0.853 
4. Work pressure 0.872 
5. Safety program 0.891 
6. Safety strategic concern 0.897 
 
6.3.2.2. SEM Specification 
Numerous iterations were performed to arrive at a final SEM specification shown in 
Figure 6.6.  
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Figure 6.6: SEM of Total Safety
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The observed or measured exogenous variables—responses to survey questions—are 
shown in the rectangular boxes in Figure 6.6. The unobserved constructs (latent 
variables) are shown in ellipses and represent the critical factors of safety dimensions, 
which cannot be directly observed. The arrows shown in Figure 6.6 represent the 
direction of hypothesized influence. For example, the straight single arrows connecting 
safety commitment to the nine exogenous variables (C1 to C9) are presumed to be the 
underlying mechanism that produced the outcomes of the observed variables (please note 
that the survey questions have been renumbered to correspond with the constructs for 
clarity as described below). Similarly, the other sets of questions are thought to reflect the 
influence of safety strategic concern, personal safety character and competence, 
supportive work environment, safety program, work pressure, and safe work behavior 
constructs on survey responses. The curved double-headed arrows linking the exogenous 
variables to each other represent the fact that these variables are correlated. The straight 
single arrows connecting the exogenous variables (safety commitment, safety strategic 
concern, personal safety character and competence, supportive work environment, safety 
program, and work pressure) to the endogenous variable safe work behavior imply causal 
relationship between the exogenous variables and the endogenous (dependent) variable. 
For simplicity, the standardized correlation coefficients are not shown on the figure. 
These are discussed later in this chapter. 
The resultant six latent variables account for about 78% of the variability in safe work 
behavior (mean estimate of 0.78 and standard error =0.005). The overall SEM model 
results are given in Table 6.2 and the goodness of fit measures are given in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.2: Overall SEM Model Results 
Description 
 
Result 
Number of parameters estimated 126 
Degrees of Freedom 1254 
Chi square at model convergence 26.54, probability <0.10 
 
Table 6.3: Overall SEM Model Results: Goodness-of-Fit Measures 
Goodness-of-fit 
measure 
Description of 
test 
Saturated 
Model  
(Best case) 
Final Model Independence 
Model 
(Worst Case) 
Number of 
parameters 
Parameters 
estimated 
192 126 60 
Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI) 
0 (no fit) to 1 
(perfect fit) 
1.000 0.990 0.000 
Normed fit index 
(NFI) 
0 (no fit) to 1 
(perfect fit) 
1.000 0.982 0.000 
Root mean 
squared error of 
approximation 
(RMSEA) 
<0.05 indicates 
very good fit 
N/A 0.042 0.735 
Akaiki 
information 
criterion (AIC) 
0 (perfect fit) to 
higher positive 
value (poor fit) 
375 233 11,235 
Browne-Cudeck 
criterion (BCC) 
imposes a larger 
penalty than AIC 
for complex 
models: 
lower numbers 
means better fit 
412 270 11,985 
 
 
The model presented was the best-fitting model selected from many competing 
models that were fit to the data, all of which had solid theoretical support for their 
estimation. The chi-square value at model convergence indicates a good model fit. 
Associated with the chi square is the probability that the data were observed if the model 
were indeed well fitting, a probability of <10%. By taking into account the numerous 
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other GOF measures for the SEM model, the model depicted in Figure 6.5 is a well-
fitting model of safe work behavior and safety determinants. The equivalent of the R-
square for the overall model ranges from 0.98 to 0.99, depending on the GOF criteria, the 
root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) is 0.042, where 0.05 cannot be 
rejected at a high level of confidence, and all other GOF measures are encouraging. The 
SEM appears to be a theoretically and statistically defensible model. 
The initial SEM was constructed using various combinations of the factor analysis 
results and then model improvements were performed using a combination of 
modification indices (Hoyle, 1995; Molenaar et al., 2009) and solid theoretical support 
until a final satisfactory model was identified. In essence, asymptotic t-statistics and R-
square goodness of fit (GOF) measures were employed to assess the regression equations 
in the model. The model development process is discussed in the section 6.3.2.4. 
Both the measurement and structural components of the SEM provide insight into the 
influence of “total” safety determinants on safety performance. The measurement portion 
of the constructs and structural portion of the SEM are discussed in sections 6.3.2.5 & 
6.3.2.6. 
The next section validates that the model developed in the research was valid in terms 
of meeting the SEM assumptions. The section states the SEM assumptions and then the 
current research data/ model is analyzed to validate that the assumptions have been met. 
6.3.2.3. Assessing the Validity of SEM Assumptions 
6.3.2.3.1. A Reasonable Sample Size  
According to James Stevens’ Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences, a 
good general rule for sample size is 15 cases per predictor in a standard ordinary least 
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squares multiple regression analysis. Since SEM is closely related to multiple regression 
in some respects, 15 cases per measured variable in SEM is not unreasonable.  
When data are not normally distributed or are otherwise flawed in some way (almost 
always the case), larger samples are required. It is difficult to make absolute 
recommendations as to what sample sizes are required when data are skewed, kurtotic, 
incomplete, or otherwise less than perfect. The general requirement is thus to obtain as 
much data as possible.  
The sample size for the research in hand was 668, which is reasonable in view of the 
above discussion. 
6.3.2.3.2. Continuously and Normally Distributed Endogenous Variables  
SEM programs assume that dependent and mediating variables (Safe Work Behavior 
in case of the research in hand) are continuously distributed, with normally distributed 
residuals. However, this assumption is never completely met in practice.  
SEM specialists have developed a number of methods (now inherently built into SEM 
software such as AMOS) to deal with non-normally distributed variables. These methods 
are designed for variables that are assumed to have an underlying continuous distribution; 
for instance, administering a Likert scale of items to research participants. The scale 
points tap into points along a continuum of scale, and even though the item data are not 
continuously distributed, the underlying distribution is continuous. 
This research employed Likert scale of items and hence, in view of above discussion, 
trustworthy results are ensured.  
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6.3.2.3.3. Complete Data or Appropriate Handling of Incomplete Data  
This assumption requires that the data set used as input for SEM analysis should not have 
any missing data value or, if so, the incomplete data must be appropriately handled (such 
as by using listwise deletion). In case of the research in hand, only complete data was 
utilized for the study. 
6.3.2.3.4. Theoretical Basis for Model Specification and Causality  
SEM models can never be accepted; they can only fail to be rejected. In most instances 
there are equivalent models that fit equally as well as the provisionally accepted model. 
Any of these models may be “correct” because they fit the data as well as the preferred 
model. The use of SEM thus entails some uncertainty, particularly with cross-sectional 
data that are not collected under controlled conditions. (This is also true of other 
commonly used models such as ANOVA and multiple regression techniques.) While 
models that fit the data well can only be provisionally accepted, models that do not fit the 
data well can be absolutely rejected.  
In order to reach the “correct” model, the research employed evaluating competing 
models by using likelihood ratio chi-square tests to compare models, in addition to 
evaluating the absolute goodness of fit of single models.  
The next section discusses the model development process. 
6.3.2.4. Model Development Process 
The model development process is illustrated in the schematic shown in Figure 6.7 
and discussed below. 
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Figure 6.7: Model Development Process Flowchart 
To arrive at the final SEM specification, model building strategy was employed 
starting with a simple model and adding paths one at a time, followed by model-
trimming. As paths were added to the model, chi-square tended to decrease, indicating a 
better fit and also increasing the chi-square difference. That is, a significant chi-square 
difference indicated the fit of the more complex model was significantly better than for 
the simpler one. Adding paths was done only if consistent with theory and face validity.  
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Modification indexes (MIs) indicated when adding a path was improving the model. The 
strategy to use MIs was to add the parameter with the largest MI, then see the effect as 
measured by the chi-square fit index. 
Using model building strategy, the model was first over-fit. Then one parameter was 
deleted at a time. That is, the researcher first added paths one at a time based on the 
modification indexes, then dropped paths one at a time based on the chi-square difference 
test. Modifying one step at a time was important because the MIs were estimates changed 
each step, as did the structural coefficients and their significance. In the overfit state, the 
model consisted of 85 indicators and 7 latent variables. The researcher then erased one 
arrow at a time based on non-significant structural paths, again taking theory into account 
in the trimming process. One focus of model trimming was to delete arrows which were 
not significant. The researcher looked at the critical ratios (CR's) for structural 
(regression) weights. Those below 1.96 were non-significant at the .05 level and the 
corresponding arrows were deleted.  
Model trimming was continued until a significant chi-square difference indicated that 
trimming had gone too far. Note that a non-significant chi-square difference means that 
the researcher should choose the more parsimonious model (the one in which the arrow 
has been dropped). The goal was to find the most parsimonious model which was well-
fitting by a selection of goodness of fit tests (Table 6.3), many of them based on the given 
model's model-implied covariance matrix not be significantly different from the observed 
covariance matrix. This is tantamount to saying the goal was to find the most 
parsimonious model which was not significantly different from the saturated model, 
which fully but trivially explained the data. After dropping a path, a significant chi-
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square difference indicated the fit of the simpler model was significantly worse than for 
the more complex model and the complex model was retained. Dropping paths was done 
only if consistent with theory and face validity. The final model consisted of 52 
indicators and 7 latent variables. The six latent variables defining total safety constituted 
50 indicators coming from various safety dimension subcategories (as shown in Table 
6.4) and two indicators from the safe work behavior construct. 
The model building and model trimming process involved comparing a model which 
was a subset of another. Chi-square difference was used because it was a hierarchical 
model. This is because model fit by chi-square is partly a function of model complexity, 
with more complex models fitting better.  
In the case of modification indexes for covariances, two error term variables were 
allowed to correlate if the MI indicated substantial decrease in chi-square and the model 
was respecified to allow the error terms to covary. If there was correlated error, as shown 
by high MI's on error covariances, causes might include redundant content of the two 
items, methods bias (for example, common social desirability of both items) However, 
this was only done if strong theoretical evidence suggested as such.  
The final model specification is as shown in Figure 6.6. 
6.3.2.5. SEM Measurement Component 
The measurement component of the SEM describes how accurately the various 
exogenous variables measure latent variables. The measurement models within a SEM 
incorporate  measurements  of  exogenous  variables  with  their  associated errors to their  
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Table 6.4: Safety Dimension Subcategories Constituting the Model Constructs (Final 
Indicators) 
                  
                               Model  
                               Constructs 
Safety  
Dimension  
Subcategories 
 
C I E P R S 
Total 
(Items in each 
subcategory) 
Personal Intention & Commitment 1 1     2 
Personal Value System 1 1     2 
Personal Attitude & Perception 1      1 
Personal Interpretation & Emotion  1  1   2 
Personal Proficiency  3     3 
Management Commitment & 
Involvement 2  1   2 5 
Workers’ Commitment & 
Involvement 1  1   1 3 
Supervisory Commitment and 
Involvement 1  2 1  1 5 
Subcontractor Commitment & 
Involvement   1   1 2 
Communication   2   1 3 
Safety Accountability   1   1 2 
Production Pressure    3   3 
Cultural Norms 1   1   2 
Shared Values  1      1 
Collective Beliefs/ Shared 
Understanding   1    1 
Safety Rules and Procedures      3  3 
Site Layout Planning   1  1  2 
Safety Training and Education  1   2 1 4 
Accident Investigation and 
Reporting      1 1 2 
Safety Incentive Mechanisms      1 1 
Safety Disincentive Mechanisms     1  1 
Total  
(Items in each construct) 9 7 10 6 8 10 50 
*C=safety commitment; I=personal safety character and competence; E=supportive work 
environment; P=work pressure; R=safety program; and S = safety strategic concern 
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corresponding latent variable. The final six latent variables discovered to directly 
influence total safety are presented below. The latent variables are discussed in their 
order of influence on the endogenous latent variable safe work behavior. A more detailed 
interpretation of the latent variable effects on safe work behavior and their correlation 
among each other is presented in the following section describing the structural 
component of the SEM. 
6.3.2.5.1. Safety Commitment 
A company’s safety commitment influenced the responses to 9 questions on the 
survey questionnaire. These variables span across 8 branches of the multiattribute 
hierarchy, including: personal intention & commitment (1), personal value system (1), 
personal attitude & perception (1), management commitment & involvement (2), 
workers’ commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (1), 
cultural norms (1), and shared values (1).  All 9 variables share the common thread of the 
company’s commitment to safety. The indicator “management acts decisively when a 
safety concern is raised” has highest squared multiple correlation (0.81). This can be 
interpreted as meaning that 81% of the variability in the observed variable can be 
explained by the latent variable, safety commitment, and the remaining 19% of the 
variability is unaccounted for and included in the error term. The indicators “management 
clearly considers safety to be more important than production” (0.78) and “workers play 
an active role in identifying site hazards” (0.77) are the next two most highly correlated 
variables. 
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in 
Figure 6.8. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations. As 
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previously described, safety commitment explains about 81% of the variability in C2, and 
eC2 explains other portions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Safety Commitment 
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6.3.2.5.2. Personal Safety Character and Competence 
The construct personal safety character and competence influenced the responses to 
7 questions on the survey questionnaire. These variables span across 5 branches of the 
multiattribute hierarchy, including: personal intention & commitment (1), personal value 
system (1), personal interpretation & emotion (1), personal proficiency (3), and safety 
training & education (1). All 7 variables share the common thread of a person’s safety 
character and competence. The indicator “I am capable of identifying potentially 
hazardous situations” has highest squared multiple correlation (0.84). This can be 
interpreted as meaning that 84% of the variability in the observed variable can be 
explained by the latent variable, personal safety character and competence, and the 
remaining 16% of the variability is unaccounted for and included in the error term. The 
indicators “I am positive that I can influence the level of safety performance” (0.80), “I 
believe safety is an integral value of my work performance” (0.78), and “I feel happy to 
behave safely” (0.77) are the next three most highly correlated variables. 
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in 
Figure 6.9. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.  
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Figure 6.9: Personal Safety Character and Competence 
6.3.2.5.3. Supportive Work Environment 
A company’s supportive work environment influenced the responses to 10 questions 
on the survey questionnaire. These variables span across 8 branches of the multiattribute 
hierarchy, including: management commitment & involvement (1), workers’ 
commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (2), 
subcontractor commitment and involvement (1), communication (2), safety 
accountability (1), collective beliefs/ shared understanding (1), and site layout planning 
(1). All 10 variables share the common thread of a supportive work environment. The 
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indicator “my supervisor/safety manager has positive safety attitude” has highest squared 
multiple correlation (0.83). This can be interpreted as meaning that 83% of the variability 
in the observed variable can be explained by the latent variable, supportive work 
environment, and the remaining 17% of the variability is unaccounted for and included in 
the error term. The indicators “as a group, we endeavor to ensure that individuals are not 
working by themselves under risky or hazardous conditions” (0.79), “subcontractors 
proactively participate in site safety and hazard analysis” (0.77), and “suggestions to 
improve health and safety are acted upon” (0.75) are the next three most highly correlated 
variables. 
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in 
Figure 6.10. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.  
6.3.2.5.4. Work Pressure 
The construct work pressure influenced the responses to 6 questions on the survey 
questionnaire. These variables span across 4 branches of the multiattribute hierarchy, 
including: personal interpretation & emotion (1), supervisory commitment & 
involvement (1), production pressure (3), and cultural norms (1). All 6 variables share the 
common thread of work pressure. The indicator “under pressure safety rules should not 
be broken, even when worker believes it affects the production” has highest squared 
multiple correlation (0.82). This can be interpreted as meaning that 82% of the variability 
in the observed variable can be explained by the latent variable, work pressure, and the 
remaining 18% of the variability is unaccounted for and included in the error term. The 
indicators “under pressure I am not given enough time by my supervisor to get the job 
done safely” (0.80) and “under pressure it is an acceptable practice here to delay periodic 
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inspection of plant and equipment” (0.78) are the next two most highly correlated 
variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Supportive Work Environment 
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The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in 
Figure 6.11. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Work Pressure 
6.3.2.5.5. Safety Program 
A company’s safety program influenced the responses to 8 questions on the survey 
questionnaire. These variables span across 5 branches of the multiattribute hierarchy, 
including: safety rules and procedures (3), site layout planning (1), safety training and 
education (2), accident investigation and reporting (1), and safety disincentive 
mechanisms (1). All 8 variables share the common thread of safety program. The 
indicator “Safety is a primary consideration when determining site layout” has highest 
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squared multiple correlation (0.79). This can be interpreted as meaning that 79% of the 
variability in the observed variable can be explained by the latent variable, safety 
program, and the remaining 21% of the variability is unaccounted for and included in the 
error term. The indicators “current safety rules and procedures enforce the use of personal 
protective equipment whenever necessary” (0.78) and “accidents, incidents and near 
misses are required to be reported and investigated using a no-blame approach.” (0.76) 
are the next two most highly correlated variables. 
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in 
Figure 6.12. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.  
6.3.2.5.6. Safety Strategic Concern 
A company’s safety strategic concern influenced the responses to 10 questions on the 
survey questionnaire. These variables span across 9 branches of the multiattribute 
hierarchy, including: management commitment & involvement (2), workers’ 
commitment & involvement (1), supervisory commitment & involvement (1), 
subcontractor commitment & involvement (1), communication (1), safety accountability 
(1), safety training and education (1), accident investigation and reporting (1), and  safety 
incentive mechanisms. All 10 variables share the common thread of strategic concern to 
safety. The indicator “management operates an open-door policy on safety issues” has 
highest squared multiple correlation (0.84). This can be interpreted as meaning that 84% 
of the variability in the observed variable can be explained by the latent variable, safety 
strategic concern, and the remaining 16% of the variability is unaccounted for and 
included in the error term. The indicators “safe behaviors are rewarded” (0.81) and 
“workers are held accountable if safety procedures are not adhered to” (0.78), and 
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“lessons from accidents are communicated to workers to improve safety performance” 
(0.77) are the next three most highly correlated variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Safety Program 
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in 
Figure 6.13. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.  
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Figure 6.13: Safety Strategic Concern 
 
 
 
Safety Strategic 
Concern 
eS2
eS3 
eS4 
eS5 
eS6 
eS7 
eS8 
S1 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
.84
.74
.81
.70
.68
.78
.72
eS9 S9 
.77
eS1 S1 
.64
eS10 S10 
.71
 293
6.3.2.5.7. Safe Work Behavior 
The construct safe work behavior was used to measure safety performance. This 
construct influenced the responses to 2 questions on the survey questionnaire. These 
variables came from the behavior branch of the multiattribute hierarchy.  
The graphical representation of the latent variable and its components is shown in 
Figure 6.14. The numbers on the arrows are the squared multiple correlations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Safe Work Behavior 
6.3.2.6. SEM Structural Component 
This section presents the results of testing the research hypotheses. The structural 
component of the SEM explains the relationships between latent variables. SEM allows 
for direct, indirect, and correlative effects to be explicitly modeled, unlike standard 
regression models, which allow for explicit modeling of direct effects only. Figure 6.15 
displays the structural component of the SEM. In this model, all latent variables are found 
to be correlated with safe work behavior, as well as all being correlated with each other. 
The numbers near the straight arrows are the standardized correlation coefficients 
obtained when an endogenous variable is regressed on the set of exogenous variables to 
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which it is functionally related and the numbers by the curved arrows are the standardized 
correlation coefficients between each of the variables. A larger number can be considered 
a better indicator of the construct. Table 6.5 contains a summary of the hypotheses and 
the path coefficients obtained from the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15: Structural component of SEM with correlation among variables shown 
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Table 6.5: Summary of Path Coefficients 
 
Hypothesis and corresponding path Expected 
sign 
Path 
coefficient
H1: Greater company commitment = safe work behaviors + 0.74 
H2: Better safety character & competence = safe work 
behaviors 
+ 0.62 
H3: More supportive work environment = safe work 
behaviors 
+ 0.68 
H4: Higher perception of work pressure = unsafe work 
behaviors 
- -0.66 
H5: Better safety program = safe work behaviors + 0.43 
H6: Higher safety strategic concern = safe work behaviors + 0.72 
H7: Higher level of total safety = safe work behaviors + 0.78 
 
As can be seen, all of the paths were in the direction hypothesized. The regression of 
the exogenous latent variables on the safe work behavior construct is a relatively high 
value of R-square of 0.98, or 98%. R-square can be interpreted in the same manner as that 
obtained for the multiple regression analysis. Thus, the model explains about 98% of the 
variance in the dependent construct safe work behavior for the sampled data. All of the 
path coefficients were statistically significant in the predicted direction, providing strong 
overall support for the hypothesized model. The majority of the total safety constructs 
affect safe work behavior. Safety commitment and safety strategic concern constructs 
have the strongest influence on safe work behaviors. Safety program has the least 
influence on safe work behaviors.  
6.3.2.7. Discussion of Results 
The structural component of SEM describes how the exogenous variables (the six 
total safety constructs) are correlated. This is discussed in the following subsection. 
Discussion of the hypotheses results is given in the next sub-section. 
 
 296
6.3.2.7.1. Correlation 
Table 6.6 provides the standardized correlation coefficients between the dependent 
constructs. The interpretation of the highly correlated constructs is given in the following 
sub-sections. 
Table 6.6: Standardized Correlation Coefficients  
 
Construct  
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Safety commitment - - - - - - 
2. Personal safety character and 
competence 
0.45 - - - - - 
3. Supportive work 
environment 
0.64 0.65 - - - - 
4. Work pressure -0.42 -0.38 -0.62 - - - 
5. Safety program 0.31 0.27 0.55 -0.21 - - 
6. Safety strategic concern 0.72 0.52 0.7 -0.33 0.41 - 
 
6.3.2.7.1.1. Safety Commitment 
In this study, the safety commitment variable is highly correlated with the safety 
strategic concern (0.72) and supportive work environment (0.64), which can be 
interpreted as meaning that a company’s commitment is shown through safety strategic 
concern and provision of a supportive work environment. 
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6.3.2.7.1.2. Personal Safety Character and Competence 
Personal safety character and competence is highly correlated with supportive work 
environment (0.65), which can be interpreted as meaning that personal safety character 
competence leads to a supportive work environment. 
6.3.2.7.1.3. Supportive Work Environment 
Supportive work environment is highly correlated with the safety strategic concern 
(0.70), safety commitment (0.64), personal safety character and competence (0.65), and 
work pressure (-0.62). The correlation of supportive work environment with safety 
commitment and personal safety character and competence has been previously 
described. The other two correlations can be interpreted as meaning that a company’s 
supportive work environment is a reflection of its strategic concern and leads to improved 
perception of valuing expediency over safety.  
6.3.2.7.1.4. Work Pressure 
Work pressure is highly correlated with the supportive work environment (-0.62) as 
has been previously described.  
6.3.2.7.1.5. Safety Program 
Safety program is significantly correlated only with supportive work environment 
(0.55), which can be interpreted as meaning that a company’s implementation of a safety 
program is positively reflected through a supportive work environment.  
6.3.2.7.1.6. Safety Strategic Concern 
Safety strategic concern is highly correlated only with safety commitment (0.72), 
supportive work environment (0.70), as has been previously described.  
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6.3.2.7.2. Hypothesis  
The broad hypothesis is that safe work behaviors are consequences of the existing 
total safety environment, which, in turn, is determined by the six inter-dependent 
constructs—safety commitment, personal safety character & competence, supportive 
work environment, work pressure, safety program, and safety strategic concern. Strictly 
speaking, support was found for the influence of these six variables on safe work 
behaviors. 
Hypotheses 1 dealt with company’s safety commitment. The path from the 
commitment construct to safe work behaviors is the most significant. This implies that a 
company’s safety commitment has the greatest influence on safety performance. This 
finding verifies previous research (Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Molenaar et al., 2009) 
and further emphasizes the importance of company being committed to and involved in 
safety activities to emphasize safety issues within the organization. Hypothesis 6 dealt 
with safety as a strategic concern. The path from the safety strategic concern construct to 
safe work behaviors is also highly significant. This infers that companies where safety is 
part of their strategic policy and is treated as a strategic concern at all levels will inculcate 
safer work behaviors. Therefore, one can conclude that both commitment and strategic 
concern are prerequisites to achieving and sustaining zero accidents in construction site 
environments. 
The result for hypothesis 3 suggests that supportive work environment has a 
significant positive impact on safe work behaviors. This is not very surprising, as a 
construction worker who continually interacts with coworkers and supervisors also relies 
on them to a greater extent to provide a safer work environment. These findings suggest 
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that workers in more positive work environments are more likely to have above-average 
working relationships with managers, supervisors, and coworkers, and hence will have 
safer behaviors. 
The structural model provides support for hypothesis 2 that personal safety character 
and competence are positively associated with safe work behaviors. This infers that 
personal commitment and proficiency are significant contributors to instilling safe work 
behaviors. Laukkanen (1999) reports that skilled and experienced construction workers 
have fewer stress symptoms and are less prone to hazards than the inexperienced ones. 
The expected influence of work pressure on safe work behaviors (hypothesis 4) was 
supported, as the work pressure construct was significantly related to safe work 
behaviors. The negative correlation can be interpreted as meaning that an improvement in 
the perception of valuing expediency over safety correlates to an increase in company’s 
safety performance as measured through a reduction in unsafe behaviors. 
Safety program (hypothesis 5) has the least significant influence on safe work 
behaviors. This finding implies that the interior individual and collective pursuits of total 
safety (person and culture) have a significantly higher impact on safety performance 
(measured by safe work behaviors) as compared to the exterior pursuit of total safety 
(process). This result also strengthens the basic premise of this research, i.e. a systems 
approach to safety, by itself, is not enough to achieve the goal of zero accidents. 
Although this finding does not imply that safety program has no positive impact on safety 
performance, it does indicate that safety rules and procedures should play a 
complementary role and more safety improvement focus should be oriented towards 
improving the interior individual and collective pursuits leading to safe behaviors.  
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6.4 Comparison and Key Model Features 
This section provides a brief description of safety models as reported in the literature 
in an attempt to highlight key features of the proposed model.  
Grote and Kunzler (2000) presented a sociotechnical model of safety culture that 
links the safety management system and safety culture to the general organizational 
design. However, the model is more schematic and lacks any mechanism to improve and 
assess safety culture.  
Geller (1994) provided a model distinguishing three dynamic and interactive factors, 
namely, person, behavior, and environment. Three years later, a total safety culture 
model, which included this safety triad and recognized the dynamic and interactive 
relationship between them, was proposed (Geller 1997). However, the model did not 
consider the process and system aspects of total safety. In addition, the model was based 
on lagging indicators for measuring safety performance.  
Cooper (2000) argued that organizational culture is the product of multiple goal-
directed interactions between people, jobs, and the organization, and presented a model 
recognizing the presence of an interactive or reciprocal relationship between 
psychological, situational, and behavioral factors. Again, the model did not consider the 
process and system aspects of total safety. 
Building upon Geller’s model, Cooper’s argument, and broadening the organization 
construct into an environmental/situational construct to incorporate the safety system 
concept, the model presented by Choudhry et al. (2007) integrated three related concepts, 
namely, safety climate, behavior-based safety, and safety system, thus allowing different 
dimensions of construction safety culture to be measured individually or in combination. 
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This model provided allowance for a multilevel analysis of construction safety culture. 
However, the model did not examine the degree to which safety management systems 
actually influence people’s behaviors. Furthermore, the study did not delve into the 
interaction between safety climate, safety management systems and safety-related 
behaviors. 
Molenaar et al. (2009) developed a structural equation model of corporate culture as it 
affects safety performance. This research was based on the hypothesis that construction 
safety performance (measured by EMR – Experience Modication Rating) is predictable 
on the basis of corporate safety culture. The research proposed that construction 
organizations can have inherent characteristics that predispose them to be susceptible to 
accidents. The characteristics that influence corporate safety culture were classified into 
three main categories: (1) people; (2) process; and (3) value. The primary results of the 
study can be summarized by stating that corporate safety culture is significantly related to 
safety performance. From an integral strategic perspective of safety, the limitations of 
this research study were: 1) the study only looked at the “culture” domain of the 
fundamental domains defining total safety; 2) the study used a lagging indicator (EMR) 
to measure safety performance; and 3) the data collected to develop the model was 
limited. The research in hand attempts to overcome these limitations and builds upon a 
large data set, considers an integral view of all fundamental total safety dimensions 
(person, culture, behavior and process), and uses a leading indicator (safe work behavior) 
to measure safety performance. 
Mohamed (2002) examined the relationship between the safety climate and safe work 
behavior in construction site environments. This study also utilized the technique of 
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structural equation modeling to come up with a relationship model between safety 
climate determinants and safety performance (as measured by safe work behaviors). 
From an integral strategic perspective of safety, the limitations of this research study 
were: 1) the study looked at the “culture” (in fact climate) and the “behavior” domains of 
the fundamental total safety dimensions; 2) the study ignored interaction effects between 
the factors determining the safety climate; and 3) the study was only based on data 
collected from construction workers and did not take into account the perspectives of top 
management and supervisors. The research in hand attempts to overcome these 
limitations and builds upon an integral view of all fundamental total safety dimensions 
(person, culture, behavior and process), considers the interaction effects between the 
factors determining total safety, and basis itself on a large data set with data collected 
from top management, supervisors, foremen, and construction workers. 
While all above models were intuitive and addressed safety from a cultural, climate or 
behavior-based perspective, they still lacked a total approach to safety i.e. an approach 
that would take into consideration the entire personal, group, behavioral, process and 
production system factors as an integrated model determining the true total safety 
performance of a construction organization. Secondly, objective measurement and 
improvement of total safety (as identified by all dimensions defining and determining 
total safety) remained a concern to be addressed. Thirdly, most of these models were 
based on lagging safety performance indicators (such as EMR) and were also limited in 
terms of data utilized for the studies.  
Building upon previous models (specifically, Molenaar et al., 2009 and Mohamed, 
2002), the model presented in this research has the following key features: 
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1. It integrates all the fundamental dimensions of total safety, namely, person, 
culture, behavior, and process, thus allowing different dimensions of 
construction total safety to be measured individually as well as in 
combination. 
2. The four constructs complement each other in a way that offers an integral 
measurement model, thus allowing for a multiattribute hierarchy analysis of 
construction total safety determinants. 
3. The measurement model considers the interaction effects between the 
constructs determining total safety as well as the integral effect of all the total 
safety dimensions on construction safety performance. 
4. The model incorporates a leading indicator of safety performance, viz. safe 
work behavior, which allows measurement of true safety performance of a 
construction organization because it does not base itself on retrospective 
accident statistics. 
5. The model is build upon data collected from various tiers of a construction 
organization, including workers, foremen, supervisors, project managers and 
corporate managers, and hence provides a more comprehensive and realistic 
measurement mechanism of total safety. 
6. The model is fundamental and very simple in nature and allows a self-
evaluation and self-improvement mechanism based on fundamental total 
safety determinants. 
7. Since the model is based on the statistical tool of structural equation 
modeling, it caters for the interaction between independent variables as well 
 304
as takes into account the measurement and model errors, and hence provides a 
more realistic assessment of total safety. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the development of a strategic safety improvement model 
based on SEM analysis on the underlying total safety determinants. The model provided 
the correlation between the factors determining total safety and their influence on a 
company’s safety performance as measured by a leading indicator of safe work behavior. 
This constituted achieving objectives 3 of the study. 
From data collected in phase II of the research (chapter 6), a research base model was 
first developed. Following this, a structural equation model (SEM) was estimated to 
identify latent constructs that describe total safety and to quantify relationships among 
them and between these total safety determinants and safety performance of a 
construction organization.  Finally, the strategic framework was presented along with a 
discussion of the key components of the framework and their utility towards strategically 
improving safety in the construction industry. 
The total safety model presented in this chapter provides a framework for continuous 
measurement and improvement of safety. From a practical perspective, this model 
approaches safety as a total process taking into consideration the interior and exterior 
individual and organizational characteristics that determine the true safety environment of 
a company and provide a quantitative framework to better understand and evaluate total 
safety performance of construction industry. Since this model is fundamental in nature 
and addresses safety from an integral perspective taking into account the personal, 
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organizational, behavioral and process perspectives collectively, it has the potential to 
strategically achieve and sustain the goal of zero accidents. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Research Summary, Conclusions and Contributions 
The research in hand had three key objectives: 1)  to assess the current state of safety 
in the construction industry and establish the need for addressing safety as a total process 
in construction contracting organizations; 2) to identify the factors determining the total 
safety environment of a construction contracting organization, which are most suitable 
and appropriate for measurement and improvement and hence play a pivotal role in 
strategic safety improvement; and 3) to develop a strategic framework for defining, 
measuring, and improving total safety in the construction industry in order to achieve and 
sustain the goal of zero accidents. To achieve the above objectives, the research endeavor 
was undertaken in two distinct phases. Phase I of the research, which was consistent to 
achieving objective of the study, concluded that the present safety management practices 
in the construction industry have failed to deliver well on the following areas of safety 
performance: 
1. Strategic vision of safety,  
2. Strategic approach to safety improvement,  
3. Employee involvement and empowerment,  
4. Organizational readiness to embrace Total Safety Management, 
5. Safety communication and decision making,  
6. Safety commitment and support,  
7. Maintaining a positive attitude towards safety, 
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8. Worker motivation, 
9. Accident investigation and reporting, and 
10. Safety training and orientation 
In addition, it was also concluded that OSHA, the lead regulatory agency driving 
safety, is not performing at par in terms of achieving strategic safety improvement in the 
construction industry and needs to improve on its vision and approach towards safety. 
OSHA’s strategic approach, as reflected from the findings, should be “continuous 
improvement through positive reinforcement” as against “inspection and penalty” 
approach. Moreover, it was concluded that OSHA would need to work with the 
companies and not against them in order to achieve the strategic goal of zero accidents in 
the industry. 
Based on the findings of Phase I of the research endeavor, the major conclusion 
drawn was a dire need of a framework that would allow the industry to strategically and 
continuously improve safety in order to attain and sustain the goal of zero accidents. Such 
a framework would be particularly instrumental in generating a total safety environment 
in the industry, which would promote safety for the sake of safety and not for the safe of 
“compliance” or “penalty avoidance”. This framework would require an integral 
approach to safety with commitment and participation from all levels as well as sectors of 
the industry. 
Following phase I of the research study, an integral model of total safety was adapted 
from literature, which formed the basis of phase II of the research undertaken to achieve 
objective 2 of the study. The integral model allowed decomposition of total safety into 
four principal dimensions, viz., person, culture, behavior and process, which were further 
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decomposed into 83 measurable attributes using a multiattribute analysis technique. 
These formed the basis of a questionnaire to measure total safety. Safe work behavior 
was selected as a measure of a company’s safety performance for the study. Based on the 
survey responses, statistical relationships between total safety dimensions and safety 
performance (measured by safe work behavior) were revealed through a series of six 
latent variables (factors) that describe the total safety environment of a construction 
organization.  
These six factors (and their corresponding indicators) formed the basis of developing 
a strategic safety improvement model for the construction industry consistent to 
achieving objective 3 of the study. The research base model followed the broad 
hypothesis that safe work behaviors (and, thus, their reciprocal, unsafe behaviors) are 
consequences of the existing total safety dimensions in a construction organization, 
which is determined by the six factors (and their corresponding indicators) already 
identified. A structural equation model (SEM) was estimated to model the latent 
constructs that describe total safety and to quantify relationships among them and 
between these total safety determinants and safety performance of a construction 
organization. Model constructs and associated hypotheses were appropriately defined 
and, after numerous iterations, a final SEM specification was reached. 
Total safety is extremely complex to define and measure as displayed though both the 
multiattribute hierarchy and the multiple interrelationships of the SEM estimated in this 
research. However, the SEM and the latent variables it describes constitute a powerful 
framework for defining, measuring, and improving total safety. Analysis of data from the 
83 measurable characteristics revealed that 50 could be used to describe a final set of six 
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latent variables. These six latent variables can be considered characteristics of total safety 
and may be used as indicators of safety performance as measured through safe work 
behaviors. 
The total safety model developed provides a framework for continuous measurement 
and improvement of safety in the construction industry without adding complexity and 
administrative burden. From a practical perspective, this model approaches safety as a 
total process taking into consideration the interior and exterior individual and 
organizational characteristics that determine the true safety environment of a company 
and provide a quantitative framework to better understand and evaluate total safety 
performance of construction industry. Since this model is fundamental in nature and 
addresses safety from an integral perspective taking into account the personal, 
organizational, behavioral and process perspectives collectively, it has the potential to 
strategically achieve and sustain the goal of zero accidents. 
Specifically, the research has provided the following contributions: 
1. A framework showing the interrelationships among the factors defining total 
safety and the relationship of these factors with the true safety performance of a 
construction organization 
2. The formulation and quantification of the interrelationships mentioned above to 
facilitate measurement of total safety 
3. A strategic tool providing a framework for continuous measurement and 
improvement of total safety.  
4. A strategic tool giving the construction participant a clear picture of the true 
safety performance of the company, but would also suggest the individual, 
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organizational, and process characteristics that need to be improved for sustained 
improvement on total safety.  
7.2 Strategic Industry Benefits 
The researcher foresees the developed framework to be used as a tool by the industry 
personnel to continuously improve safety in their organizations. It would not only give 
the construction participant a clear picture of the true safety performance of the company, 
but would also suggest the individual, organizational, and process characteristics that 
need to be improved for sustained improvement on total safety.  
Specifically, the developed strategic safety improvement framework can provide the 
following benefits to the industry. 
1. The current financial crisis has put the role of safety management in the 
construction business into focus. For U.S. firms engaging themselves in the 
construction business, one of the most effective means of mitigating financial 
risks is through a strategic safety management model. The developed 
framework can be adopted by U.S. contractors and subcontractors to measure 
and continuously improve their safety performance and hence achieve the goal 
of zero accidents. 
2. The developed framework can be adopted by OSHA to devise strategies for 
safety measurement and improvement in the construction industry on 
sustainable basis. Since this model is based on an integral approach to safety, 
it is deemed to have the adaptability to implement itself in the existing safety 
management systems and hence will help induce a sustainable safety culture 
in the construction industry. 
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3. The developed framework can be adopted by construction owners to devise 
strategies for evaluating the safety performance of construction contractors (at 
the bidding stage or otherwise), who will now have the opportunity to present 
their firm-specific safety strategies based on their own safety performance 
levels. 
4. The developed framework may largely reduce the administrative over-burden 
for safety regulatory bodies (OSHA), owners, contractors and subcontractors 
by providing a self-evaluation and self-improvement mechanism for safety 
based on process measurement. Of course, this is not to say that this 
framework will eliminate the requirement of monitoring the safety 
performance of contractors and subcontractors from a regulatory perspective – 
the mechanism will now be more powerful and less cumbersome because it 
will be focusing on safety as a total process rather than focusing on unsafe 
outcomes (accidents). 
5. Since this framework is integral for implementing safety as a total process in 
the construction industry, strategically, it may prove to be a best value system 
for the industry. That is, the model, if successfully implemented, will not only 
improve the safety performance of the construction industry, but will also help 
the industry become more competitive and productive; hence providing best 
value to its customers. 
6. Although the framework has focused on the U.S. construction industry 
commercial building sector, the nature of the model makes it suitable to any 
sector of construction industry around the globe. This is particularly because 
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the model was based on well-established principles and was focused on total 
process measurement and improvement, both of which are independent of the 
particular industry in which the model will be functional. 
7. It is envisaged that this research effort will immensely contribute to the 
development of education and training programs in construction safety, as this 
model will help provide a strategic insight into the aspects to be included in 
long-term and effective safety education and training programs. The very 
premise (and the results) of this model provides a shift of focus from treating 
safety as a systems approach to approaching it as a total (individual and 
group) process that integrates personal and collective values, beliefs, 
commitments, attitudes, perceptions, interpretations, emotions and 
understandings.   
7.3 Recommendations 
This SEM suggests that total safety dimensions are important determinants of safety 
performance. The six characteristics described by the latent variables in the SEM may be 
interpreted as action items that companies can use to improve their total safety 
environment and their safety performance. Each latent variable can be summarized as a 
total safety characteristic with corresponding action items that may improve safety 
performance as follows: 
Increase a company’s safety commitment: 
• Actively participate in safety; 
• Clearly emphasize on safety to be more important than production; 
• Involve workers in proactively identifying site hazards;  
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• Obtain commitment from all the supervisors and key people to incident and injury 
free. (This may be done in orientation sessions and in the field.)  
• Identify and correct the causes of unsafe actions before they get translated to 
accidents. 
• Recognize those people who have demonstrable success in safety and people 
skills.  
• Encourage and reward those who “step out of the box” and take initiative.  
• Attempt to create the right attitude in those who need a little coaching.  
• Encourage coaching within crafts and across craft lines.  
• Post signs with Safety slogans on all drinking water cans and in conspicuous 
places throughout the worksite. Move signs around.  
• Have Staff through Front Line Supervisors participate in High Performance 
Safety Sessions.  
• Have all Craftsperson’s and Helpers participate in High Performance Safety 
Meetings without any supervisors present.  
 
Increase a company’s safety strategic concern: 
• Maintain an open-door policy on safety issues (offer opportunities for all 
personnel to provide feedback regarding safety concerns; 
• Reward safe behaviors (create an understanding that field employees will be 
recognized for safe performance); 
• Strengthen accountability measures at worker level; and 
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• Effectively communicate lessons from accidents to improve safety performance 
of workers. 
• Acquire and retain those people who have exposure to the injury/ incident free 
initiative.  
• Retain those people with the right attitude.  
• Treat the workforce to refreshments on occasion to reward them for a good job 
and to help keep morale and awareness elevated.  
• Canvass other jobsites for ideas that would help keep awareness and enthusiasm 
where it should be.  
• Encourage everyone to mention something regarding Safety in every 
conversation. It does not have to be lengthy or sophisticated, just enough to keep 
awareness up.  
• Share with employee’s info from the weekly HSE report from the company to 
heighten awareness of things to prevent.  
• Encourage the working population to focus on Safety one hour at the time. Be 
sure that Management has furnished them all that it takes to do that.  
• Keep a team intact to continue to work on barriers and solutions.  
• Share with other sites those things that work for yours.  
Improve individual safety character and competence: 
• Increase individual capability of identifying potentially hazardous situations; 
• Encourage individuals to positively influence the level of safety performance; 
• Instill safety as an integral value of work performance; and 
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• Encourage safe behaviors. 
• Offer coaching. 
• Have Staff members greet employees as they come in each morning.  
Improve a company’s supportive work environment: 
• Continuously emphasize on supervisors to maintain a positive attitude towards 
safety; 
• Encourage workers to ensure that individuals are not working by themselves 
under risky or hazardous conditions;  
• Encourage subcontractors to proactively participate in site safety and hazard 
analysis;  
• Create long-term relationships with subcontractors; and 
• Promptly act upon suggestions to improve health and safety. 
• Have project manager, superintendents and supervisors visible in field as well as 
accessible to the working population.  
• Hold job wide safety meetings on a monthly basis. Solicit some of the topics from 
the workforce. Involve some speakers from the workforce. 
• Establish a Project Manager’s Safety and Quality Advisory Team with 
representation from each craft. Have periodic meetings. Act on recommendations. 
Provide feedback.  
• Encourage all supervisors to communicate their concern for and interest in each 
member of the workforce.  
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• Establish a Front Line Supervisor’s forum. Meet on a periodic basis to discuss 
needs, concerns, suggestions for improvement and new developments.  
• Make visible the fact that the Project Manager and the Safety Manager are 
working closely together to manager the project.  
Improve a company’s safety program: 
• Ensure that safety is a prime concern in site layout planning; 
• Enforce the use of personal protective equipment;  
• Ensure that accidents, incidents and near misses are reported and investigated 
using a no-blame approach; and 
• Provide safety training emphasizing on identifying potential risks and 
consequences. 
• Assure that job plans include plans for the safe execution of work assignments.  
Improve the perception of valuing expediency over safety: 
• Demonstrate clear commitment that safety rules should not be broken, even when 
worker believes it affects the production; 
• Emphasize on supervisors to value safety over productivity; and 
• Emphasize on supervisors to periodically inspect plant and equipment, even under 
production pressure. 
7.4 Limitations 
Three potential limitations of the current research study, which are also suggestive of 
future research paths, deserve attention. First and foremost, as with most research 
surveys, the data collected were partly self-reported; hence, some of the relationships 
may be exaggerated due to common method bias. Available information from top 
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management and supervisors was used to reduce the bias, in particular, in matters 
concerning management commitment, communication, and the supervisory environment.  
A second limitation is that the scope was limited to general and specialty contractors 
working in the building construction sector only. However, this is not really a limitation 
because the fundamental nature of the model allows it to be used for other sectors in other 
industries as well. 
A third limitation is that the questionnaire was distributed only in English. Although a 
reasonable sample from each company was achieved at the upper management, middle 
management, and field levels, non-English speaking employees did not complete the 
survey. In the future, a computer survey could be considered with multiple languages, 
leading to automation and expediency of the data collection process. Employees without 
access to computers would still require paper-based questionnaires.  
Despite the stated limitations, this research shows that total safety can be quantified 
and is related to safety work behaviors. The methodological framework presented in this 
paper provides a new set of tools for identifying and measuring total safety. The 
recommendations from this research are based on findings of this study. As more data are 
collected and new variables are observed, these results may be further refined; however, 
this research serves as a fundamental advancement in the industry’s understanding of 
total safety and its correlation to safety performance. 
7.4 Future Research Directions 
The next step in the research could be to expand the data collection and develop the 
framework into a “thermometer” of total safety environment. By automating the process 
via computer, companies could distribute this questionnaire to all their employees and 
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quickly measure their total safety environment. Just as a poor cholesterol test identifies 
increased risk of a heart attack, a poor total safety environment test would indicate 
increased risk of an impending accident. More importantly, the test would help to identify 
aspects of total safety needing improvement. 
More formally, a tool to predict the likelihood of construction accidents, the accident 
potential index (API) can be developed based on the strategic model developed herein. 
No such tool is currently available in the construction safety research, although use of 
such tools has been seen in other areas of construction research such as construction 
disputes, wherein a dispute potential index (DPI) has been in use since 1994 to predict the 
likelihood of legal disputes (Diekmann and Girard 1995). The API would be a predictive 
tool designed to identify the presence of problem-prone characteristics in the safety 
performance of a construction company, measure them, and report the results to the 
participants in the company so they can take corrective action to prevent accidents. 
The API would consist of a self-administered questionnaire asking a company leader 
to answer critical questions about the total safety dimensions in the company. A computer 
program may process the answers, analyzes them, and calculates two sets of numbers: 
• first, an overall numerical rating indicating generally whether the company is 
likely to fall into the good, bad, or average range with respect to overall potential 
for accidents; and  
• second, an individual score for each of six key total safety determinants, to 
identify particular areas of the company that have the greatest potential for 
breeding unsafe behaviors.  
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Appendix A – Survey Instrument 1 
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Assessment of Current Safety Attitudes and Approaches of Contractor Top 
Management in the U.S. Construction Industry 
 
(To be filled by Contractor Top Management/ Office Management, e.g. CEO, 
Operations Manager, Safety Director, Project Director, etc.) 
 
NOT TO BE FILLED BY ANY SITE RELATED PERSONNEL 
 
All the information gathered here will be kept strictly confidential and will be used only 
for research and analysis without mentioning the person or company names. Thank you 
very much for your cooperation. 
Personal Information (Optional)       
Name of Respondent: ______________________________________________________ 
Present position in the company: _____________________________________________ 
Total work experience: _____________ years                
Work experience in this company: ___________ years 
Please provide contact info if you like to be contacted again regarding this questionnaire:   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Company Information       
Company Name: _________________________________________________________ 
Company Location (City & State): ___________________________________________ 
Type of Company (Contractor Trade): 
 General Contractor (GC) 
 Poured Concrete Foundation 
and Structure Contractor 
 Structural Steel and Precast 
Concrete Contractor 
 Framing Contractor 
 Masonry Contractor 
 Glass and Glazing Contractor 
 Roofing Contractor 
 Siding Contractor 
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 Electrical Contractor 
 Plumbing, Mechanical & 
HVAC Contractor 
 Drywall and Insulation 
Contractor 
 Painting and Wall Covering 
Contractor 
 Flooring Contractor 
 Tile and Terrazzo Contractor 
 Finish Carpentry Contractor 
 Site Preparation Contractor 
 Other 
___________________________ 
 
Approx. company size (no. of persons):  _________ (admin)   ________ (technical) 
Number of Years in Business: ___________   
Approx. annual turnover (in millions): ______________ 
States of operation (Check all that apply): 
 Alabama  
 Iowa  
 Alaska  
 Kansas  
 Arizona  
 Kentucky  
 Arkansas  
 Louisiana  
 California  
 Maine  
 Colorado  
 Maryland  
 Connecticut  
 Massachuse
tts  
 Delaware  
 Michigan  
 District of 
Columbia  
 Minnesota  
 Florida  
 Mississippi  
 Georgia  
 Missouri  
 Hawaii  
 Montana  
 Idaho  
 Nebraska  
 Illinois  
 Nevada  
 Indiana  
 New Hampshire  
 New Jersey  
 South Dakota  
 New Mexico  
 Tennessee  
 New York  
 Texas  
 North Carolina  
 Utah  
 North Dakota  
 Vermont  
 Ohio  
 Virginia  
 Oklahoma  
 Washington  
 Oregon  
 West Virginia  
 Pennsylvania  
 Wisconsin  
 Rhode Island  
 Wyoming  
 South Carolina 
   
Below, you will be presented with a series of statements about the company’s top 
management attitude towards health and safety. Please indicate your level of agreement 
or disagreement with the statements with respect to your experience with the company by 
checking (√ ) only one appropriate box. (1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neutral - neither 
disagree nor agree; 5 = strongly agree). 
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Score  
Top Management Safety Attitude Statement 1 
(disagree) 
2 3 4 5 
(agree) 
I. Safety Policy 
1 The company has safety related criterion for 
subcontractor selection (e.g. past safety 
records). 
     
2 The company has safety related criterion for 
workers’ recruitment (e.g. experience, safety 
training). 
     
3 The company has safety related criterion for 
managers’ & supervisors’ recruitment (e.g. 
experience, safety training). 
     
4 The revisions (where relevant) are promptly 
brought to the attention of all employees. 
     
5 The review arrangement includes feedback 
from employees at all levels. 
     
6 The safety policy clearly states that decisions 
on other priorities should give due regard to 
construction safety requirements. 
     
7 There are effective arrangements for 
reviewing the health and safety policy at least 
once a year. 
     
8 The company has a well-written substance 
abuse program. 
     
9 The company has a well-written light-duty, 
return-to-work policy. 
     
10 The policy endeavors to set targets (corporate 
safety goals) for health and safety 
performance including a commitment to 
progressive improvement. 
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11 The policy identifies key senior personnel for 
overall coordination and implementation of 
the policy. 
     
12 The company has a well established 
disciplinary process for enforcement of safety 
program/safety plan. 
     
13 The company has a well-written safety field 
manual. 
     
14 As part of company policy, workers are given 
a booklet containing work rules, 
responsibilities, and other appropriate 
information. 
     
15 The company has a well-written personal 
protective equipment (PPE) policy. 
     
16 The policy is explained to new employees as 
part of their training and orientation before 
entry to a work on-site. 
     
17 The company has a well-written policy on 
accident reporting and investigation. 
     
18 The policy explicitly commits the 
organization to full compliance with all 
relevant health and safety legislation. 
     
19 The company has a well-written safety 
program manual/ safety plan. 
     
 
II. Management Commitment and Support 
20 The number of safety officers delegated on a 
site depends on the perceived/ evaluated 
hazards and complexity of the site. 
     
21 The management emphasizes on having 
project safety committees. 
     
324 
22 Safety is a mandatory part of the supervisor’s 
performance evaluation. 
     
23 There are effective arrangements to collect 
and review worker feedback on health and 
safety matters. 
     
24 The executive management reviews accident 
reports. 
     
25 The safety officers are delegated the 
responsibility and authority to suspend work 
if there are unsafe acts. 
     
26 The executive management involves itself in 
promoting safety by giving directions/ 
motivation. 
     
27 The executive management involves itself in 
enacting incentive schemes to encourage staff 
and subcontractors to observe safety  
     
28 The executive management involves itself in 
attending or chairing safety committees. 
     
29 The management clearly emphasizes safety 
over productivity. 
     
30 The number of safety officers delegated on a 
site depends on the accident records. 
     
31 The executive management reviews safety 
statistics. 
     
32 The number of safety officers delegated on a 
site depends on the requirements of the law/ 
the contract. 
     
33 The executive management reviews 
inspection reports. 
     
34 The executive management involves itself in 
requiring and facilitating regular safety 
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inspection on sites. 
35 The names and positions with responsibility 
lines for safety performance management are 
explicitly identified (such as an organization 
chart). 
     
36 The management sets corporate safety goals.      
37 The management always keeps someone in 
charge of updating health and safety including 
changes to regulations, new codes of practice, 
newly identified hazards, and new work 
practices. 
     
38 Management strongly emphasizes that safety 
problems be openly discussed between 
workers and supervisors.  
     
39 Management strongly emphasizes that 
workers be involved in site safety decisions.  
     
40 As per management directives, a formal 
behavior observation program exists on work 
sites. 
     
41 Management strongly encourages workers to 
raise safety concerns with their supervisors. 
     
42 Management emphasizes that workers be 
involved in preparation of site safety plans. 
     
43 Management strongly emphasizes that 
subcontractors/ subcontractor safety rep/ 
subcontractor staff be involved in site safety 
decisions.  
     
44 Management communicates lessons from 
accidents to workers in order to improve 
safety performance.             
     
45 As per management directives, site managers 
and supervisors are required to engage 
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themselves in regular safety talks with 
operatives. 
 
IV. Safety Training and Orientation 
46 The safety program requires subcontractors to 
hold regular safety meetings. 
     
47 The effectiveness of health and safety training 
is monitored by the company by checking 
new skills. 
     
48 Management strongly emphasizes on site 
managers and supervisors in meetings to 
maintain a positive attitude towards safety so 
that workers take safety on the site seriously. 
     
49 The safety program requires all subcontract 
workers to attend a formal standard safety 
orientation. 
     
50 The health and safety training program/ plan 
exists at the managerial level. 
     
51 The safety program requires holding tool box/ 
tailgate safety meetings focused on specific 
work operations/exposures. 
     
52 The safety program requires conducting 
safety inductions for site visitors. 
     
53 The health and safety training program/ plan 
exists at the supervisory level. 
     
54 Safety training is always a line or compulsory 
item within the budget. 
     
55 The health and safety training program/ plan 
exists at the workforce level. 
     
56 The safety program requires conducting site 
safety orientation for every person new to the 
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job site. 
57 The safety program requires safety training 
meetings for each supervisor (foreman and 
above). 
     
58 The company has a well-documented health 
and safety training program/ plan  
     
59 The safety program requires equipment 
operation/certification training. 
     
 
V. Safety Administration and Procedures 
60 The company has an established system to 
recognize safety accomplishments (such as 
award given out on a regular basis with 
recognition given for good safety 
performance. 
     
61 Any non-compliance to wearing appropriate 
PPE is required by the management to be 
investigated.  
     
62 Management motivates workers to work 
safely by providing incentives/ awards/ 
recognitions for good safety performance (e.g. 
monetary incentives). 
     
63 The work rules are regularly updated.       
64 There are appropriate arrangements to 
monitor the effectiveness and thoroughness of 
safety inspection. 
     
65 There are appropriate arrangements to collect 
and analyze the results of safety inspections. 
     
66 There are appropriate arrangements to ensure 
that action is taken as a result of the findings 
of safety inspections. 
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67 The safety program requires having pre-task 
meetings before executing an activity. 
     
68 The safety program requires performing site 
layout planning before start of work. 
     
69 The management discusses safety at all 
preconstruction and progress meetings. 
     
70 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety communications procedures. 
     
71 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety risk identification and 
management procedures. 
     
72 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety planning procedures. 
     
73 Management disciplines workers to work 
safely by imposing disciplinary action (e.g. 
penalties) for safety non-performance. 
     
74 The safety program requires conducting 
emergency response drills.  
     
75 The company’s written safety program 
addresses physical controls and rules. 
     
76 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety organization and 
responsibilities. 
     
77 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety implementation, monitoring 
and control procedures. 
     
78 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety training and awareness 
procedures.  
     
79 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safe work procedures. 
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80 Safety bulletin boards are provided and 
located so that every employee will see them 
during working days.   
     
81 The safety program requires maintaining a 
site hazard register containing hazards, 
impacts and preventive measures. 
     
82 The company’s written safety program 
addresses safety reporting procedures.  
     
83 Safety signs and posters are prominently 
displayed on work sites. 
     
84 The company maintains jobsite safety 
checklists (or similar tools) for inspection. 
     
85 The company’s written safety program 
addresses accident and emergency response 
mechanisms. 
     
86 The safety program requires conducting 
regular job site safety inspections/ audits. 
     
87 The company has documented safety work 
rules/ procedures for all site operations 
performed by the company (such as 
excavation works, trenching works, high rise 
work etc.). 
     
88 Site safety inspections are required to include 
routine safety inspection of equipment (e.g., 
scaffold, ladders, fire extinguishers, etc.). 
     
89 There are established procedures to ensure the 
proper use of PPE as well as its training and 
inspection. 
     
90 The company maintains PPE facilities on 
worksites. 
     
91 The company maintains continuous supply of      
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first aid facilities on work sites.  
 
VI. Accident Investigation and Reporting 
92 The company has a system to effectively use 
safety records and logs for enhancing safety 
performance. 
     
93 Management requires investigating near 
misses to help prevent accidents. 
     
94 Management requires reporting incidents/ 
near misses in the company’s reporting 
system. 
     
95 After each accident, appropriate steps are 
taken to prevent similar accidents in future. 
 
     
96 The company always investigates accidents.      
97 Management requires keeping safety records 
and logs (such as in a database that logs 
injuries on past projects). 
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Assessment of Current Safety Attitudes and Approaches of Supervisors and 
Foremen in the Construction Industry 
(To be filled by Foremen and Supervisors) 
All the information gathered here will be kept strictly confidential and will be used only 
for research and analysis without mentioning the person or company names. Thank you 
very much for your cooperation. 
Personal Information (Optional)       
Name of Respondent: ______________________________________________________ 
Present position in the company: _____________________________________________ 
Total work experience: _____________ years                
Work experience in this company: ___________ years 
Please provide contact info if you like to be contacted again regarding this questionnaire:   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Company Information       
Company Name: _________________________________________________________ 
Company Location (City & State): ___________________________________________ 
Type of Company (Contractor Trade): 
 General Contractor (GC) 
 Poured Concrete Foundation 
and Structure Contractor 
 Structural Steel and Precast 
Concrete Contractor 
 Framing Contractor 
 Masonry Contractor 
 Glass and Glazing Contractor 
 Roofing Contractor 
 Siding Contractor 
 Electrical Contractor 
 Plumbing, Mechanical & HVAC 
Contractor 
 Drywall and Insulation Contractor 
 Painting and Wall Covering 
Contractor 
 Flooring Contractor 
 Tile and Terrazzo Contractor 
 Finish Carpentry Contractor 
 Site Preparation Contractor 
 Other 
___________________________ 
 
Approx. company size (no. of persons):  _________ (admin)   ________ (technical) 
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Number of Years in Business: ___________   
Approx. annual turnover (in millions): ______________ 
States of operation (Check all that apply): 
 Alabama  
 Iowa  
 Alaska  
 Kansas  
 Arizona  
 Kentucky  
 Arkansas  
 Louisiana  
 California  
 Maine  
 Colorado  
 Maryland  
 Connecticut  
 Massachuse
tts  
 Delaware  
 Michigan  
 District of 
Columbia  
 Minnesota  
 Florida  
 Mississippi  
 Georgia  
 Missouri  
 Hawaii  
 Montana  
 Idaho  
 Nebraska  
 Illinois  
 Nevada  
 Indiana  
 New Hampshire  
 New Jersey  
 South Dakota  
 New Mexico  
 Tennessee  
 New York  
 Texas  
 North Carolina  
 Utah  
 North Dakota  
 Vermont  
 Ohio  
 Virginia  
 Oklahoma  
 Washington  
 Oregon  
 West Virginia  
 Pennsylvania  
 Wisconsin  
 Rhode Island  
 Wyoming  
 South Carolina 
   
Below, you will be presented with a series of statements about the responsibilities of a 
foreman or a supervisor towards health and safety on a construction site. Please indicate 
your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements with respect to your 
experience with the company by checking (√ ) only one appropriate box. (1 = strongly 
disagree; 3 = neutral - neither disagree nor agree; 5 = strongly agree). 
Score  
Supervisor Safety Responsibility Statement 1 
(disagr
ee) 
2 3 4 5 
(agre
e) 
I. Safety Training and Orientation 
1 I am responsible to provide job-specific safety 
training 
     
2 I am responsible to hold tool box/ tailgate 
safety meetings focused on specific work 
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operations/exposures 
3 I am responsible to hold safety meetings      
4 I am responsible to coach workers      
5 I am responsible to explain safety operations/ 
rules to workers 
     
6 I am responsible to orient new workers      
 
II. Safety Administration 
7 I am responsible to establish inspection teams 
for hazard analysis 
     
8 I am responsible to investigate accidents      
9 I am responsible to correct unsafe conditions      
10 I am responsible to take unsafe tools out of 
production 
     
11 I am responsible to correct unsafe acts      
12 I am responsible to report all incidents/ near 
misses 
     
13 I am responsible to authorize regular 
maintenance or repair of equipment 
     
14 I am responsible to report all accidents      
15 I am responsible to maintain first aid facilities      
16 I am responsible to conduct (safety) 
inspection of my own division of work 
     
17 I am responsible to send the injured or sick 
workers for medical attention 
     
 
III. Maintaining Discipline 
335 
18 I am responsible to require workers to report 
any malpractice by a fellow worker 
     
19 I am responsible to conduct emergency 
response drills 
     
c20 I am responsible to report a worker for unsafe 
acts 
     
21 I am responsible to discharge a worker’s 
duties  
     
22 I am responsible to recommend promotion or 
demotion to a worker 
     
23 I am responsible to issue warnings to workers 
in case of unsafe acts 
     
24 I am responsible to enforce the use of 
personal protective equipment whenever 
necessary 
     
 
IV. Safety Communication 
25 I am responsible to recommend changes in 
safety policy 
     
26 I involve/ consult workers in preparation of 
task safety plan 
     
27 I encourage feedback from workers on safety 
issues 
     
28 I am responsible to improve safe work 
procedures through worker involvement 
     
29 I keep an open-door policy on safety issues      
30 I take responsibility to communicate workers’ 
safety concerns to management 
     
31 I take responsibility to make suggestions to      
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improve safety 
32 I take responsibility to discuss safety 
problems with the management 
     
 
V. Safety Commitment and Support 
33 I emphasize on workers to contribute to job 
safety analysis 
     
34 I ensure good preparedness for emergency 
among workers 
     
35 I allow workers to act decisively if they find 
any situation contrary to safe conditions on 
site 
     
36 I participate actively in developing / 
reviewing health and safety procedures 
     
37 I take responsibility to ensure that the 
workload is reasonably balanced among 
workers 
     
38 I  emphasize on workers to contribute to 
accident investigations 
     
39 I continuously emphasize on workers that 
safety rules should not be broken, even when 
worker believes it affects the production 
     
40 I emphasize on a no-blame approach to 
highlight unsafe work behavior  
     
41 I emphasize on workers to achieve high levels 
of safety performance 
     
42 I take responsibility to provide right 
equipment to the workers so that they can do 
the job safely 
     
43 I take responsibility to detect potential      
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hazards as part of the planning exercise 
44 I often remind workers to work safely       
45 I emphasize on workers that everyone has the 
responsibility to reflect on safety practice 
     
46 I emphasize on workers that safety is the 
number one priority while working 
     
47 I keep safety as a primary consideration when 
planning  
     
48 I take responsibility to never allow working 
with defective equipment  
     
49 I emphasize on workers to report accidents, 
incidents, and potentially hazardous situations 
     
50 I emphasize on workers to offer help to fellow 
workers when needed to perform the job 
safely 
     
51 I emphasize on workers to maintain a good 
relationship with fellow workers  
     
52 I emphasize on workers to play an active role 
in identifying site hazards 
     
53 I endeavor to maintain a positive attitude 
towards safety during meetings so that 
workers take safety on the site seriously 
     
54 I take responsibility to identify potential risks 
& consequences prior to execution 
     
55 I emphasize on workers to ensure that 
individuals are not working by themselves 
under risky or hazardous conditions 
     
56 I react strongly against workers who break 
health and safety procedures / instructions / 
rules. 
     
338 
 
VI. Maintaining a Positive Attitude 
57 I engage myself in regular safety talks 
(discuss safety problems openly with workers 
and supervisors) 
     
58 I never advocate working around safety 
procedures to meet deadlines 
     
59 I welcome reporting safety hazards/incidents      
60 I gather ideas from workers about improving 
safety when significant changes to work 
practices are suggested 
     
61 I provide the help, authority, information & 
resources workers need to behave safely 
     
62 I always inform workers of safety concerns 
and issues. 
     
63 I take responsibility to solve safety problems      
 
VII. Motivating 
64 I take responsibility for assuring job security 
of workers under my belt 
     
65 I am responsible for recommending 
recognition/ reward for good safety 
performance 
     
66 I take responsibility for helping and caring for 
workers’ personal problems 
     
67 I take responsibility for creating feeling of 
belonging among workers 
     
68 I take responsibility for promoting job 
satisfaction among workers 
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Assessing the Criticism on the Role of OSHA as a Driving Force towards 
implementing a Total Safety Culture in a Construction Organization 
 
(To be filled by Contractor Top Management incl. CEO, Operations Head, 
Construction Head, Safety Department Head, Project Management Division Head, 
etc.) 
 
Personal Information (Optional)       
Name of Respondent: ______________________________________________________ 
Present position in the company: _____________________________________________ 
Total work experience: _____________ years                
Work experience in this company: ___________ years 
Please provide contact info if you like to be contacted again regarding this questionnaire:   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Company Information       
Company Name: _________________________________________________________ 
Company Location (City & State): ___________________________________________ 
Type of Company (Contractor Trade): 
 General Contractor (GC) 
 Poured Concrete Foundation 
and Structure Contractor 
 Structural Steel and Precast 
Concrete Contractor 
 Framing Contractor 
 Masonry Contractor 
 Glass and Glazing Contractor 
 Roofing Contractor 
 Siding Contractor 
 Electrical Contractor 
 Plumbing, Mechanical & HVAC 
Contractor 
 Drywall and Insulation Contractor 
 Painting and Wall Covering 
Contractor 
 Flooring Contractor 
 Tile and Terrazzo Contractor 
 Finish Carpentry Contractor 
 Site Preparation Contractor 
 Other 
___________________________ 
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Approx. company size (no. of persons):  _________ (admin)   ________ (technical) 
Number of Years in Business: ___________   
Approx. annual turnover (in millions): ______________ 
States of operation (Check all that apply): 
 Alabama  
 Iowa  
 Alaska  
 Kansas  
 Arizona  
 Kentucky  
 Arkansas  
 Louisiana  
 California  
 Maine  
 Colorado  
 Maryland  
 Connecticut  
 Massachuse
tts  
 Delaware  
 Michigan  
 District of 
Columbia  
 Minnesota  
 Florida  
 Mississippi  
 Georgia  
 Missouri  
 Hawaii  
 Montana  
 Idaho  
 Nebraska  
 Illinois  
 Nevada  
 Indiana  
 New Hampshire  
 New Jersey  
 South Dakota  
 New Mexico  
 Tennessee  
 New York  
 Texas  
 North Carolina  
 Utah  
 North Dakota  
 Vermont  
 Ohio  
 Virginia  
 Oklahoma  
 Washington  
 Oregon  
 West Virginia  
 Pennsylvania  
 Wisconsin  
 Rhode Island  
 Wyoming  
 South Carolina 
 
 
Based on your experience and judgment, please select your level of agreement with each 
of the following negative statements about OSHA. Please indicate your level of 
agreement or disagreement with the statements with respect to your experience/ expert 
judgment by checking (√ ) only one appropriate box. (1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neutral - 
neither disagree nor agree; 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Note that “Strongly Agree” (5) means you strongly agree to the negative statement (i.e. 
OSHA is doing very bad on the aspect under question), while “Strongly Disagree” (1) 
means you strongly disagree to the negative statement (i.e. OSHA is doing very good on 
the aspect under question). 
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Score  
OSHA Performance Statement 1 
(disagr
ee) 
2 3 4 5 
(agre
e) 
I. Regulations and Standards 
1 OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver an 
overbearing and unwanted presence that has a 
negative impact on worker productivity. 
     
2 OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver an 
overbearing and unwanted presence that has a 
negative impact on worker acceptance to 
safety policies and procedures. 
     
3 OSHA takes extraneous amount of time to 
actualize new regulations/ standards. 
     
4 Existing OSHA procedures are not updated 
timely. 
     
5 OSHA health and safety procedures/ 
instructions/ rules are not generally 
practicable (implementable). 
     
6 OSHA health and safety procedures/ 
instructions/ rules generally fail to reflect how 
the job is actually done. 
     
7 OSHA’S overloaded guidelines deliver an 
overbearing and unwanted presence that 
greatly restricts an organization’s ability to 
develop as well as compete 
     
8 OSHA regulations and standards fail to 
incorporate current technology. 
     
9 OSHA regulations/ procedures can be easily 
manipulated by some companies. 
     
10 OSHA regulations/ standards/ procedures are 
generally burdensome (trying to do too much 
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without any practical advantage). 
11 OSHA regulations are generally over-strict.      
12 OSHA regulations/ standards/ procedures are 
generally confusing (not very clear to 
implement). 
     
13 Substantial amount of capital has been 
needlessly wasted by your organization for 
complying with OSHA standards. 
     
14 Substantial amount of working hours have 
been needlessly lost by your organization for 
complying with OSHA standards. 
     
15 The cost of implementing OSHA regulations 
is usually unjustified as against their benefit 
in achieving reduced worker injury. 
     
 
II. Enforcement Methods 
16 The priority of OSHA inspections is mostly 
centered towards imposing penalties, rather 
than preventing accidents and/ or identifying 
problems. 
     
17 OSHA fails to provide adequate reward 
mechanisms. 
     
18 OSHA performs inadequate number of 
inspections. 
     
19 OSHA generally seems more interested in 
issuing the fine rather than correcting the 
problem. 
     
20 OSHA’s methods are mostly directed towards 
correcting only single events, such as the one 
your company was fined for. 
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21 The penalties/ fines imposed by OSHA are 
not usually justified in proportion to the 
violation. 
     
22 OSHA inspections are unbalanced distributed 
among construction firms. 
     
23 OSHA inspections are unbalanced distributed 
among different types of construction 
expertise. 
     
24 OSHA training programs are generally 
ineffective. 
     
25 OSHA inspection procedures are generally 
ineffective. 
     
26 OSHA is an overbearing bureaucracy with 
methods bearing little or no sensitivity to the 
needs & limitations of employers who are 
struggling to survive in a competitive 
marketplace. 
     
27 OSHA’s heavy fines restrict an organization’s 
ability to develop as well as compete. 
     
28 OSHA follow-up inspections (after initial 
citations have been issued) are usually 
performed at an unreasonably slower rate. 
     
29 OSHA deals with workplace accidents usually 
at an unreasonably slow rate. 
     
 
III. Vision and Approach 
30 OSHA has generally failed to take a proactive 
approach in developing long term safety 
measures. 
     
31 OSHA standards are mostly ineffective in 
setting up a Total Safety Culture on a 
construction jobsite (OSHA is the driving 
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force to implement a total safety culture in a 
construction organization). 
32 OSHA has not been concentrating enough on 
positive safety reinforcement. 
     
33 The expenditures made for compliance with 
OSHA regulations and/ or paying for fines 
could be spent in a more strategic way that 
would create a safer work environment and a 
better understating of safety. 
     
34 OSHA does not focus on the strategic picture 
by taking into consideration the underlying 
factors leading to accident (such as 
leadership, work pressure, communication) 
but rather focuses on the apparent causes of 
accident (such as lack of PPE). 
     
35 OSHA emphasizes more on appointing 
supervisors to administer fines in the 
workplace, rather than appointing personnel 
to act as health and safety advisors. 
     
36 OSHA, as a safety organization, is not 
actively participating in necessary research 
activities to view and incorporate safety as an 
industrial development process, which would 
have improved ways construction 
organizations can incorporate safety in the 
industry. 
     
37 OSHA representatives do not usually provide 
follow up information pertaining to the 
incident such as: how the accident could be 
corrected or any appropriate training that 
could be utilized to ensure the incident is not 
repeated. 
     
38 OSHA should train their inspectors better 
regarding on how to facilitate developing a 
strategic safety culture in a construction 
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organization leading to total safety. 
39 OSHA representatives do not usually provide 
information about how to improve safety 
strategically in your organization. 
     
40 OSHA is more devoted to inspections 
(monitoring) than to safety as a strategic 
concern. 
     
41 OSHA's safety approach restricts your 
organization by compelling it to increase 
investment in following procedures rather 
than investing in long-term safety objectives. 
     
42 OSHA focuses more on the employer actions 
rather than on the employee safety, thereby 
increasing the short term expenses of the 
organization instead of the long term 
investment. 
     
43 OSHA places a heavy burden on 
organizations by forcing increased operational 
fees and the costs associated to retrofit 
outdated equipment rather than investing on 
improving the processes for achieving long-
term (strategic) safety objectives. 
     
44 OSHA’s inspection and penalty approach of 
enforcement is an inappropriate and 
ineffective way to ensure workplace safety in 
the long-term. 
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Assessing the State of Adoption and Implementation of Total Safety Management in 
Construction Industry & Assessing the Readiness of Construction Contractors 
towards Implementing Total Safety Management 
 
(To be filled by Contractor Top Management and Middle Management) 
 
All the information gathered here will be kept strictly confidential and will be used only 
for research and analysis without mentioning the person or company names. Thank you 
very much for your cooperation. 
Personal Information (Optional)       
Name of Respondent: ______________________________________________________ 
Present position in the company: _____________________________________________ 
Total work experience: _____________ years                
Work experience in this company: ___________ years 
Please provide contact info if you like to be contacted again regarding this questionnaire:   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Company Information       
Company Name: _________________________________________________________ 
Company Location (City & State): ___________________________________________ 
Type of Company (Contractor Trade): 
 General Contractor (GC) 
 Poured Concrete Foundation 
and Structure Contractor 
 Structural Steel and Precast 
Concrete Contractor 
 Framing Contractor 
 Masonry Contractor 
 Glass and Glazing Contractor 
 Roofing Contractor 
 Siding Contractor 
 Electrical Contractor 
 Plumbing, Mechanical & HVAC 
Contractor 
 Drywall and Insulation Contractor 
 Painting and Wall Covering 
Contractor 
 Flooring Contractor 
 Tile and Terrazzo Contractor 
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 Finish Carpentry Contractor 
 Site Preparation Contractor 
 Other 
___________________________ 
 
Approx. company size (no. of persons):  _________ (admin)   ________ (technical) 
Number of Years in Business: ___________   
Approx. annual turnover (in millions): ______________ 
States of operation (Check all that apply): 
 Alabama  
 Iowa  
 Alaska  
 Kansas  
 Arizona  
 Kentucky  
 Arkansas  
 Louisiana  
 California  
 Maine  
 Colorado  
 Maryland  
 Connecticut  
 Massachuse
tts  
 Delaware  
 Michigan  
 District of 
Columbia  
 Minnesota  
 Florida  
 Mississippi  
 Georgia  
 Missouri  
 Hawaii  
 Montana  
 Idaho  
 Nebraska  
 Illinois  
 Nevada  
 Indiana  
 New Hampshire  
 New Jersey  
 South Dakota  
 New Mexico  
 Tennessee  
 New York  
 Texas  
 North Carolina  
 Utah  
 North Dakota  
 Vermont  
 Ohio  
 Virginia  
 Oklahoma  
 Washington  
 Oregon  
 West Virginia  
 Pennsylvania  
 Wisconsin  
 Rhode Island  
 Wyoming  
 South Carolina 
   
Below, you will be presented with a series of statements about the state of adoption and 
implementation of total safety management in your company and the readiness of your 
company towards embracing total safety management. Please indicate your level of 
agreement or disagreement with the statements with respect to your experience with the 
company by checking (√ ) only one appropriate box. (1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neutral - 
neither disagree nor agree; 5 = strongly agree). 
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Score  
TSM Statement 1 
(disagree) 
2 3 4 5 
(agree) 
I. Knowledge of TSM 
1 TSM can be achieved by measuring and 
keeping records of the number of accidents 
and incidents and applying punitive measures 
to workers that are caught violating safety 
rules.  
     
2 I am aware of construction industry programs 
implementing TSM.  
     
3 TSM programs should be based on scientific 
decision making. 
     
4 TSM can be achieved by making and 
maintaining a safe and healthy workplace as 
part of the company’s strategic plan. 
     
5 TSM can be achieved by ensuring safe 
working through positive reinforcement and 
advice and improving by adopting good 
practice that exceeds legislative requirements. 
     
6 TSM programs should be strategically 
focused.  
     
7 TSM can be achieved by motivating staff 
through a measurement and reward scheme 
and providing the skills and information to 
enable staff to work safely via training and its 
intranet. 
     
8 TSM programs should focus on peak 
performance.  
     
9 TSM programs should have unity of purpose.       
10 TSM programs should be committed to      
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employee empowerment. 
11 TSM programs should be committed to 
continual improvement. 
     
12 TSM programs should be performance and 
process oriented. 
     
13 TSM programs are largely dependent on 
executive-level commitment. 
     
14 TSM programs should contain 
comprehensive, ongoing training.  
     
15 TSM programs should be teamwork oriented.      
 
II. Strategic Vision of Safety 
16 My company views safety as a tool to 
increase profits. 
     
17 My company views safety as a competitive 
advantage. 
     
18 My company’s safety policy can be best 
defined as “Implementation of a set of safety 
rules by the Company with punitive measure 
for violators.” 
     
19 My company’s safety policy can be best 
defined as “a set of processes developed to 
manage safety aspects of a project including 
encouraging, measuring and rewarding 
behavior that creates a safe working 
environment rather than catching people who 
break the rules.” 
     
20 My company’s safety policy can be best 
defined as “a performance-and-process-
control oriented approach to safety and health 
management that gives organization 
sustainable competitive advantage in the 
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marketplace by establishing a safe and 
healthy work environment that is conducive 
to consistent peak performance and that is 
improved continually.” 
21 Poor safety performance decreases 
productivity and organizational performance.  
     
22 The company management strongly believes 
that excellence in safety would positively 
affect the ability to achieve excellence in 
other areas; e.g. production, etc. 
     
23 My company views safety and health as an 
integral part of its business. 
     
24 My company believes that poor safety 
performance restricts strategic organizational 
growth.  
     
25 OSHA regulations provide a driving force to 
implementing TSM.  
     
26 My company views safety as achieving zero 
accidents. 
     
27 My company views safety as elimination of 
hazards. 
     
28 A TSM program is (will be) beneficial for my 
organization.  
     
 
III. Strategic Approach to Safety Improvement 
29 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement program 
include: “A dollar value has been assigned to 
the cost of unsafe behaviors”. 
     
30 “Obtaining client satisfaction” is a major 
objective of my organization’s safety 
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improvement program. 
31 Training currently emphasizes: data gathering 
& analysis. 
     
32 “Pressure from competitors” was a key factor 
that provided the motivation to start the safety 
improvement program. 
     
33 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement program 
include: “Benchmarks for improvement have 
been defined”. 
     
34 “Environmental issues/considerations” was a 
key factor that provided the motivation to 
start the safety improvement program. 
     
35 “Increasing productivity” is a major objective 
of my organization’s safety improvement 
program. 
     
36 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement program 
include: “Organizing a multi-disciplinary 
team”. 
     
37 Company’s safety training is oriented towards 
TSM (or continuous safety improvement). 
     
38 The company’s safety improvement program 
is centered on Total Safety Management and/ 
or zero accident strategies. 
     
39 “Safety of processes” was a key factor that 
provided the motivation to start the safety 
improvement program. 
     
40 Training currently emphasizes: process 
improvement. 
     
41 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement program 
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include: “Data has been collected to measure 
the safety performance”. 
42 “Demanding customers” was a key factor that 
provided the motivation to start the safety 
improvement program. 
     
43 “Need to reduce costs and improve 
performance” was a key factor that provided 
the motivation to start the safety improvement 
program. 
     
44 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement program 
include: “An educational program has been 
implemented”. 
     
45 “My company’s chief executive” was a key 
factor that provided the motivation to start the 
safety improvement program. 
     
46 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement program 
include: “Safety problems have been 
identified”. 
     
47 Training currently emphasizes: teamwork.      
48 Training currently emphasizes: 
communication. 
     
49 “Achieving zero accidents” was a key factor 
that provided the motivation to start the safety 
improvement program. 
     
50 “Ensuring involvement of employees in the 
safety building effort” is a major objective of 
my organization’s safety improvement 
program. 
     
51 Steps taken in implementing my 
organization’s safety improvement program 
include: “An internal awareness program is 
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underway”. 
52 Training currently emphasizes: zero accident 
strategies.  
     
53 Formal training in TSM or other safety 
improvement philosophies is given to 
employees. 
     
54 After the implementation of my safety 
improvement program, the relationship with 
my customers and suppliers has improved. 
     
55 My organization’s safety improvement 
program can be described as formal with 
widespread employee awareness. 
     
56 As part of the management team, we have a 
TSM Steering Committee/ a TSM Facilitator/ 
a safety improvement project team. 
     
57 The company provides feedback loops to 
determine if the safety improvement practices 
are working. 
     
58 After the implementation of my safety 
improvement program, worker behaviors have 
improved. 
     
59 “Employee safety” was a key factor that 
provided the motivation to start the safety 
improvement program. 
     
60 “Health and Safety agencies (like OSHA)” 
was a key factor that provided the motivation 
to start the safety improvement program. 
     
 
IV. Employee Involvement and Empowerment 
61 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous 
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safety improvement) include: serving 
effectively on improvement teams”. 
62 There is an anonymous way for employees to 
make safety improvement suggestions. e.g. 
drop box.   
     
63 The company has a mentoring program for all 
new employees to develop safe working 
habits. 
     
64 The company has incentive programs to 
reward workers, supervisors, superintendents, 
or specific teams for outstanding safety 
performance and/or for generating ideas to 
reduce the number of accidents. 
     
65 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous 
safety improvement) include: “practicing 
hazard identification techniques constantly”. 
     
66 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for setting 
safety goals. 
     
67 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for selecting 
safe projects.  
     
68 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous 
safety improvement) include: “encouraging 
fellow employees to work safely”. 
     
69 The extent to which the employees provide 
input that is useful in making continual safety 
improvements to the organization is very 
significant. 
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70 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for measuring 
safety improvement. 
     
71 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for identifying 
solutions. 
     
72 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous 
safety improvement) include: “setting positive 
examples of working safely”. 
     
73 Methods adopted in the company to 
encourage employees to fulfill their 
responsibilities towards TSM (or continuous 
safety improvement) include: “recommending 
accident prevention strategies”. 
     
74 Employee feedback is almost always included 
in the safety decision making process. 
     
75 Employees are empowered to make 
significant safety improvement suggestions 
and changes to operations. 
     
76 The level of feedback collected from 
employees is very significant for identifying 
safety issues. 
     
77 The importance of employee input in my 
company’s safety improvement program is 
very high. 
     
 
V. Readiness to Embrace TSM 
78 All team members understand how unsafe 
team members will be guided for 
improvement. 
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79 Decisions are supported by all in my 
organization.  
     
80 All team members understand how team 
decisions are made. 
     
81 “Company executives/ managing directors” 
are involved in safety management efforts/ 
activities. 
     
82 “Appropriate storage practices” are my 
company’s strength in terms of safety. 
     
83 Company looks at the past safety performance 
(safety portfolio) of a prospective employee 
as an important criterion for selection. 
     
84 “Consistent commitment to improvement” 
promotes safety conscience in my company. 
     
85 The organization has a mission statement with 
specific responsibilities for approval of 
recommendations for improvement of the 
work environment. 
     
86 My company provides (or strives to provide): 
safety information. 
     
87 In my company, we would never compromise 
safety to meet deadlines. 
     
88 “Employee participation” promotes safety 
conscience in my company. 
     
89 The organization has a mission statement with 
specific responsibilities for building safety 
and health concerns into the strategic plan. 
     
90 The responsibility of the accidents and their 
effects belongs to the whole organization. 
     
91 “Management leadership” promotes safety 
conscience in my company. 
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92 Team’s success is understood by all team 
members in my organization. 
     
93 Team’s goal is understood by all team 
members in my organization. 
     
94 “An active TSM steering committee/ safety 
improvement team” is my company’s strength 
in terms of safety. 
     
95 All team members understand their authority 
within the team and that of all other team 
members. 
     
96 All team members know the responsibilities 
of all other team members. 
     
97 “A capable and committed safety director” is 
my company’s strength in terms of safety. 
     
98 When unforeseen inhibitors impede progress 
all members know what to do. 
     
99 The whole organization is responsible to 
follow and get involved in the safety & health 
mission accomplishment. 
     
100 My company provides (or strives to provide): 
management encouragement towards safety. 
     
101 Company uses the method of positive 
reinforcement for good safety practices. 
     
102 Safety practices are recognized and rewarded.      
103 The whole organization is responsible to 
assess the safety precautions and rules. 
     
104 Company follows independent (cold eye) 
safety reviews and ratings.  
     
105 My company provides (or strives to provide): 
safe working environment. 
     
360 
106 “Company administration and support” are 
involved in safety management efforts/ 
activities. 
     
107 “Self accountability” promotes safety 
conscience in my company. 
     
108 My company provides (or strives to provide): 
clearly defined mission statement. 
     
109 “Commitment by senior management” is my 
company’s strength in terms of safety. 
     
110 “Individual employees” are involved in safety 
management efforts/ activities. 
     
111 Peer pressure exists among workers to work 
in a safe and healthy manner. 
     
112 Everyone is open and honest with each other 
in my organization. 
     
113 Safety mission is understood by all team 
members in my organization. 
     
114 Company looks at past safety performance of 
the subcontractors/ suppliers as an important 
criterion for selection. 
     
115 The organization has a mission statement with 
specific responsibilities for regular review of 
the safety and health program in order to keep 
up with the safety best practices. 
     
116 “A comprehensive safety and health plan” is 
my company’s strength in terms of safety. 
     
117 My company provides (or strives to provide): 
safety manager or safety committee. 
     
118 “Safe facilities” are my company’s strength in 
terms of safety. 
     
361 
119 “Up-to-date safety procedures” is my 
company’s strength in terms of safety. 
     
120 My company provides (or strives to provide): 
formal, written statement of corporate safety 
policies and objectives. 
     
121 “Safe equipment” is my company’s strength 
in terms of safety. 
     
122 “Project managers” are involved in safety 
management efforts/ activities. 
     
123 “Site managers” are involved in safety 
management efforts/ activities. 
     
124 My company provides (or strives to provide): 
personal protective equipment. 
     
Score  
TSM Benefits 1 
(disagree) 
2 3 4 5 
(agree) 
125 TSM improves performance.      
126 TSM increases employee morale.      
127 TSM increases profits.       
128 TSM provides the opportunity to avoid costly 
redesign or project delay by addressing 
hazard issues as early as possible. 
     
129 TSM provides traceable and effective hazard 
management system. 
     
130 TSM provides a check-and-balance 
mechanism at different stages of a project 
lifecycle.  
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Score  
 
TSM Obstacles 
 
1 
(disagree) 
2 3 4 5 
(agree) 
131 “Changing attitudes and behaviors” is an 
obstacle in TSM implementation. 
     
132 “Emphasis on short-term objects” is an 
obstacle in TSM implementation. 
     
133 “Lack of top-management commitment/ 
understanding” is an obstacle in TSM 
implementation. 
     
134 “Lack of education and training to drive the 
improvement process” is an obstacle in TSM 
implementation. 
     
135 “Schedule and cost treated as the main 
priorities” is an obstacle in TSM 
implementation. 
     
136 “Current bidding climate” is an obstacle in 
TSM implementation. 
     
137 “Lack of employee commitment/ 
understanding” is an obstacle in TSM 
implementation. 
     
138 “Lack of expertise/resources in TSM” is an 
obstacle in TSM implementation. 
     
139 “Tendency to cure symptom rather than eradicate 
the root cause” is an obstacle in TSM 
implementation. 
     
 
 
 
363 
REFERENCES 
Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI). (1993). Third 
report: Organizing for safety, Study Group on Human Factors, Health and Safety 
Executives, UK. 
 
Agrilla, J. A. (1999). ‘‘Construction safety management formula for success.’’ Proc., 2nd 
Int. Conf. of Int. Council for Research and Innovation in Building and Construction 
(CIB) Working Commission W99, Honolulu, 33–36. 
 
Ahmed, S. M., and Azhar, S. (2004). “Risk Management in the Florida Construction 
Industry”. Proceedings of the 2nd Latin American and Caribbean Conference for 
Engineering and Technology, Miami, Florida, June 2-4. 
 
Ahmed, S. M., Tang, S. L., and Poon, T. K. (1999). ‘‘Problems of implementing safety 
programmes on construction sites and some possible solutions.’’ Proc., 2nd Int. Conf. 
of Int. Council for Research and Innovation in Building and Construction (CIB) 
Working Commission W99, 525–529. 
 
Ahmed, S.M., Kwan, J.C., Weiming, F.Y., and Pui Ho, D.C. (2000). Site safety 
management in Hong Kong. Journal of Management in Engineering, 16(6), 34-42. 
 
Akintoye, A.S., and Macleod, M.J. (1997). “Risk Analysis and Management in the 
Construction.” International Journal of Project Management, 15(1), 31-38. 
 
Anderson, J. C., and Gerbing, D. W. (1988). ‘‘Structural equation modeling in practice: 
A review and recommended two-step approach.’’ Psychol. Bull., 103, 411–423. 
 
Anumba, C. J., and Bishop, G. (1997). ‘‘Safety-integrated site layout and organisation.’’ 
Proc., Annual Conf. of Canadian Society for Civil Engineers, Vol. III, Montreal, 147–
156. 
 
Baker, S. W. (1998). “Risk Management in Major Projects”. Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, UK. 
 
Ballard, G., and Howell G. (1998). “Shielding Production: Essential Step in Production 
Control.” J. of Constr. Engrg. and Mgt., ASCE, 124 (1). 
 
Baxendale, T., and Jones, O. (2000). ‘‘Construction design and construction management 
safety regulations in practice – Progress and implementation.’’ Int. J. Proj. Manage., 
18(1), 33–40. 
 
BLS (2010). U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor (2010). 
www.bls.gov   
364 
Brown, K. A., Willis, P. G., and Prussia, G. E. (2000). “Predicting safe employee 
behaviour in the steel industry: Development and test of a sociotechnical model.” J. 
Operations Manage., 18, 445–465. 
 
Choudhry, R. M., and Fang, D. P. (2005). “The nature of safety culture: A survey of the 
state-of-the-art and improving a positive safety culture.” Proc., 1st Int. Conf. on 
Construction Engineering and Management for Korea Institute of Construction 
Engineering and Management (KICEM), Seoul, Korea, 480–485. 
 
Choudhry, R. M.; Fang, D.P., and Mohamed, S. (2007). Developing a Model of 
Construction Safety Culture. Journal of Management in Engineering. 23(4): p. 207-
212. 
 
CII (1993). “Zero Injury Techniques.” CII Special Publication 32-1, Construction 
Industry Institute, Austin, Tex. 
 
Coble, R. J., and Hinze, J. (2000). “Analysis of the magnitude of underpayment of 1997 
construction industry workers’ compensation premiums in the state of Florida.” 
Internal Research Rep., Gainesville, Fla. 
 
Coble, R.J., Hinze, J.W., McDermott, M.J., and Elliott, B.R., (1998), “Colleges’ 
Emphasis on Construction Safety”, in proceedings of the Second International 
Conference of CIB W99, Implementation of Safety and Health on Construction Sites, 
(Eds., Singh, Hinze and Coble), Balkema, Rotterdam, pp. 257-263.  
 
Cohen, J. M. (2002). “Measuring safety performance in construction.” Occup. Hazards, 
64(6), 41–44. 
 
Cooper MD. (2000). Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Sci 36:111-136.  
 
Cox, S. J., and Cheyne, A. J. T. (2000). ‘‘Assessing safety culture in offshore 
environments.’’ Safety Sci., 34, 111–129. 
 
Cox, S. J., and Cox, T. R. (1991). ‘‘The structure of employee attitude to safety: A 
European example.’’ Work and Stress, 5, 93–106. 
 
Dekker, Sidney. (2005). Ten Questions About Human Error. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, New Jersey, NJ. 
 
Diekmann, J. E., and Girard, M. J. (1995). ‘‘Are contract disputes predictable?’’ J. 
Constr. Engrg. and Mgmt., ASCE, 121(4), 355–363. 
 
Everett J. G., and Frank, P. B. (1996). “Costs of accidents and injuries to the construction 
industry.” J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 122(2), 158–164. 
 
365 
Flach, J. M., Vicente, K. J., Tanabe, F., Monta, K., and Rasmussen, J. (1998). An 
Ecological Approach to Interface Design,” Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting 
of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Santa Monica, CA. 
 
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O’Connor, P., and Bryden, R. (2000). ‘‘Measuring safety climate: 
Identifying the common features.’’ Safety Sci., 34, 177–192. 
 
Fornell, C. R., and Larcker, D. F. (1981). ‘‘Evaluating structural equation models with 
unobservable variables and measurement error.’’ J. Mar. Res., 18, 39–50. 
 
Fowler, F.J., (1993). Survey Research Methods – Second Edition. Newbury Park, 
California: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
 
Fuller, R. (2005). “Towards a general theory of driver behavior.” Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 37, pp 461-472. 191 
 
Geller, S. (1994). “Ten principles for achieving a total safety culture.” Prof. Saf., 39(9), 
18–24. 
 
Geller, S. (1997). The psychology of safety: How to improve behaviors and attitudes on 
the job, CRC, Boca Raton, Fla. 
 
Gibb, A. G. F., and Knobbs, T. (1995). ‘‘Computer-aided site layout and facilities.’’ 
Proc., 11th Annual Conf. Association of Researchers in Construction Management  
(ARCOM), York, U.K., 541–550. 
 
Glazner, J. E., Borgerding, J., Bondy, J., Lowery, J., Lezotte, D., and Kreiss, K. (1999).  
“Contractor safety practices and injury rates in construction of the Denver international 
airport.’’ Am. J. Ind. Med., 35, 175–185. 
 
Glendon, A. I., and Mckenna, E. F. (1995). Human safety and risk management, 
Chapman and Hall, London. 
 
Glendon, A. I., Stanton, N. A., and Harrison, D. (1994). ‘‘Factor analyzing a performance 
shaping concept questionnaire.’’ Contemporary ergonomics, S. A. Robertson, ed., 
Taylor and Francis, London, 340–345. 
 
Gliner, J. A. & Morgan, G. A. (2000). Research methods in applied settings: An 
integrated approach to design and analysis. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.  
 
Goldberg, A. I., Dar-El, E. M., and Rubin, A. E. (1991). ‘‘Threat perception and the 
readiness to participate in safety programs.’’ J. Organisational Behaviour, 12, 109–
122. 
 
366 
Graves, D. (1986). Corporate culture—Diagnosis and change, St. Martin’s Press, New 
York. 
 
Groover, D. R., and Krause, T. R. (1993). “Behavior-based approach helps Boise’s 
Deridder Mill foster safe environment.” Pulp and Paper, 67(9), 139–141. 
 
Grote, G., and Kunzler, C. (2000). “Diagnosis of safety culture in safety management 
audits.” Safety Sci., 34(1–3), 131–150. 
 
Grubb, P. L., and Swanson, N. G. (1999). ‘‘Identification of work organization risk 
factors in construction.’’ Proc., 2nd Int. Conf. of Int. Council for Research and 
Innovation in Building and Construction (CIB) Working Commission W99, 
Honolulu, 793–797. 
 
Guldenmund, F. W. (2000). “The nature of safety culture: A review of theory and 
research.” Safety Sci., 34(1–3), 215–257. 
 
Hai, D. M. (1986). Organizational behavior: Experiences and cases, West Pub. Co., St. 
Paul, Minn. 
 
Hale, A. R. (2000). “Editorial: Culture’s confusions.” Safety Sci., 34(1–3), 1–14. 
 
Hallowell, M.R. and Gambatese, J.A. (2009). “Construction Safety Risk Mitigation.” J. 
Constr. Eng. Manage., 135(12), 1316–1323.  
 
Hamilton, L. (1992). Regression with graphics, Druxbury Press, Belmont, Calif. 
 
Hampden-Turner, C. (1990). Creating corporate culture, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 
Mass. 
 
Heinrich, H.W., Peterson, D & Ross, N. (1980) Industrial Accident Prevention: A Safety 
Management Approach. Mc- Graw Hill Book Co., New York. 
 
Hinze, J. (1997). Construction safety, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J. 
 
Hinze, J. (2005). “A paradigm shift: Leading to safety.” Proc., 4th Triennial Int. Conf. of 
the Int. Council for Research and Innovation in Building and Construction (CIB) 
Working Commission W99, Port Elizabeth, South Africa, 01–11. 
 
Hinze, J., and Appelgate, L. (1991). “Costs of construction injuries.” J. Constr. Eng. 
Manage., 117(3), 537–550. 
 
Hodson, S., and Graham, T., Jr. (1998). “Weyerhaeuser construction team slashes project 
injuries.” Occup. Hazards, 60(7), 77–79. 
 
367 
Hood, S. (1994). ‘‘Developing operating procedures: 9 steps to success.’’ Accident 
Prevention, (May–June). 
 
Hoyle, R. (1995). Structural equation modeling : concepts, issues and applications. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
 
HSE (2005). A review of safety culture and safety climate literature for the development 
of the safety culture inspection toolkit. Research Report 367 prepared by Human 
Engineering for the Health and Safety Executive, United Kingdom.  
 
Hulland, J. (1999). ‘‘Use of partial least squares (PLS) in strategic management research: 
A review of four recent studies.’’ Strategic Manage. J., 20, 195–204. 
 
Hulland, J. (1999). ‘‘Use of partial least squares (PLS) in strategic management research: 
A review of four recent studies.’’ Strategic Manage. J., 20, 195–204. 
 
Jaselskis, E. J., Anderson, S. D., and Russell, J. S. (1996). “Strategies for achieving 
excellence in construction safety performance.” J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 122(1), 61–
70. 
 
Kilne, R. B. (1998). Principles and practices of structural equation modeling, Guildford 
Publications, New York. 
 
Knoke, D., & Bohrnstedt, G.W. (1994). Statistics for Social Data Analysis, Itasca, 
Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc. 
 
Kotter, J. P., and Heskett, J. L. (1992). Corporate culture and performance, Free Press, 
New York. 
 
Krause, T. R. (1997). The behaviour-based safety process managing involvement for an 
injury-free culture, 2nd Ed., Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York. 
 
Krause, T. R., Hidley, J. H. and Lareau, W. (1984). Behavioral science applied to 
accident prevention. Professional Safety, 29, 21-27. 
 
Laitinen, H., Marjamaki, M., and Paivarinta, K. (1999). ‘‘The validity of the TR safety 
observation method on building construction.’’ Accid. Anal. Prev., 31(5), 463–472. 
 
Langford, D., Rowlinson, S., and Sawacha, E. (2000). ‘‘Safety behaviour and safety 
management: Its influence on the attitudes of workers in the UK construction 
industry.’’ Eng., Constr., Archit. Manage., 7(2), 133–140. 
 
Laukkanen, T. (1999). ‘‘Construction work and education: Occupational health and 
safety reviewed.’’ Constr. Manage. Econom., 17(1), 53–62. 
368 
Lee, T., and Harrison, K. (2000). “Assessing safety culture in nuclear power stations.” 
Safety Sci., 34(1–3), 61–97. 
 
Lingard, H. & Rowlinson, S. (1998) Behaviour-based safety management in Hong 
Kong’s construction industry: the results of a field study. Journal of Construction 
Management and Economics, 16, 481–488. 
 
Litwin, M. S. (1995). How to measure survey reliability and validity, Sage, Thousand 
Oaks, Calif. 
 
Lo, T. Y. (1996). “Safety: An element of quality management.” Implementation of safety 
and health on construction sites, Balkema, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 195–201. 
 
Mahalingam, A., and Levitt, R. E. (2007). “Safety issues on global projects.” J. Constr. 
Eng. Manage., 133(7), 506–516. 
 
Maloney, W. F., and Federle, M. O. (1990). “Organizational culture in engineering and 
construction organizations.” Source Document No. 52, Construction Industry 
Institute, Austin, Tex. 
 
Miller, J. (1970). Professional decision making, Praeger, New York. 
 
Mitropoulos, P., Cupido, G., and Namboodiri, M. (2009). “Cognitive Approach to 
Construction Safety: Task Demand-Capability Model.” J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 
135(9), 881–889. 
 
Mohamed, S. (2000). ‘‘Empirical investigation of construction safety management 
activities and performance in Australia.’’ Safety Sci., 33(3), 129–142. 
 
Mohamed, S. (2002). “Safety climate in construction site environments.” J. Constr. Eng. 
Manage., 128(5), 375–384. 
 
Mohamed, S. (2003). “Scorecard approach to benchmarking organizational safety culture 
in construction.” J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 129(1), 80–88. 
 
Mohamed, S., and Bostock, G. J. (1999). ‘‘An empirical analysis of construction safety 
management practices in Queensland.’’ Proc., 2nd Int. Conf. on Construction Process 
Re-engineering, Univ. of South Wales, Sydney, Australia, 317–327. 
 
Molenaar K.R., Park J., and Washington S. (2009). “Framework for Measuring Corporate 
Safety Culture and Its Impact on Construction Safety Performance.” J. Constr. Engrg. 
and Mgmt., ASCE, 135(6), 488–497. 
 
Molenaar, K. R., and Songer, A. D. (1998). ‘‘Model for public sector design-build project 
selection.’’ J. Constr. Engrg. and Mgmt., ASCE, 124(6), 467–479. 
369 
Myers, R. H. (1990). Classical and modern regression with applications, 2nd Ed., 
Duxbury Press, Belmont, Calif. 
 
Neal, A., Griffin, M. A., and Hart, P. M. (2000). “The impact of organizational climate 
on safety climate and individual behavior.” Safety Sci., 34(1–3), 99–109. 
 
Niskanen, T. (1994). ‘‘Safety climate in the road administration.’’ Safety Sci., 7, 237–
255. 
 
NORA (2008). National Occupation Research Agenda. 2008. 
 
O’Toole, M. (2002). “The relationship between employees’ perceptions of safety and 
organizational culture.” J. Safety Res., 33, 231–243. 
 
Oppenheim, A. N. (2001). Questionnaire design, interviewing and attitude measurement, 
Continuum, New York. 
 
OSHA – Occupational Safety and Health Administration. (2008). OSHA Regulations 
(Standards – 29 CFR). 
 
Panthi, K.; Ahmed, S.M.; and Azhar, S. (2007). “Risk Matrix as a Guide to Develop Risk 
Response Strategies”. Proceedings of 43rd ASC National Annual Conference, April 
12-14, Flagstaff, Arizona. 
 
Pedhazur, E. J., and Schmelkin, L. P. (1991). Measurement, design and analysis: An 
integrated approach, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J. 
 
Preston, R., and Topf, M., (1994). “Safety discipline: A constructive approach.” Occup. 
Hazards, 54(3), 51–54. 
 
Rasmussen J., Pejtersen A.M., and Goodstein L.P. (1994). Cognitive System 
Engineering. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. NewYork, NY. 
 
Rasmussen, J. (1997). “Risk management in a dynamic society: A modeling problem.” 
Safety Sci., 27(2–3), 183–213. 
 
Rasmussen, J., Pedersen, O. M., Mancini, G., Carnino, A., Griffon, M., and Gagnolet, P. 
(1981). “Classification system for reporting events involving human malfunctions.” 
Technical Rep. No. Riso-M-2240, Riso National Laboratory, Roskilde, Denmark. 
 
Reason, J. T. (1990). Human error, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
 
Rigby, L. (1970). “The nature of human error.” Proc., Annual Technical Conf. 
Transactions of the American Society for Quality Control, Pittsburgh, Pa., 475–566. 
 
370 
Rowlinson, S. (1997) Hong Kong Construction-Site Safety Management, pp. 330. Sweet 
& Maxwell, London. 
 
Russell, J. S., and Jaselskis, E. J. (1992). ‘‘Predicting construction contract failure prior 
to contract award.’’ J. Constr. Engrg. and Mgmt., ASCE, 118(4), 791–811. 
 
Salancik, G. R., and Pfeffer, J. (1978). ‘‘A social information processing approach to job 
attitudes and task design.’’ Adm. Sci. Q., 23, 224–253. 
 
Sanders, S. R., and Thomas, H. R. (1993). ‘‘Masonry productivity forecasting model.’’ J. 
Constr. Engrg. and Mgmt., ASCE, 119(1), 163–179. 
 
Sawacha, E., Naoum, S., and Fong, D. (1999), “Factors affecting safety performance on 
construction sites.” Int. J. Proj. Manage., 17(5), 309–315. 
 
Simon, J. M., and Piquard, P. (1991). ‘‘Construction safety performance significantly 
improves.’’ Proc., 1st Int. Health, Safety and Environment Conf., 465–472. 
 
Simons, R. (1995). Control in an age of empowerment. Harvard Bus. Rev., 73(2), 80–88. 
 
Smallwood, J. J. (1996). “The influence of management on occupational health and 
safety.” Implementation of safety and health on construction sites, Balkema, 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 215–225. 
 
Smith, G. R., and Arnold, T. M. (1991). ‘‘Safety performance for masonry construction.’’ 
Proc., 1st Int. Conf of Int. Council for Research and Innovation in Building and 
Construction (CIB) Working Commission W99, 103–114. 
 
SPSS. (2001). “SPSS 10.0 users manual.” (http://www.spss.com). 
 
Staley, B. G. (1996). ‘‘Investigating accidents and incidents effectively.’’ Mining 
Technology, 78(865), 67–70.  
 
Thompson, R. C., Hilton, T. F., and Witt, L. A. (1998). ‘‘Where the safety rubber meets 
the shop floor: A confirmatory model of management influence on workplace 
safety.’’ J. Safety Res., 29(1), 15–24. 
 
Tomas, J. M., and Oliver, A. (1995). ‘‘The perceived effect of safety climate on 
occupational accidents.’’ Proc., Work and Well-being: An Agenda for Europe Conf., 
Univ. of Nottingham, U.K. 
 
Wang, S.Q., Dulaimi, M.F., and Aguria, M.Y. (2004). “Risk Management Framework for 
Construction Projects in Developing Countries.” Construction Management & 
Economics, Volume 22, pp. 237-252. 
371 
Weick, K., Sutcliffe, K., and Obstfeld, D. (1999). ‘‘Organizing for reliability: Processes 
of collective mindfulness.’’ Res. Organ. Behav., 21, 81–123. 
 
Wikipedia (2011). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Wilber 
 
Wilde, G. J. S. (1985). “Assumptions Necessary and Unnecessary to Risk Homeostasis.” 
Ergonomics, 28 (11), pp 1531-15-38. 
 
Williamson, A. M., Feyer, A., Cairns, D., and Biancotti, D. (1997). ‘‘The development of 
a measure of safety climate: The role of safety perceptions and attitudes.” Safety Sci., 
25(1–3), 15–27. 
 
Zohar, D. (1980). “Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied 
implications.” J. Appl. Psychol., 65(1), 96–102. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
372 
VITA 
 
RIZWAN UL-HAQUE FAROOQUI 
 
Education    
• Ph.D. student (2006-2011) in Civil Engineering majoring in Construction 
Engineering & Management, Florida International University, Miami, Florida, 
USA.  Dissertation Topic: Achieving Zero Accidents – A Strategic Framework 
for Continuous Safety Improvement in the Construction Industry.     
• MS (2001) in Civil Engineering majoring in Structural and Construction 
Engineering, National University of Singapore, Singapore. 
• BE (1998) in Civil Engineering, NED University of Engineering and Technology, 
Karachi, Pakistan. 
 
Appointments 
• Aug 2006 – Apr 2011, Ph.D. Student, Research and Teaching Assistant, Adjunct 
Faculty, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA 
• Mar 2004 – July 2006, Project Management Consultant (part-time), TEAMS, 
Karachi, Pakistan 
• Jan 2002 – Present, Assistant Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, NED 
University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan 
• Jan 2000 – Mar 2001, MS Student, National University of Singapore, Singapore 
• Jan 1999 – Dec 1999, Design Engineer, AA Associates, Karachi, Pakistan 
 
Statistics of Research Grants, Publications and Scholarly Activities 
 
Funded Research (Completed) 1 (USD 403,000) 
Refereed Journal Papers 10 
Refereed Proceedings Papers 71 
Edited Proceedings 2 
Books (co-authored) 1 
Book Chapters, Excerpts and Articles 3 
Technical Reports 1 
Member review panel on peer reviewed journals 2 
Member review panel on peer reviewed conferences 6 
Member organizing committee on peer reviewed conferences  2 
 
Summary of Awards and Scholarships 
 
Competitive study grant USD 100,000 
Ph.D. Fellowship USD 25,000 
Scholarships USD 5,750 
Best scholarly paper awards (conferences) 6 nos. 
Best scholarly paper awards (scholarly forums) 4 nos. 
 
373 
Statistics of Teaching, Training and Research Supervision Activities 
 
Graduate Courses (face-to-face) 14 
Graduate Courses (online) 7 
Undergraduate Courses  7 
Total Teaching hours (undergraduate & graduate) 5052 
Corporate training hours >400 
Supervision of master’s thesis 3 
Supervision of master’s level independent studies 12 
Supervision of undergraduate projects 16 
 
• Developed the master’s program in engineering management with specializations 
in construction management and industrial management at NED University of 
Engineering & Technology, Karachi, Pakistan. 
• Developed a proposal for the master’s program in construction management at 
University of Engineering & Technology, Texila, Pakistan. 
• Developed 28 graduate courses and 3 undergraduate courses 
• Expanded, revised and updated almost all the undergraduate and graduate courses 
taught during the past nine years 
 
Summary of Professional, Honorary and Community Memberships 
 
Member professional organizations 6 nos. 
Member honor associations 6 nos. 
Member community service organizations 3 nos. 
 
Selected Consultancy 
• Project management for construction of STIEFEL laboratories production plant in 
Lahore, Pakistan, 2007-2008  
• Construction process re-engineering (CPR) for SUR construction (PLC.) Ethiopia, 
2004-2006  
• Production planning and resource optimization for Dollar industries, Pakistan, 
2004  
• Implementation of a project management information system (PMIS) for Alstom 
Pakistan, 2003  
• Portfolio management at project management office for Techno Consult 
International, Pakistan, 2003  
• Project management of 2nd 100 MGD K-III project for Techno Consult 
International, Pakistan, 2003  
• Project management of RBOD extension from Sehwan to sea for Mott Mcdonalds 
Pakistan (MMP), 2003  
 
